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SPECULATION AND REALITY:
THE ROLE OF FACTS IN JUDICIAL
PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
RACHAEL N. PINEt
Therefore in the main there shall be adherence to precedent.
There shall be symmetrical development, consistently with
history or custom . . . [,] logic or philosophy .... But
symmetrical development may be bought at too high a price.
Uniformity ceases to be a good when it becomes uniformity of
oppression. The social interest served by symmetry or cer-
tainty must then be balanced against the social interest
served by equity and fairness or other elements of social wel-
fare. These may enjoin upon the judge the duty of drawing
the line at another angle, of staking the path along new
courses, of marking a new point of departure from which
others who come after him will set out upon their journey.
If you ask how he is to know when one interest out-
weighs another, I can only answer that he must get his
knowledge just as the legislator gets it, from experience and
f Copyright © Rachael N. Pine 1987. All rights reserved. Staff Counsel, Repro-
ductive Freedom Project, American Civil Liberties Union (New York, NY); B.A. 1978,
Wesleyan University; J.D. 1983, New York University School of Law.
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At times it seems that the law's ignorance of its actual impact is
one of the most severe threats to basic civil liberties. When justice is
* B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 112-13 (1921).
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blind to the fruits of scientific and social scientific research, and to the
demonstrable effects of a statute in operation, rules of law are divorced
from the empirical world. Courts are thus rendered impotent in the
exercise of their duty to safeguard fundamental constitutional guaran-
tees for rights may be violated in innumerable ways not apparent by
speculation. Litigants seeking to expand or preserve constitutional
rights have thus sought to introduce'scientific and empirical evidence of
the facts pertinent to constitutional analysis. In this way, courts have
been educated about the medical, psychological, and socio-economic re-
alities of matters such as racism, sexism, poverty, and pregnancy, and
states have been forced to demonstrate that their reasons for restricting
rights are in truth compelling.
This Article sets forth the unique properties of what is herein de-
fined as an "operational challenge" to the constitutionality of law. In
such a challenge, the actual burdens and benefits of a law infringing
fundamental rights are at long last presented for judicial review. For
the legal result in such a challenge to be predetermined by rules of law
developed in cases devoid of a factual record would require that consti-
tutional principle persist in ignorance of what is empirically known.
Constitutional review would be an empty formalism in a changing
world.
The argument made in the sections that follow proceeds on three
basic premises: first, that standards of constitutionality should be in-
formed by empirical truth; second, that judicial protection of fundamen-
tal rights is facilitated by proof of and reliance upon the facts underly-
ing constitutional determinations; and third, that a degree of
inconsistency among lower courts can and should be tolerated to permit
the zealous protection of basic rights and liberties, at least pending Su-
preme Court review on a full factual record of the real effects of a law.
With these principles in mind, Part I traces the emerging importance of
facts to constitutional analysis by courts reviewing legislation. Part II
illustrates how rules of law developed on the basis of assumed facts
have acted to foreclose judicial protection of rights by lower courts even
where reality has disproved judicial speculation about the operation of
law. The discussion in Part II revolves around the cases consolidated in
Brown v. Board of Education' and the cases involving the constitu-
tional right of minors to abortion. Part III articulates a theory support-
ing lower court deviation from precedent in order to protect constitu-
tional rights in cases based on new facts about the real effects of an
operating law. Finally, Part IV describes and evaluates the risks of cre-
1 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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ating fact-based standards of constitutionality and of permitting lower
court freedom from precedent based on factual findings.
I. THE EMERGING IMPORTANCE AND CENTRALITY OF FACTS
TO JUDICIAL REVIEW
In the world of "natural law" there was little place for empirical
reality.2 The rules by which the judiciary resolved the disputes of citi-
zens were universal, unchanging, even divine.' Judges were the mouth-
pieces of laws that were found, not made," and precedent was revered.
5
This was the era of Blackstone and beyond.
6
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, scholars be-
2 At the turn of this century, American law was dominated by classical
jurisprudence-the belief that a single, correct legal solution could be
reached in every case by the application of logic to a set of natural, self-
evident principles. Classical jurisprudence understood the process of decid-
ing cases to be purely rational and exclusively deductive ....
Monahan & Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing So-
cial Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 479 (1986); see Pound, Mechanical
Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 607 (1908) (contrasting "scientific" jurispru-
dence to the new "sociological" jurisprudence). The central tenet of classical or formal
jurisprudence was that "'law' existed apart from those who decreed it." 3 R. Ro-
TUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE
AND PROCEDURE 467 (1986) [hereinafter TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW]. In
this climate, "law" was conceptualized as distinct from "fact," see, e.g., J. THAYER, A
PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 183-262 (1898) (dis-
cussing the importance of distinguishing between law and fact in jury trials), because
"law did not change, so any demonstrably changeable material had to be 'fact' or else
the concept of law risked 'embarrassment'." Monahan & Walker, supra, at 480 (quot-
ing Morris, Law and Fact, 55 HARV. L. REV. 1303, 1315 (1942)).
1 See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *39-40. See generally A. HARDING, A
SOCIAL HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 236 (1966) (the medieval idea of a "natural law"
is rooted in the Roman notion of a moral law).
" See, e.g., 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *37-42 (there exist "eternal im-
-mutable laws of good and evil" to be discovered by human nature); see also B. CAR-
DOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 131 (1921) ("The old Blackstonian
theory of pre-existing rules of law which judges found, but did not make, fitted in with
a theory still more ancient, the theory of a law of nature.").
I See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *69-70. Even so, precedent was not to
be followed if it was determined to be "flatly absurd or unjust." Id. at *70. This was
because the opinions of judges may at times fail to state "the law" and not because a
prior opinion was "bad law." Id. Even to Blackstone, however, precedent was only
binding where "the same points come again in [subsequent] litigation." Id. at *69 (em-
phasis added).
I See, e.g., 3 TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 2, at 467 (dis-
cussing the natural law and contractual theorist movements). Such concepts of the na-
ture of law continued to predominate throughout much of the nineteenth century, see
supra note 2, but also preceded Blackstone. See Pound, Law in Books and Law in
Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 24 (1910) ("To the ancient, law was sacred. It was not
made by man, and could not be changed by man. Man simply discovered it. Any at-
tempt to alter it was of necessity futile.").
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gan to foretell the demise of this doctrine and to rebel against its resis-
tance to the notion that law, and justice, should be informed by empiri-
cal fact.' Oliver Wendell Holmes, then a Justice of the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, predicted that the "black-letter man"
of the present would give way to the "man of statistics and the master
of economics." ' He expressed absolute revulsion at the adherence to a
rule of law through "blind imitation of the past" though its "grounds"
in fact or principle "have vanished long since." 9 Roscoe Pound, lauding
the development of new principles of law "express[ing] the spirit of the
time,"1 followed suit. Pound admonished students and practitioners of
the law to "look the facts of human conduct in the face[; to] look to
economics and sociology and philosophy, and cease to assume that juris-
prudence is self-sufficient."1
Under this new legal philosophy, rules of law were not "final
truths, but [were instead] working hypotheses, continually retested in
7 These scholars sowed the seeds of a transformation in American jurisprudence
that began as "sociological jurisprudence" and ultimately came to be known as "real-
ism." See generally White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurispru-
dence and Social Change in Early Twentieth Century America, 58 VA. L. REV. 999,
1000-26 (1972) (tracing the evolution of legal philosophy through "mechanical juris-
prudence," "sociological jurisprudence," and "legal realism"). Realism was a "revolt
against formalism," Monahan & Walker, supra note 2, at 482, and its proponents
rejected the emphasis on deductive logic and embraced the importance of social sciences
and the empirical world to the understanding and evolution of law. See, e.g., White,
The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social
Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279, 280-82 (1973) (describing components of realism); see
generally L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 688-89 (2d ed. 1985) (ex-
plaining that realists did not revere tradition); W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND
THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1985) (discussing the American realist mivement in histor-
ical context). Of the lasting importance of this chapter in American legal history, it has
been said that "realism is dead; we are all realists now." W. TWINING, supra, at 382;
see also Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1152, 1152
(1985) (stating that realists "debunked" formalists).
8 Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897) (address
delivered at Boston University School of Law).
9 Id.
10 Pound, supra note 6, at 35.
11 Id. at 35-36. "It is the work of lawyers. . . to make the law in action conform
to the law in books. . . by making the law in the books such that the law in action can
conform to it . . . ." Id. at 36. While Pound's writings were motivated by the same
"revolt against formalism" that fueled the so-called "realist movement," see Monahan
& Walker, supra note 2, at 482, he was a critic of certain elements of "realist" thought
and saw himself as an outsider. See, e.g., Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence,
44 HARV. L. REV. 697, 707 (1931) ("Radical neo-realism seems to deny that there are
rules or principles or conceptions or doctrines at all . . . ."); id. at 697 (criticizing some
elements of realism). Pound was, however, the leading proponent of what he called
"sociological jurisprudence." See Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological juris-
prudence (pts. 1-3), 24 HARV. L. REv. 591 (1911), 25 HARV. L. REV. 140 (1911), 25
HARV. L. REV. 489 (1912).
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those great laboratories of the law, the courts of justice."' 2 Benjamin
Cardozo drew the inevitable conclusion that laws resulting from this
experimental process are in truth created by judges acting as legislators
in the interstices of precedent and of existing law,'" and celebrated the
"ageless process of testing and retesting""' by which the law evolves in
pursuit, "as best may be, [of] justice and social utility .... ."1 This
12 B. CARDOZO, supra note 4, at 23 (quoting M. SMITH, JURISPRUDENCE 21
(1909)).
[U]ntil the end of the eighteenth century people believed in generalizations
for their own sake[.] The nineteenth century has, of course, made its own
generalizations . . . but it has insisted on observation as the basis of gen-
eralization and has reserved the right to alter, amend or repeal all general-
izations in accordance with the facts found from time to time.
Isaacs, The Law and the Facts, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1922); see also Corbin, The
Law and the Judges, 3 YALE REV. 234, 249 (1914) ("[Tlhe growth of the law is an
evolutionary process. Its principles consist of such generalizations as may tentatively be
made from a vast number of individual instances.").
"8 See B. CARDOZO, supra note 4, at 115 ("[W]ithin the confines of these open
spaces and those of precedent and tradition, choice moves with a freedom which stamps
its action as creative. The law which is the resulting product is not found, but made.
The process, being legislative, demands the legislator's wisdom.").
14 Id. at 179.
16 Id. at 120. The realists and sociological jurists plainly embraced the principles
of constitutional adjudication first hinted at by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 315, 406 (1819) ("it is a constitution we are ex-
pounding"). "A constitution states or ought to state not rules for the passing hour, but
principles for an expanding future." B. CARDOZO, supra note 4, at 83. The method of
the law involves "filling the gaps" by reference to "social welfare," id. at 71, and
"present-day conditions, as revealed by the labors of economists and students of the
social sciences in our own country and abroad," id. at 81. See generally 3 TREATISE
ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 2, at 469 (describing "sociological
jurisprudence").
A complete discussion of "realist" theory, its opponents, and its relationship to the
development of American constitutional jurisprudence since the 19 30s is well beyond
the scope of this Article. Suffice it to say that some have equated "realism" with "nihil-
ism" in its purported ratification of freewheeling subjective judicial lawmaking. See
Tushnet, Truth, justice and the American Way: An Interpretation of Public Law
Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TEx. L. REV. 1307, 1340, 1342 (1979); see also
Mechem, The Jurisprudence of Despair, 21 IOWA L. REV. 669, 669-70 (1936) (dis-
cussing the realists' rebellion against the myth of law). See generally 3 TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 2, at 474-77 (discussion of realism and the "neu-
tral principles" theorists).
Although "realism" per se fell out of favor by the late 1930s, its teachings have
remained a part of American jurisprudence. See, e.g., Kaufman, The Anatomy of Deci-
sionmaking, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 2 (1984) (maintaining that cases must not be
decided on the basis of abstract generalities and pure logic, but that emphasis must be
placed on concrete and particular facts and on the importance of the outcome to the
individual litigant); Wald, Thoughts on Decisionmaking, 87 W. VA. L. REY. 1, 3
(1984) (noting the empirical bases for some judicial decisions); Wisdom, Random Re-
marks on the Role of Social Sciences in the Judicial Decision-Making Process in
School Desegregation Cases, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1975, at 134, 137
("Sociology has always played a part in the decisionmaking process, although fre-
quently it comes in wearing a mask."). Moreover, the perceived nihilistic elements of
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legitimation of change in the law and of courts as the locus for testing
legal principles against empirical observation and the social welfarel"
opened the door to an expanded role for facts in the judicial process
and particularly in constitutional adjudication."' The importance of
facts to the interpretation"8 and constitutional validity19 of laws came to
be accepted, and courts correspondingly broadened the permissible
sources of fact upon which they would rely in deciding the cases before
them: "Once heretical, the belief that empirical studies can influence
the content of legal doctrine is now one of the few points of general
agreement among jurists."2 From Muller v. Oregon2" to Brown v.
the "realist" vision of the judicial process spawned an entirely new jurisprudential
movement that defended the role of so-called "neutral principles" in even an activist
judicial process. See, e.g., Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 26-35 (1959) (discussing "neutral principles" in the context
of past Supreme Court decisions on fundamental rights).
16 See, e.g., Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean
Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1235-37 (1931) [hereinafter Some Realism] (discuss-
ing "realist" belief in investigation of the facts to ascertain the effect of law and make
judgments about the future); see also Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next
Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 454 (1930) (discussing the realist response to "the ten-
dency of the crystallized legal concept to persist after the fact model from which the
concept was once derived has disappeared or changed out of recognition").
17 See Monahan & Walker, supra note 2, at 482. Realists sought to evaluate the
merits of particular rules of law, not through moral or political philosophies of natural
law, but by "the practical benefits or burdens allocated to members of society." 3
TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 2, at 472. Moreover, realists em-
phasized that when courts make law in the gaps left by precedent, the real effect that
law has on people is an important component of the policy analyses courts then per-
form. See Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 1223, 1253-55; Peller, supra note 7, at 1242-
43.
,8 See, e.g., Brandeis, The Living Law, 10 ILL. L. REV. 461, 467 (1916) ("[N]o
law, written or unwritten, can be understood without a full knowledge of the facts out
of which it arises, and to which it is to be applied.").
19 See, e.g., Bikl, Judicial Determination of Questions of Fact Affecting the Con-
stitutional Validity of Legislative Action, 38 HARV. L. REV. 6, 6 (1924).
[N]o court can undertake to decide upon the validity of legislation ...
[without] first be[ing] informed as to the truth of some question of fact
which the statute postulates or with reference to which it is to be applied;
and the validity of the legislation depends on the conclusions reached by
the court with reference to this question of fact.
Id.
20 Monahan & Walker, supra note 2, at 477; see also supra note 2; see generally
N. CHANNELS, SOCIAL SCIENCE METHODS IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 258 (1985) (dis-
cussing how "social science methodology is accepted now by courts," and "empirical
research has become the standard resource for the legal professional"); J. MONAHAN &
L. WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 17 (1985) (stating that
"empiricism . . .has become an inherent aspect of current American legal thought");
P. ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 197-229 (1972) (discussing
the use of social science by the Supreme Court); THE UsE/NONUSE/MISUSE OF AP-
PLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH IN THE COURTS (M. Saks & C. Baron eds. 1980) (sympo-
sium on the application of social research findings to the judicial process); Collins, The
Use of Social Research in the Courts, in L. LYNN, KNOWLEDGE AND POLICY: THE
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Board of Education2 2 and since,2" the Supreme Court has relied upon
social facts presented either through expert testimony, "Brandeis
briefs," or judicial notice.24
UNCERTAIN CONNECTION 145, 146 (1978) (explaining why law and social science
have been incompatible in the past); Doyle, Social Science Evidence in Court Cases, in
EDUCATION, SOCIAL SCIENCE, AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 10, 10 (1977) (noting that
congressional grants of jurisdiction over areas such as civil rights requires use of social
sciences); Schlessinger & Nesse, Justice Harry Blackmun and Empirical Jurispru-
dence, 29 AM. U.L. REv. 405, 406 (1980) (discussing Justice Blackmun's reliance on
quantifiable criteria to elucidate the bases of decisions).
21 208 U.S. 412 (1908). It is in this case that Louis Brandeis presented the Court
with his infamous "Brandeis brief," setting forth the results of a vast storehouse of
medical and social science research regarding the debilitating effect of long work hours
on women. See Monahan & Walker, supra note 2, at 480-81.
22 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See generally R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 491, 491-504
(1976) (discussing the role of social science testimony in the Brown trial); L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-15 (1978) (reviewing rationales for the deci-
sion in Brown). But see generally Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REv. 150, 165-
67 (1955) (discussing the dangers of grounding fundamental rights in social-science
research).
23 See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 n.6 (1984) (research on the
effects of the exclusionary rule); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758 n.9 (1982)
(research on the long-term consequences of sexual exploitation of children); Mississippi
Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 727 n.13 (1982) (social history of the col-
lege's gender-based discrimination); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 231-39 (1978)
(empirical data relevant to the question of jury size); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. 543, 563 n.16, 564 n.17 (1976) (statistical estimates refuting contention that
apparent Mexican ancestry served as sole criterion in selecting motorists for investiga-
tion). See generally J. MONAHAN & L. WALKER, supra note 20, at 99 (reviewing
cases in which social science research was considered by the Supreme Court). For a
discussion of the recent trend away from reliance on such data as reflected in recent
cases, see infra note 30.
Researchers have attempted to study the reliance upon social science and other
secondary authority through empirical means. See generally Hafemeister & Melton,
The Impact of Social Science Research on the Judiciary, in REFORMING THE LAW:
IMPACT OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH 27, 27-56 (1987) [hereinafter RE-
FORMING THE LAW]. For example, the growth in frequency of Supreme Court citations
to nonlegal secondary sources was summarized as follows:
About one-fifth of opinions published in 1978 (34.1% of majority opin-
ions) cited a nonlegal source, double the percentage of 1940 and a 1,000-
fold increase since 1900. Nonlegal citations per opinion rose even more
markedly . . . . The absolute growth also was striking: from 17 citations
of nonlegal sources in 1900 to 99 in 1940 and 260 in 1978. The sources
cited were quite diverse. In 1978, 26 different journals accounted for the
49 citations of nonlegal periodicals. They were drawn from accounting,
anthropology, business, foreign affairs, history, insurance, optometry, po-
litical science, psychiatry, psychology, and sociology.
See id. at 35 (citing Daniels, "Far Beyond the Law Reports": Secondary Source Cita-
tions in United States Supreme Court Opinions, October Terms 1900, 1940 and
1978, 76 L. LIBR. J. 1, 5-27 (1983)).
24 Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 n.11, 495; Muller, 208 U.S. 420-21. A discussion of
the various methods of introducing social facts into judicial proceedings is beyond the
scope of this Article. For a full exposition and evaluation of these methods, see P.
BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS
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In 1942, amidst this background, Kenneth Culp Davis first made
the distinction between what he called "legislative" and "adjudicative"
facts.25 This distinction marked the impact of the "realists": "Davis's
candid recognition of a judicial lawmaking function [and] his recogni-
tion that facts are a component of lawmaking directly contradicted the
classical position that law was deductively discovered rather than judi-
cially created."26
In subsequent decades, legislative fact-finding by courts came to be
increasingly accepted., Commentators recognized that judicial scrutiny
938-42 (1975); J. MONAHAN & L. WALKER, supra note 20, at 45-66; Melton, Judi-
dal Notice of "Facts" About Child Development, in REFORMING THE LAW, supra
note 23, at 232-47; Monahan & Walker, supra note 2, at 495-98; Walker &
Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV.
559, 583-98 (1987).
25 Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process,
55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402-03 (1942). In his treatise on administrative law, Professor
Davis further explained:
Adjudicative facts usually answer the questions of who did what,
where, when, how, why, with what motive or intent; adjudicative facts are
roughly the kind of facts that go to a jury in a jury case. Legislative facts
do not usually concern the immediate parties but are the general facts
which help the tribunal decide questions of law and policy and discretion.
2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 12:3 (2d ed. 1979).
26 Monahan & Walker, supra note 2, at 483. "When [a court or] an agency wres-
tles with a question of law or policy, it is acting legislatively . . . and the facts which
inform its legislative judgment may [thus] be denominated legislative facts." Davis,
supra note 25, at 402.
Davis's distinction between these two sorts of facts has been widely recognized by
courts. See, e.g., Concerned Citizens v. Pine Creek Conservancy Dist., 429 U.S. 651,
657 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); New Jersey Citizen Action v. Edison Town-
ship, 797 F.2d 1250, 1259 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1336 (1987); id. at
1267 (Weis, J., dissenting); City of New York Mun. Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 744
F.2d 827, 840 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985); NOW, D.C.
Chapt. v. Social Sec. Admin., 736 F.2d 727, 737 n.95 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Commentators
have also recognized this distinction. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 201(a) advisory commit-
tee's note; Davis, "There is a Book Out. . .": An Analysis ofJudicial Absorption of
Legislative Facts, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1540-41 (1987); Karst, Legislative Facts
in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 Sup. CT. REV. 75, 76-77; Monahan & Walker,
supra note 2, at 482-83; see also P. BREST, supra note 24, at 894-953 (discussing
problems presented by legislative or constitutional facts); 1 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
§§ 200[03]-[04] (1986) (concerning the judge's use of legislative fact).
27 See supra note 23; see, e.g., Alfange, The Relevance of Legislative Facts in
Constitutional Law, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 637, 678 (1966) (concluding that it is feasible
and in some instances "indispensable to sound constitutional adjudication" for the Su-
preme Court to examine legislative facts); Karst, supra note 26, at 78 ("Although some
of the [Court's] justices have been reluctant, they now appear to be unanimous in ac-
cepting the necessity of weighing the factual justification of state regulation." (footnote
omitted)); Shaman, Constitutional Fact: The Perception of Reality by the Supreme
Court, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 236, 242-45 (1983) (acceptance of fact-finding by courts is
a consequence of heightened scrutiny); see also Bikl6, supra note 19, at 6 (laws are
premised on facts that courts must assess for accuracy).
Some commentators have relabeled Davis's "legislative" facts "constitutional" facts
19881
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of the factual bases for legislation was not only inherent in judicial
review generally,2" but was critical to the protection of fundamental
rights.29 With the advent of the Warren Court3 and the development
of a firmer jurisprudential basis for aggressive constitutional scrutiny of
legislation," concern with the time-worn "presumption of constitution-
in that they are defined as those factual issues whose "determination is 'decisive of
constitutional rights'." Bishin & Stone, Constitutional Facts, in THE JUDICIAL PRO-
cEss 703, 703-04 (1976); see Shaman, supra, at 236. Other commentators have pre-
ferred the term "constitutional" facts because such facts are "constitutionally relevant
legislative facts." P. BREST, supra note 24, at 894.
28 "[Ilt is not only manifestly feasible for the Court to examine legislative facts,
but such an examination is often altogether indispensable to sound constitutional adju-
dication." Alfange, supra note 27, at 678; see Bikl, supra note 19, at 6; Shaman,
supra note 27, at 236, 242; see also 1 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 26,
§ 200[041 (discussing judicial scrutiny of legislative assumptions).
29 "To uphold the regulation [or law] without determining that it will in fact
[serve the state's asserted interests] would be inconsistent with the principles of height-
ened scrutiny. . . .The Supreme Court has frequently recognized that meaningful
evaluation of constitutional fact is a critical element of heightened scrutiny." Shaman,
supra note 27, at 245 (footnote omitted). Thus, "where the exercise of legislative power
approaches a constitutionally prohibited area, as in legislation restricting speech, ...
no sound constitutional judgment can be made except by consideration of legislative
facts." Alfange, supra note 27, at 644.
30 Supreme Court reliance on secondary sources, including nonlegal sources, in-
creased substantially during the Warren Court years. See Hafemeister & Melton,
supra note 23, at 37. Hafemeister and Melton, however, draw the following
conclusions:
In the past 40 years, the use of secondary authority has become com-
monplace on the Supreme Court and, to a lesser extent, the lower federal
courts and the state appellate courts. This trend has been both cause and
effect of the expansion of constitutional doctrines and the re-shaping of
judicial roles in response to realist and post-realist critics of the law ...
Nonetheless, the use of social science still is controversial and rather
uncommon, especially in state courts. Courts appear unsure of whether
and how to use social science to examine the policy questions that they
have been asked to decide in recent decades. As a result, with the excep-
tion of a few judges who "specialize" in cases involving scientific expertise,
reliance on social science still is largely a "liberal" practice of judges who
have an expansive view of the judiciary's role in shaping legal doctrine
and protecting disenfranchised groups.
Id. at 54-55. These conclusions are confirmed by recent trends in the more conservative
era of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. The Court has continued to cite and analyze
social science and record evidence of constitutional fact. While doing so, however, it has
sharply curtailed the degree and frequency with which it relies on such proofs in reach-
ing constitutional results. Thus, in cases such as McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756,
1769 (1987) (statistical study of race factors in imposition of death penalty), and Lock-
hart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986) (research on jury composition regarding im-
panelment of death-qualified juries), the Supreme Court has seemingly gone out of its
way to discredit or entirely disregard statistical, testimonial, and other forms of evi-
dence probative of constitutional fact. Thus, judicial reliance on constitutional facts ap-
pears to go hand in hand with the protection of civil liberties. But see United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 n.6 (1984) (contracting constitutional protections based on
statistical data regarding the effects of the exclusionary rule).
31 See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 369-73 (1986) (discussing the self-con-
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ality" 2 gave way. Instead of presuming the legitimacy of statutory law,
courts began weighing means against ends, burdens against benefits,
and asserted state interests against a law's actual achievements in the
course of determining constitutional validity.3"
Such judicial tasks necessitate legislative fact-finding by courts.
3 4
tradictory nature of "passivism"-the doctrine of judicial deference to a legislature); J.
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 73-104 (1980) (discussing United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)); Richards, Constitutional Legitimacy and
Constitutional Privacy, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 800, 824-32 (1986) (the durability of the
Constitution has stemmed from flexible and adaptive interpretation).
11 The so-called "presumption of constitutionality" calls upon courts to extend a
degree of deference to the policy determinations of legislators. See Alfange, supra note
27, at 661-67; see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1982) ("We begin, of
course, with the presumption that the challenged statute is valid."); Flemming v. Nes-
tor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960) ("presumption of constitutionality with which this enact-
ment, like any other, comes to us forbids us lightly to [invalidate it]"); United States v.
Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 635 (1882) ("Proper respect for [Congress] requires the courts of
the United States to give effect to the presumption that Congress will pass no act not
within its constitutional power."); Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14, 17 (1800)
(Washington, J., seriatim) ("The presumption, indeed, must always be in favor of the
validity of laws, if the contrary is not clearly demonstrated."). Legislative fact-finding
by courts has led some commentators to express "concern for the survival of the pre-
sumption" in that it appears to permit courts to make independent policy judgments.
See Karst, supra note 26, at 86 (citing L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 27-30 (1958)).
" With the rise of judicial activism under Chief Justice Warren, the Court devel-
oped three tiers of judicial scrutiny (strict, intermediate, and minimal or rational) in its
effort to answer the essential constitutional question as to whether there existed suffi-
cient justification for the governmental infringement of any particular constitutional
right. See, e.g., Shaman, supra note 27, at 242-45. Some commentators have viewed
these "tiers" as reflecting different degrees of "presumption." See Karst, supra note 26,
at 86-95. With judicial activism came the emergence of the "public law litigation
model," which, for the first ,time, made courts more than a forum for private dispute
resolution. See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281, 1296-98 (1976). In making the policy judgments traditionally made only by
legislators, judicial fact-finding became "principally concerned with 'legislative' rather
than 'adjudicative' fact." Id. at 1297.
Whether the question be one of political freedom or economic freedom,
"We deal not with absolutes but with questions of degree." And regardless
of the weight one attaches to the presumption of constitutionality, the
same questions-the objectives of the regulation, the means of achieving
them, and the impact on the protected interest-remain to be illuminated
by the legislative facts.
Karst, supra note 26, at 94-95 (quoting Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520,
530 (1959)).
"' Although it has been argued that legislative fact-finding should be as important
to an absolutist constitutional approach as it is to judicial balancing, see Karst, supra
note 26, at 80, this has traditionally not been the case. As Dean Alfange observed:
[T]he defenders of judicial self-restraint and constitutional absolutism
unite on this common ground: the common ground of mechanical jurispru-
dence. For, at bottom, either position requires acceptance of the theory
that constitutional questions can be decided by merely holding the words
of the statute up against the applicable constitutional provision, and decid-
ing on that basis alone whether the statute is permissible. It was the prey-
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For example, Professor Karst noted that courts called upon to review
the constitutionality of a statute would be required to answer the fol-
lowing questions:
On the objective (or purpose, or utility) side of the bal-
ance, the questions of legislative fact are these:
1. How much will this regulation advance the chosen
governmental objective? It is essential to recognize that there
are two parts to this question:
a) If the regulation is completely successful, how much
more safe, or healthy, or moral will the community be?
b) What is the chance of complete success for the regu-
lation? Of partial success?
2. How much more will this regulation advance the ob-
jective than some other regulation which might interfere less
with constitutionally protected interests?
On the impact (or cost) side, the questions of legislative
fact are exact parallels:
1. How much will freedom (of speech, of commerce,
etc.) be restricted by this regulation? This question also di-
vides into two parts:
a) If the regulation operates with its maximum restric-
tive effect, how, and how much, will freedom be restricted?
b) What is the chance that the regulation will have its
maximum restrictive effect? A partial effect?
2. How much more restrictive is this regulation than
some other regulation which might achieve the same
objective?
All of these are questions of fact; all of them are an-
swered, whether or not the judge recognizes what he is do-
alence of this belief in mechanical jurisprudence at the start of the century
that led Dean Roscoe Pound . . . to decry "the sharp line between law
and fact . . . which requires constitutionality, as a legal question, to be
tried by artificial criteria of general application and prevents effective judi-
cial investigation or consideration of the situations of fact behind or bear-
ing upon the statutes."
Alfange, supra note 27, at 642 (footnote omitted) (quoting Pound, Liberty of Contract,
18 YALE L.J. 454, 458 (1909)). Thus, the influence of the realists and the move toward
aggressive judicial protection of fundamental rights through a tiered balancing analysis
have shared an emphasis on legislative fact-finding by courts in constitutional cases.
This has, in turn, blurred the traditional bright line distinction between facts and law
in general. See generally Monahan & Walker, supra note 2, at 488-95 (stating that
classification of social science research as either fact or law is plausible); Morris, supra
note 2 (law and fact do not naturally stand apart because laws determine the selection
and description of facts, while facts determine the scope of the laws based upon them).
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ing. If he does not hear testimony or receive memoranda illu-
minating these questions, he assumes their answers on the
basis of his own experience and education. Thus a judge
may make assumptions far beyond the ordinary range of ju-
dicial notice .... Such assumptions may be correct or in-
correct, enlightened or unenlightened, but they are always
made.35
Trial courts have a duty to answer these questions on a fully de-
veloped factual record36 and appellate courts have a duty to ensure,
through remand or otherwise, that facts of constitutional significance
are found based on such a record and not simply assumed.37 Moreover,
as a general matter,
it seems clear that [judicial] decisions, in order to command
public support, should be based upon the records in the cases
before them, and should find in the evidence, or in matters
properly brought before them for judicial notice, a complete
basis for a determination that legislation, challenged because
of some underlying question of fact, is invalid because it is so
demonstrated upon the record. 8
'5 Karst, supra note 26, at 84. But see Monahan & Walker, supra note 2, at 516
(arguing that social or legislative facts should, for some purposes, be treated by courts
as authority akin to law).
36 See, e.g., Shaman, supra note 27, at 246 (Courts should "not uphold govern-
mental regulations on the basis of speculative or hypothetical facts. Important constitu-
tional rights . . . may not be circumscribed by imaginary state interests. Nothing less
than a relatively sound factual basis for governmental action would seem to be accept-
able under heightened scrutiny." (footnotes omitted)). The Supreme Court has often
noted that a full factual record is advisable when deciding questions of constitutional
magnitude or of public importance. See, e.g., Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406
U.S. 583, 588 (1972) (declining to consider constitutionality of certain Ohio election
laws without record setting forth relevant facts); Aircraft & Diesel Equip. Corp. v.
Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1947) (constitutional questions not to be entertained
upon dubious presentations); Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 575
(1947) (constitutional question not determinable when municipal court did not make
clear which charge was being brought against defendant and thus did not properly
develop facts of the case); Alabama State Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450,
462 (1945) (refusing to pass on constitutionality of state statute "without reference to
some precise set of facts").
17 See, e.g., Karst, supra note 26, at 98 (Supreme Court must ensure that lower
federal court judges engage in proper factual inquiries). See generally Monaghan, Con-
stitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 229 (1985) (arguing for de novo review
by appellate courts transcending, at times, the "clearly erroneous" standard).
38 BiklE, supra note 19, at 27. When the Court is engaged in its public law task
of overseeing the complex activities of modern government,
[t]he extended impact of the judgment demands a more visibly reliable and
credible procedure for establishing and evaluating the fact elements in the
litigation, and one that more explicitly recognizes the complex and contin-
uous interplay between fact evaluation and legal consequence. The major
19881
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In keeping with these developments, rules of constitutional law
have increasingly come to reflect social, psychological, economic, and
medical realities. Out of necessity, and contrary to these trends, how-
ever, a tradition of facial adjudication of constitutional claims based on
assumed legislative facts has persisted. 9 Part II, below, will illustrate
how defenders of rights-infringing legislation have relied upon these
cases to resurrect and maintain the wall between constitutional princi-
ple and empirical truth, thereby attempting to prevent courts from ex-
amining the real effects of a challenged statute in operation.
II. WHEN THE FACTS FAIL TO COMPEL A CONSTITUTIONAL
RESULT
A. A Preview of the Problem
At the very birth of the evidentiary proof of legislative facts in the
courtroom can be found one means of its demise: district court refusal
to rely on factual findings found to support a legal result contrary to
precedent. Many of the district courts in the cases consolidated in
Brown v. Board of Education,4 ° after hearing evidence on the harm to
minority school children resulting from segregated but substantially
equal educational facilities, nevertheless felt precluded from relying on.
these facts in searching for a constitutional result. For example, con-
cluding that segregation in South Carolina's public schools .did not
"of itself" violate the fourteenth amendment, the three-judge district
court in Briggs v. Elliotte1 found support in "overwhelming authority
which we are not at liberty to disregard on the basis of theories ad-
response to the new requirements has been to place the responsibility for
fact-finding increasingly on the trial judge.
Chayes, supra note 33, at 1297; see also Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation
and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REv. 4, 56 (1982) (even the more conservative
Burger Court recognized the necessity of finding legislative facts when deciding public
law litigation cases).
8 See infra notes 40-50, 190-96 and accompanying text.
40 See 347 U.S. 483, 486 n.1 (1954). The cases consolidated are as follows: Davis
v. County School Bd., 103 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Va. 1952); Brown v. Board of Educ., 98
F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951); Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529 (E.D.S.C. 1951);
Belton v. Gebhart, 32 Del. Ch. 343, 87 A.2d 862, affd, 33 Del. Ch. 144, 91 A.2d 137
(Del. 1952). The same issues were raised in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500
(1954) (racial segregation in District of Columbia public schools violated fifth
amendment).
4' 98 F. Supp. 529 (E.D.S.C. 1951).
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vanced by a few educators and sociologists." '42 Similarly, in Belton v.
Gebhart,4 3 the court declared itself precluded from issuing the relief
compelled by the evidence. The Delaware chancellor summarized the
unrebutted testimony and found that, as a matter of fact, "[s]tate-im-
posed segregation in education itself results in the Negro children, as a
class, receiving educational opportunities which are substantially infer-
ior to those available to white children otherwise similarly situated ' 44.
Although the Supreme Court had never "passed upon a case containing
[such] a specific finding,' 45 and although the "separate but equal" rule
of Plessy v. Ferguson4 had at best "implicit" applicability to the school
segregation context, the court nevertheless concluded that it could not
enjoin segregation in the Delaware schools.47
The Supreme Court in Brown, of course, made clear that new
facts and extralegal social-scientific evidence could contribute to judicial
alteration or even reversal of a constitutional rule of law. But this in no
way ameliorated the general problem experienced by district courts,
when presented with such evidence.
As the finder of facts,48 charged with the power to invalidate un-
42 Id. at 537. The court's view was bolstered by the absence of a fully developed
and judicially acceptable concept of strict scrutiny of legislative judgments when funda-
mental rights or suspect statutory classifications were at issue. Thus, the Briggs court
went on to state:
The constitutional principle is the same now that it has been throughout
this period; and if conditions have changed so that segregation is no longer
wise, this is a matter for the legislatures and not for the courts. The mem-
bers of the judiciary have no more right to read their ideas of sociology
into the Constitution than their ideas of economics.
Id. Briggs thus illustrates once again how deference to the legislature and judicial fail-
ure to modify legal authority in the presence of new facts go hand in hand. A lower
court that feels its hands are tied in this way is likely to be unable or unwilling to
scrutinize state legislation with the requisite degree of care. See infra notes 250-71 and
accompanying text.
" 32 Del. Ch. 343, 87 A.2d 862, affid, 33 Del. Ch. 144, 91 A.2d 132 (1952).
44 Id. at 349, 87 A.2d at 865.
45 Id.
46 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding that separate but equal railroad cars satisfy the
fourteenth amendment), overruled, Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
47 Belton, 32 Del. Ch. at 350, 87 A.2d at 865. The court stated:
I, therefore, conclude that while State-imposed segregation in lower
education provides Negroes with inferior educational opportunities, such
inferiority has not yet been recognized by the United States Supreme
Court as violating the Fourteenth Amendment. On the contrary, it has
been by implication excluded as a Constitutional factor. It is for that
Court to re-examine its doctrine in the light of my finding of fact. It fol-
lows that relief cannot be granted plaintiffs under their first contention.
Id. at 351, 87 A.2d at 866; see also Gebhart v. Belton, 33 Del. Ch. 144, 152, 91 A.2d
137, 141-42 (only the Supreme Court may overrule Plessy).
48 District courts are the factfinders of the federal judiciary and all facts upon
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constitutional laws,4 what is a district court to do when it concludes
that a law is unconstitutional on the basis of facts unknown to those
courts that previously established the applicable standards of constitu-
tionality? Should it be barred from granting relief pending appellate
review in all circumstances? The example discussed in detail in Part II
B below demonstrates that, at least in some cases, justice delayed is in
truth justice denied.50 Lower courts must be empowered to grant the
relief compelled by the facts, even if in so doing they implicitly arrive at
a constitutional result at odds with the decision of a higher court.
B. The Right of Minors to a Confidential Abortion:
An Unresolved Question
The state of the law regarding a minor's constitutional right to
choose an abortion reveals with precision how adherence to precedent
continues to lead postrealist courts to discount facts pertinent to consti-
tutional analysis. The problem previewed in the cases consolidated in
Brown has become full blown. The unduly binding nature of ill-consid-
ered precedent still ties the hands of even courts applying a fully mod-
ern and developed standard of strict judicial scrutiny.
As the discussion which follows will reveal, the Supreme Court
has recognized that minors, too, have a constitutional right of privacy
but has allowed that right to be heavily burdened through a constitu-
tional analysis predicated on wide ranging and assumed legislative
which the constitutionality of legislation depend are "properly ... the subject of judi-
cial inquiry." United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1937) (citing
Borden's Farm Prods. Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194, 210 (1934)). Where there is
precedent, the proper inquiry includes "whether a change has occurred in the factual
basis" of that precedent as well as "the existence of a particular state of facts assumed
but never demonstrated." Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 774 (D. Minn.
1986), petition for cert. before judgment in the Court of Appeals denied, 107 S. Ct.
1333 (1987) (this petition attempted to consolidate the case with Hartigan v. Zbaraz,
763 F.2d 1532 (7th Cir. 1985), affd without opinion by an equally divided court, 56
U.S.L.W. 4053 (U.S. Dec. 14, 1987)), affd, 827 F.2d 1191 (8th Cir. 1987), vacated
and reh'g granted, Nos. 86-5423/86-5431 (8th Cir. Nov. 13, 1987) (rehearing held in
abeyance pending Supreme Court decision in Zbaraz), judgment reinstated and reh'g
en banc granted, Nos. 86-5423/86-5431 (8th Cir. Dec. 31, 1987).
"' See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803) ("It is em-
phatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. ...
This is the very essence of judicial duty."); see also Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon,
473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985) ("[Ilt is of course the duty of this Court 'to say what the law
is' . . . ."); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 567 (1985)
(Powell, J., dissenting) ("At least since Marbury v. Madison, it has been the settled
province of the federal judiciary to 'say what the law is' with respect to the constitu-
tionality of Acts of Congress." (citation omitted)).
50 Cf Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940) ("leadenfootedness"
weakens justice); In re Ragan, 2 F.2d 785, 791 (1st Cir. 1924) (Anderson, J., dissent-
ing) ("Justice thus delayed is justice denied.").
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facts.5" In particular, the Court has assumed that parental notice or
consent requirements serve a purported state interest in protecting mi-
nors and promoting family integrity.52 Although both experience and
scientific research have since virtually disproved this and other assumed
legislative facts,53 lower courts continue to find themselves precluded
from departing from precedent.54 Such a result mistakes fact for law,
interprets too narrowly the judicial duty to safeguard fundamental
rights from infringement and, at minimum, delays relief from the ongo-
ing violation of rights until Supreme Court review should occur.55
1. An Overview
In 1976, the Supreme Court held that the right to terminate a
pregnancy, first recognized in Roe v. Wade,56 does not arise "magically
only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. ' 57 Instead, the
Court found that minors, as well as adults, are protected by both the
Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amendment 58 and that the state may
not constitutionally delegate an absolute veto power over a minor's
abortion choice to a third party, such as a parent, regardless of that
minor's age or maturity.59 Thus, judicial interpretation of the reach of
specific constitutional guarantees led the Supreme Court to conclude
that a state law requiring every minor to obtain parental consent is
flatly and facially unconstitutional.6"
51 See infra notes 56-92 and accompanying text.
52 See infra notes 62-65, 85-90 and accompanying text.
51 See infra notes 93-142 (experience with operating laws), 143-63 (social science,
medicine, professional opinion) and accompanying text.
"' See infra notes 164-85 and accompanying text.
5 See generally infra notes 186-294 and accompanying text (arguing that lower
courts should be free of precedent in certain types of constitutional cases).
56 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
5 Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976); see also Bellotti v.
Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633 (1979) [hereinafter Bellotti II] ("the status of minors under
the law is unique," but "not beyond the protection of the Constitution").
58 See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74; see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967)
("[N]either the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.").
11 See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74.
60 See Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 440 (1983).
"[l]t is clear that Akron may not make a blanket determination that all minors under
the age of 15 are too immature to make [the] decision [to have an abortion] or that an
abortion never may be in the minor's best interests without parental approval." Id.
(emphasis added); see also Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 643; Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74. Such
laws are unconstitutional because the right to privacy protects a woman's "interest in
independence in making certain kinds of important decisions" as well as her "interest
in avoiding disclosure of personal matters." Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600
(1977). Moreover, any asserted state interest in requiring parental involvement must
"give way to the constitutional right [to have an abortion] of a mature minor or of an
immature minor whose best interests are contrary to parental involvement." Akron, 462
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In 1979, however, the Court noted that a state has a number of
significant interests in regulating a minor's abortion choice in addition
to those recognized as compelling in Roe.8 The Court suggested that a
parental consent law that provided minors with an opportunity to by-
pass consent might be constitutionally permissible if it met certain re-
quirements.6 2 Though no such statute was then presented, 3 the Court
suggested that an anonymous, expeditious judicial bypass procedure
that permitted a confidential abortion for any minor who could demon-
strate sufficient maturity or establish that an abortion was in her best
interests would be constitutional under the fourteenth amendment. 4 In
three subsequent opinions the Court adhered to these basic principles.6 5
U.S. at 428 n.10.
8" See Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 634 ("We have recognized three reasons justifying
the conclusion that the constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with those of
adults: the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in
an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in child rear-
ing."). In Roe, the Court permitted regulation of an adult woman's choice to abort only
when necessary and narrowly tailored to protect her health after the first trimester of
pregnancy, or to protect the potential life of the fetus after it became independently
"viable." Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-64; see also Akron, 462 U.S. at 428-30. Though in-
creasingly divided, a majority of the Court has never wavered in the zealous protection
of a woman's right to reproductive choice. See Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 106 S. Ct. 2169, 2178 (1986) ("The States are not
free, under the guise of protecting maternal health or potential life, to intimidate
women into continuing pregnancies. . . . [Neither may the States] deter a woman from
making a decision that, with her physician, is hers to make.").
82 See Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 643-44.
83 See id. at 651 n.32; id. at 656 n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring).
, See id. at 643-44.
81 In H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981), a majority of the Court upheld a
parental notification law with no judicial bypass procedure as applied to a class of
immature, unemancipated minors living with and dependent on their parents. See id. at
407, 413. However, a different majority of the Court made clear that a requirement of
parental notice without a judicial bypass option would be unconstitutional as applied to
mature minors. See id. at 420 (Powell & Stewart, JJ., concurring); id. at 450-54
(Marshall, Brennan & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting). The Court's "primary holding" in
H.L. was that a minor plaintiff who did not allege that she or any member of the
plaintiff class was mature or emancipated did not have standing to challenge the paren-
tal notification requirement as applied to such minors. See Akron, 462 U.S. at 440 n.30
(citing H.L., 450 U.S. at 406).
In Akron, the Court struck down a municipal ordinance that required parental
consent because it failed to specifically and expressly provide minors with a procedure
for bypassing the consent requirement. Akron, 462 U.S. at 440-42. The Court also
made clear that any sort of mandatory parental involvement (consent or notice) was a
burden on the exercise of a fundamental right, necessitating an alternative procedure
for demonstrating maturity or best interests. See id. at 428 n.10.
In Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983), decided the same
day as Akron, the Court sustained a parental consent and judicial bypass statute of the
sort it had anticipated in Bellotti II. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 491-93.
On November 3, 1987, the Supreme Court heard argument in yet another case
involving a minor's right to abortion. The issues presented in that case were the consti-
tutionality of a mandatory 24-hour waiting period after notification and before a mi-
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The Court's decisions in Bellotti v. Baird ("Bellotti HI"),66 H.L. v.
Matheson,17 Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health68 and
Planned Parenthood Association v. Ashcroft69 permitting a state to re-
quire parental notice or consent as long as a constitutionally adequate
waiver procedure was provided were the-result of its analysis, under
the appropriate standard of review, of the states' asserted interests.
70
Contrary to its own admonition, the Court's constitutional analysis in
all four cases was performed " 'in the absence of "an adequate and full-
nor's abortion when the state has provided a judicial bypass procedure as well as the
constitutional sufficiency of the bypass procedure itself. See Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 763
F.2d 1532 (7th Cir. 1985), af'd without opinion by an equally divided court, 56
U.S.L.W. 4053 (U.S. Dec. 14,1987).
66 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
87 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
68 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
6- 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
70 Although constitutional review has permitted the infringement of a minor's
right to privacy in furtherance of state interests that would not justify burdening an
adult woman's choice, in the earlier cases, "for all practical purposes [the Court's re-
view] approache[d] the 'compelling state interest' standard (employed in cases involving
adults)." Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 706 (1977) (Powell, J., con-
curring). In fact, a majority of the Court stated that "[t]he need to preserve the consti-
tutional right and the unique nature of the abortion decision, especially when made by
a minor, require a State to act with particular sensitivity when it legislates to foster
parental involvement . . . ." Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 642 (emphasis added). Thus, the
Court has consistently held that a statute that burdens a minor's right to choose abor-
tion by requiring parental involvement must be invalidated unless it "plainly serves
important state interests [and] is narrowly drawn to protect only those interests." H.L.,
450 U.S. at 413. See generally Akron, 462 U.S. at 428 n.10 (summarizing the state's
legitimate interest in encouraging parental involvement in their minor children's deci-
sion to have an abortion).
There remains, nevertheless, an underlying inconsistency in the Court's analysis of
the standard of review applicable to governmental infringement of a minor's right to
privacy. For one thing, although so-called "strict scrutiny" has traditionally resulted in
the invalidation of state regulatory measures, the Court has upheld laws restricting a
minor's abortion choice, at least in principle. See Akron, 462 U.S. at 440-41; Bellotti
II, 443 U.S. At 643-44. The Court has also upheld laws that in fact have operated to
restrict a minor's abortion choice. See Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 491-93; H.L., 450 U.S. at
413. Moreover, it has done so based upon the apparent legitimacy of what it calls
"significant" or important state interests, see Akron, 462 U.S. at 428 n.10, rather than
by expanding the list of interests recognized as "compelling" in Roe, see supra note 61.
These inconsistencies have led to confusion, and some lower courts have labeled the
analysis of the relationship between "significant" state interests and burdensome legis-
lation as a "compelling [state] interest" test. See Zbaraz, 763 F.2d at 1536-37.
Whatever the appropriate label, it is clear that the Court has employed some form
of heightened scrutiny and has never applied a "rational basis test" to laws infringing
on a minor's abortion right. See Akron, 462 U.S. at 427-28 n.10; H.L., 450 U.S. at
413; Carey, 431 U.S. at 695 n.18; Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75. Of course the concept of
"intermediate scrutiny" is not new; it has been consistently employed in gender dis-
crimination cases under the equal protection clause. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
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bodied record ''"''71 of the legislative history necessary for heightened ju-
dicial scrutiny of a state law that burdens a fundamental right. Also
lacking was an understanding of the actual operation of the challenged
law over time.72 Facial constitutional analysis73 was the device for as-
suming the facts necessary for constitutional scrutiny without referring
either to the limited factual hearings below or to a significant and rep-
resentative sample of outside medical or social science data.
2. Assumed Facts in Bellotti II, H.L., Akron, and Ashcroft
In concluding that mandatory parental notification or consent is
permissible when accompanied by an adequate judicial bypass proce-
dure, the Supreme Court necessarily made assumptions regarding the
importance and legitimacy of the states' asserted interests, the likelihood
that the chosen means would further these interests, and the degree to
which the means chosen would burden those seeking to exercise a fun-
damental constitutional right and others. In particular, the Court made
assumptions about minors and their family relationships, about the
abortion procedure and the provision of abortion-related health services,
and about the impact of an operating judicial bypass procedure. Most
of these factual assumptions have since been demonstrated to be either
false or dubious.
7 4
The Court assumed, for example, that "minors often lack the ex-
perience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that
could be detrimental to them" ' 5 and that so-called "immature minors
often lack the ability to make fully informed choices that take account
of both immediate and long-range consequences, ' '7 6 particularly while
71 H.L., 450 U.S. at 414 n.25 (quoting Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 546
(1976) (quoting Public Affairs Assocs., Inc. v. Rickover, 369 U.S. 111, 113 (1962))).
See generally cases cited supra note 36.
72 The statutes at issue in Bellotti II and in Ashcroft were preliminarily enjoined
before going into effect on the basis of a limited record compiled at a pretrial hearing
without benefit of discovery. See Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 627-31, 645 n.25; Planned
Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 483 F. Supp. 679, 683 (W.D. Mo. 1980). Although the
statute at issue in H.L. had been in operation, the Court's analysis was based on a
factual record consisting solely of appellant, a 15-year-old girl, "giving monosyllabic
answers to her attorney's leading questions." H.L., 450 U.S. at 401-02.
" Though the Court gave only "as applied" relief in H.L., 450 U.S. at 413, the
Court itself described its analysis as "facial," id. at 407.
"I See infra notes 93-131 and accompanying text.
75 Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 635.
78 Id. at 640 (emphasis added); see id. at 634; see also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S.
584, 603 (1979) ("Most children, even in adolescence, simply are not able to make
sound judgments concerning many decisions, including their need for medical care or
treatment."). The Court also assumed that adults are more "capable" of making such
decisions. See Akron, 462 U.S. at 430 n.10.
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under stress and without parental support." In a later decision, the
Court summarily concluded that "[t]here is no logical relationship be-
tween the capacity to become pregnant and the capacity for mature
judgment concerning the wisdom of an abortion.""8
The Court also assumed that minors are vulnerable and in need of
protection 9 from the "medical, emotional, and psychological conse-
quences of an abortion [that] are serious and can be lasting[,] particu-
larly so when the patient is immature.""0 Without any supporting au-
thority, the Court drew the astonishing conclusion that the state's
decision not to require parental notice for prenatal care was "rational"
because "[i]f the pregnant girl elects to carry her child to term, the
medical decisions to be made entail few-perhaps none-of the poten-
tially grave emotional and psychological consequences of the decision to
abort."81
The Court also assumed the worst about providers of abortion
services and concluded that minors need parental aid to ensure that
they obtain quality care. For example, the Court stated that "[ilt seems
unlikely that [a minor] will obtain adequate counsel and support from
the attending physician at an abortion clinic, where abortions for preg-
nant minors frequently take place."18 2 The Court went on to state that
adult women [are] presumably capable of selecting and ob-
taining a competent physician [while minors] are less likely
than adults to know or be able to recognize ethical, qualified
physicians, or to have the means to engage such profession-
als. Many minors who bypass their parents probably will
resort to an abortion clinic, without being able to distinguish
the competent and ethical from those that are incompetent or
unethical.8 3
The Court also questioned whether minors are capable of providing
physicians with an adequate psychological and medical history and ap-
pears to have assumed that doctors would not question the adequacy of
1 See Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 641.
78 H.L., 450 U.S. at 408.
11 See Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 635.
80 H.L., 450 U.S. at 411.
81 Id, at 412-13 (emphasis omitted). Contra Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 642 ("[T]here
are few situations in which denying a minor the right to make an important decision
will have consequences so grave and indelible." (emphasis added)).
82 Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 641 (quoting Danforth, 428 U.S. at 91 (Stewart, J.,
concurring)).
83 Id. at 641 n.21. Of course, such arguments do not distinguish minors from poor
adults in states without Medicaid funding who, though "capable" of selecting a private
doctor, are equally without the means to be selective.
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the information provided by the minor. Consequently, it was assumed
that parents would in fact be more reliable sources of such
information.84
The Court found that, at least for "immature and dependent mi-
nors, [a parental notification] statute plainly serves the important con-
siderations of family integrity"85 and parent-child "consultation" in
matters raising, for some, "profound moral and religious concerns."86
In reaching this conclusion the Court necessarily assumed a wide range
of facts about family communication and relationships. The fundamen-
tal premises implicitly, if not explicitly, made by the Court were: 1)
that even involuntary consultation with a parent or parents regarding
matters such as sex, pregnancy and an abortion choice would be benefi-
cial to the minor;8" 2) that parents act in the best interests of their
minor children;88 and 3) even if they do not, that "[1]egal restrictions on
minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be impor-
tant to the child's chances for the full growth and maturity that make
eventual participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding".89
Legal restrictions also may be important to the integrity of the institu-
tion of the family in general.90 These assumptions would seem to lead
to the view that mandatory notice or consent laws would, in practice,
improve parent-child communication and support the family as a social
institution.
In sustaining parental involvement laws containing a statutory
procedure that allows a minor to get a waiver of the consent require-
ment from a judge-a "judicial bypass option"-the Court also made
assumptions regarding the operation and impact of the bypass proce-
dure itself.91 In particular, the Court implicitly found that such proce-
, See H.L., 450 U.S. at 411. Contra id. at 442-43 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(stating that the majority opinion failed to identify what types of information may be
provided by parents or why it is available only to parents and not to the minors).
85 Id. at 411.
" Id. at 409 (quoting Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 640-41 (quoting Danforth, 428 U.S.
at 91 (Stewart, J., concurring))).
8" See H.L., 450 U.S. at 409. But see id. at 446 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that this assumption does not apply when the minor's pregnancy results from in-
cest, when a hostile parental response is assured, or when the minor's fear of such a
response deters her from the abortion she desires).
88 See H.L., 450 U.S. at 437; see also Parham, 442 U.S. at 602 (The law's con-
cept of the family "recognizes that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the
best interests of their children.").
88 Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 638-39.
90 See id. at 637-39.
81 See, e.g., Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 490-93. Relying almost entirely on the prece-
dent of Bellotti II, H.L., and Akron, the Court in Ashcroft saw the issue presented as
"one purely of statutory construction: whether Missouri provides a judicial alternative
that is consistent with these established legal standards." Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 491-92.
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dures would serve the state's interests in separating mature from imma-
ture minors and in accurately assessing the best interests of immature
minors. It also implicitly found that there actually exists a category of
immature minors whose best interests are served by requiring notifica-
tion or consent, even at the risk of significant delay in or deterrence
from obtaining an abortion. Finally, the Court implicitly found that the
statutory bypass procedure relieves all mature minors and minors
whose best interests would be served by an abortion of the conceded
burdens imposed by a mandatory notice or consent requirement. The
Court presumably assumed that the judicial bypass procedure accom-
plished this without imposing severe additional burdens of its own on
all minors, their families, and health care providers.92
3. Reality Disproves Speculation:
Experience and Social Science
a. The Minnesota and Massachusetts Experience
93
Of the states that presently have statutes requiring parental in-
volvement in a minor's abortion choice,9 4 Minnesota's law is the most
No further constitutional scrutiny was performed, even though Ashcroft was the first
case presenting the Court with a true Bellotti //-type bypass law.
" See Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 655-56 & n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring) (declining to
join the majority opinion because the burden imposed by a duly enacted scheme may
itself have been unconstitutional and was not before the Court).
" This section is drawn primarily from the district court's opinion and, where
necessary, from the record at trial in the case of Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp.
756 (D. Minn. 1986). Hodgson was tried in February and March of 1986. The author
of this Article is one of the attorneys for plaintiffs in the Hodgson case. The case is the
first across-the-board challenge to a notice or consent/bypass law in operation. While
there exists no equally comprehensive record of the Massachusetts experience, all avail-
able sources indicate that it is strikingly similar. See, e.g., infra note 97. See generally
Brief Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees by the Judicial Consent for Minors Law-
yer Referral Panel, An Organization of Lawyers Who Represent Pregnant Minors
Seeking Judicial Consent to Confidential Abortions in Massachusetts at 1-5, 20-34, 37-
38, Hartigan v. Zbaraz, 56 U.S.L.W. 4053 (U.S. Dec. 14, 1987) [hereinafter Zbaraz
Amicus Brief] (setting forth the effects and operation of the Massachusetts judicial by-
pass procedure and arguing that it creates a substantial burden on minors and does not
advance any legitimate state interest).
N Twenty-three states have some form of either mandatory parental notification
or consent legislation for abortion. For statutes requiring notification, see GA. CODE
ANN. § 15-11-112 (1987); IDAHO CODE § 18-609(6) (Supp. 1986); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 38, para. 81-54(3), 81-64 (Smith-Hurd 1986); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN.
§ 20-102, -103 (1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343 subd. 2 (West Supp. 1988);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-107 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 442.255 (Michie
1986); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.12(B) (Anderson 1985); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-7-304 (1978); W. VA. CODE § 16-2F-3(a) (1985). For statutes requiring consent,
see 1987 Ala. Acts 87-286 (approved by the governor June 25, 1987); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 36-2152 (1986), amended by 1987 Ariz. Legis. Serv. ch. 192 (West)
(approved by the governor Apr. 29, 1987); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25958
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restrictive.95 Minnesota and Massachusetts have had the most long-
standing and comprehensive experience with an operating and actively
enforced judicial bypass system.96 Between them, well over 7,000 mi-
(West 1984), amended by 1987 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1237 (West) (approved by the
governor Sept. 27, 1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-2.5 (West Supp. 1985); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.732 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1299-35.5 (West Supp. 1986); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12S (West
1983); 1986 Miss. Laws ch. 448; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.028 (Vernon Supp. 1987);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-03.1 (1981); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3206 (Purdon
1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.7-6 (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-30 (Law. Co-op.
1976).
Eight of these statutes are currently under court injunction. See Roe v. Collins,
No. 85-2118PHX (D. Ariz. Aug, 14, 1987) (Arizona); Eubanks v. Collins II, No.
C82-0360-L(A) (W.D. Ky. filed June 6, 1986) (Kentucky); Hartigan v. Zbaraz, 534
F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill. 1984), modified, 763 F.2d 1532 (7th Cir. 1985), affd without
opinion by an equally divided court, 56 U.S.L.W. 4053 (U.S. Dec. 14, 1987) (Illinois);
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756 (D. Minn. 1986), petition for cert. before
judgment in the Court of Appeals denied, 107 S. Ct. 1333 (1987) (this petition at-
tempted to consolidate the case with Zbaraz), affd, 827 F.2d 1191 (8th Cir. 1987),
vacated and reh'g granted, Nos. 86-5423/86-5431 (8th Cir. Nov. 13, 1987) (rehear-
ing held in abeyance pending Supreme Court decision in Zbaraz), judgment reinstated
and reh'g en banc granted, Nos. 86-5423/86-5431 (8th Cir. Dec. 31, 1987) (Minne-
sota); Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. Rosen, 633 F. Supp. 1123 (N.D. Ohio
1986), appeal dismissed sub nom. Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. Slaby, 805
F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1986) (Ohio); Barnes v. Mississippi, No. J86-0458(W) (S.D.
Miss. filed June 30, 1986) (Mississippi); Glick v. McKay, 616 F. Supp. 322 (D. Nev.
1985) (Nevada); American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists v. Thornburgh,
656 F. Supp. 879 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (Pennsylvania).
Three of the statutes, those of Idaho, Montana, and South Carolina, are facially
unconstitutional under the analysis of Bellotti II and the alternate majority in H.L.
because they fail to provide minors with a judicial mechanism to bypass the parental
notice or consent requirement. See Bellotti 11, 443 U.S. at 646-50; H.L., 450 U.S. at
420 (Powell & Stewart, JJ., concurring); id. at 450-54 (Marshall, Brennan & Black-
mun, JJ., dissenting). For this reason, these statutes are generally not enforced.
" Minnesota requires notification of both a minor's parents without exception for
divorce, separation, or other comparable situations. See MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 144.343(3) (West 1986).
6 Minnesota's law requires two-parent notification before a minor's abortion or a
judicial waiver of the requirement. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343(2)-(7) (West
1986). The effective date of this provision was August 1, 1981. A temporary restraining
order was issued in Hodgson v. Minnesota on July 30, 1981, see Hodgson, 648 F.
Supp. at 770; the case challenges the constitutionality of the law both on its face and as
applied. Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 760. On July 31, 1981, the district court tempora-
rily restrained enforcement of MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343(2) (West 1986) (requir-
ing notification without a bypass option) and on August 1, the judicial bypass proce-
dure in subdivision 6 of the law went into effect. Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 770. On
January 23, 1985, the district court granted summary judgment to defendants on plain-
tiff's claim that the law was unconstitutional under the due process clause on its face,
id., and the challenge to the statute "as applied" went to trial in February and March
of 1986, id. at 759-60. At the time of trial, the bypass law had been operating for five
years. On November 6, 1986, the district court declared the law unconstitutional and
granted plaintiffs the injunctive relief they sought. Id. at 781. On August 28, 1987, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court, Hodgson, 827 F.2d 1191
(8th Cir. 1987), but that decision was subsequently vacated. Hodgson, Nos. 86-5423/
86-5431 (8th Cir. Nov. 13, 1987). The Eighth Circuit granted a rehearing, id., but
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nors have petitioned the courts for a waiver of the notification or con-
sent requirements.9
The real impact of such bypass laws on minors who go to court,
on those who cannot, on the families of pregnant minors, and on the
provision of health care was systematically documented for the first
time in the five-week trial of Hodgson v. Minnesota." The trial re-
vealed that the judicial bypass alternative to parental notification and
consent requirements does not afford minors a meaningful choice. Al-
ready pregnant, without supportive parents, and facing financial and
logistical obstacles to obtaining an abortion,9" the trial record demon-
strated that these laws compel minors to choose among trauma in the
courthouse, crisis at home, and unwanted teen-age motherhood. The
pages of trial testimony, depositions, and exhibits tell a story of burdens
and harm that the Supreme Court neither imagined nor antici-
held the rehearing in abeyance pending the Supreme Court's decision in Hartigan v.
Zbaraz, affd without opinion by an equally divided court, 56 U.S.L.W. 4053 (U.S.
Dec. 14, 1987). Following the Zbaraz decision, the Eighth Circuit has reinstated the
court of appeals judgment and granted rehearing en banc. Hodgson, Nos. 86-5423/86-
5431 (8th Cir. Dec. 31, 1987).
Massachusetts law requires the consent of both parents, or the custodial parent if
divorced, or a judicial waiver of the requirement. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 112,
§ 12S (West 1983). Although the predecessor to this statute had been enjoined before
ever being implemented, see Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 625 n.1, preliminary injunctive
relief as to the parental consent portion of the amended statute was denied. See Planned
Parenthood League v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006, 1023 (1st Cir. 1981). The challenge to
the statute is still pending, but the bypass scheme has been operating since the post-
Bellotti II version of the statute became effective.
" See Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 765 (3,573 from 1981-86 in Minnesota); Zbaraz
Amicus Brief, supra note 93, at 2 (4,000 from 1981-87 in Massachusetts); see also
Mnookin, Bellotti v. Baird: A Hard Case, in IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN: ADVO-
CACY, LAW REFORM AND PUBLIC POLICY 149, 239 (1985) (approximately 1,300 from
April 1981 to February 1983 in Massachusetts).
9' 648 F. Supp. 756; see supra note 93.
" The obstacles for adult women seeking abortions in Minnesota-such as low
availability of services, cost, inconvenience, travel, weather, and loss of privacy-are
that much more severe for minors. See Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 761 (discussing the
availability of abortion services in Minnesota). Nationwide, the trend is the same. See
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISKING THE FUTURE: ADOLESCENT SEXUALITY,
PREGNANCY AND CHILDBEARING 114 (1987) [hereinafter NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL] (a publication of the National Academy of Sciences); Cates, Abortions for
Teenagers, in ABORTION AND STERILIZATION: MEDICAL AND SOCIAL ASPECTS 139,
144-45 (1981). The harsh effect of the unavailability of services on teens is exacerbated
because teenagers generally tend to seek abortions later in pregnancy than do adult
women. See Cates, Adolescent Abortions in the United States, 1 J. ADOLESCENT
HEALTH CARE 18, 20 (1980); Henshaw, Forrest & Blaine, Abortion Services in the
United States, 1981 and 1982, 16 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 119, 125 (1984) (reduced
availability of second trimester abortion services); Grimes, Second Trimester Abortions
in the United States, 16 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 260, 261-62 (1984) (disproportionate need
for second trimester abortions among adolescents).
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pated'°°-of proposed ameliorative measures that have themselves be-
come insurmountable barriers to the exercise of fundamental rights and
of even the most laudable of governmental objectives undermined by the
very means chosen to effectuate them. 01 Contrary to the best of judicial
prediction and logic, the experiences of Minnesota and Massachusetts
have shaken the very foundation of the constitutional conclusions of
Bellotti II, H.L., Akron, and Ashcroft.
The federal district court found that "Minn. Stat. § 144.343(2)-
(7) imposes the substantial burden of obtaining a judicial waiver of the
parental notification requirement on a group of minors composed al-
most entirely of either mature minors or minors whose best interests
are not served by notification."10 2 The court concluded that "[t]his sub-
stantial burden is not justified by the state's interests in encouraging
intra-family communication and protecting immature minors because
[the law] fails to further either of those interests . . . .""' In short,
"[f]ive weeks of trial . . . produced no factual basis upon which the
court [could] find that Minn. Stat. § 144.343(2)-(7), on the whole fur-
thers in any meaningful way the state's interest in protecting pregnant
minors or assuring family integrity," ''"4 nor, if it does so at all, that it
"promotes these values more than it undermines them."1 5
In support of these factual conclusions, the court found that the
judicial bypass option resulted in occasional breaches of confidentiality
and that routine court scheduling problems, compounded by other fac-
tors, frequently resulted in a delay of more than a week in obtaining an
abortion.' Such delays created a statistically significant increase in the
medical risk of abortion for the minor; even shorter delays may push
her from the first into the second trimester of pregnancy, necessitating
"cgreater costs, inconvenience, and medical risk."' 0 7 The judicial bypass
100 Only Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion in Bellotti II, hinted at the
burdens a bypass requirement might itself impose. See Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 655-56
(Stevens, J., concurring). Indeed, in Hodgson, the district court noted, "it appears...
that the prophecy with which Mr. Justice Stevens closed his concurrence in Bellotti 11
is fulfilled." Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 776.
101 There is substantial evidence to support the allegation that, at least for some
legislators, the real purpose behind parental notice and consent laws is "to deter and
dissuade minors from choosing to terminate their pregnancies." See, e.g., Hodgson, 648
F. Supp. at 766. Indeed, the Hodgson defendants were unable to persuade the court
that, in practice, the Minnesota statute served any legitimate purpose in any meaning-
ful way. See id. at 768.
102 Id. at 776.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 775.
105 Id. at 768.
10 See id. at 763.
107 Id.; see also NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 99, at 277 (delays
that result in postponements until the second trimester of pregnancy can result in an
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procedure produced fear, tension, anger, and resentment in minors who
were compelled "to reveal intimate details of their personal and family
lives to . . . strangers."' 0 8 They were made to feel "guilty and
ashamed" about their lifestyles and their desire to terminate preg-
nancy.1 09 In fact, the bypass procedure was considered by some minors
to be more difficult than the abortion procedure itself.110
As Minnesota discovered, "[s]ome mature minors and some minors
in whose best interests it is to proceed without notifying their parents
are so daunted by the judicial proceeding that they forego the bypass
option and either notify their parents [against their best interests] or
carry to term.""' Those choosing to brave the courthouse in order to
exercise their right to an abortion "tend to'be above average in intelli-
gence, education, and personal motivation. They also tend to be ambi-
tious and concerned about the effect their decision will have on their
futures."" 2 It is an underclass of teenagers, already possessing few op-
tions, that is deprived of yet one more.
In Minnesota, statistical data confirmed that the notification law
deterred some teenagers from aborting, thus forcing them to carry to
term. In the City of Minneapolis, where the most complete data were
available, the figures were startling. The birthrate for teenagers 15-17
years old (those burdened by the notice requirement) rose 38.4% from
1980-1984".. while the birthrate for teenagers 18-19 years old (those
unaffected by the law), rose a mere 0.3%.114 Statewide statistics on teen
pregnancy in Minnesota indicated that the parental notification statute
may have slowed down the decline in the rate of births to minors.
115
increased health risk to the mother).
108 Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 763.
,o9 See id.
110 See id. at 763-64.
1* Id. at 763.
112 Id. at 767.
"I See Plaintiffs' Exhibit 116, Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. 756 (No. 3-81-538) [here-
inafter Hodgson P.Ex. 116] (on file with the ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project);
Transcript of Record at 2022-23, Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. 756 (No. 3-81-538) [herein-
after Hodgson Record] (on file with the ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project) (testi-
mony of Dr. Edward Ehlinger, Director of Personal Health Services, Minneapolis
Health Department). Further, the birthrate for teenagers 15-17 years old had risen
only 2% over the entire nine-year period prior to passage of the notification law. Id. at
2023-24.
114 See Hodgson P.Ex. 116, supra note 113; Hodgson Record, supra note 113, at
2025-26 (testimony of Dr. Edward Ehlinger, Director of Personal Services, Minneapo-
lis Health Department).
"' See Hodgson Record, supra note 113, at 38-39, 42 (testimony of Dr. Stanley
Henshaw, Deputy Director of Research, Alan Guttmacher Institute, Feb. 10, 1986).
For a comparison of adolescents' use of abortion services with and without parental
notification, see Torres, Forrest & Eisman, Telling Parents: Clinic Policies and Ado-
lescents' Use of Family Planning and Abortion Services, 12 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 284,
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Finally, the state-wide abortion rate for those 15-17 years old, during
the period that the notification law was in effect, declined much more
noticeably than did the rate for those 18-19 years old, who were not
covered by the parental notification law. "'
Additional burdens imposed by the bypass procedure fell upon mi-
nors who successfully navigated the court process but were deprived of
optimal medical care as a result. Doctors and clinics were compelled to
forego the use of certain time-consuming precautionary medical proce-
dures in order to permit minors to get through court, obtain the abor-
tion, and travel home all in one day."' Not suprisingly, counselling
sessions began to focus on the court experience and the feelings it
evoked, rather than on the abortion choice and procedure and their at-
tendant emotions."' Finally, involuntary parental involvement" 9 is
often destructive to the medical welfare of the pregnant adolescent, and
a preoperative judicial proceeding that produced tension and stress 20
291-92 (1980). See generally Tietze, Teenage Pregnancies: Looking Ahead to 1984,
10 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 205, 205-07 (1978) (discussing teenage pregnancy and abortion
rates generally).
18 See Hodgson Record, supra note 113, at 32-33 (testimony of Dr. Stanley Hen-
shaw, Deputy Director of Research, Alan Guttmacher Institute, Feb. 10, 1986); id. at
2026 (testimony of Dr. Edward Ehlinger, Director of Personal Health Services, Min-
neapolis Health Department).
11. For example, the use of laminaria by ob-gyn doctors providing abortions to
Minnesota minors had to be curtailed if the abortion was to remain a one-day proce-
dure. Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 92 (vol. II) at 14-15, 103, Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. 756
(No. 3-81-538) [hereinafter Hodgson P.Ex. 92] (deposition testimony of Dr. Jane
Hodgson). Laminaria is made from a seaweed extract, laminaria digitata, and is often
used to soften and dilate the cervix prior to a second trimester abortion or, on a minor,
even prior to a first trimester abortion. See, e.g., Grimes & Gates, Dilatation and
Evacuation, in SECOND TRIMESTER ABORTION 119, 127 (1981); Hodgson, Abortion
by Vacuum Aspiration, in ABORTION AND STERILIZATION: MEDICAL AND SOCIAL As-
PECTS 225, 227 (1981); Gates, Schulz & Grimes, The Risks Associated with Teenage
Abortion, 309 NEW ENG. J. MED. 621, 624 (1983); Grimes, Schulz & Gates, Preven-
tion of Uterine Perforation in Curettage Abortion, 251 J. A.M.A. 2108, 2109, 2111
(1984); Schulz, Grimes & Gates, Measures to Prevent Cervical Injury During Suction
Curettage Abortion, 1 LANCET 1182, 1183 (1983). Laminaria must be inserted at least
six hours prior to the abortion to be fully effective. See Hodgson P.Ex. 92 (vol. I),
supra, at 103-05 (deposition testimony of Dr. Jane Hodgson). Since laminaria inser-
tion is the first step in the abortion procedure, a judicial waiver must be obtained before
insertion. For many minors, there is simply not enough time in one day to go to court
and have the full benefits of laminaria. Hodgson Record, supra note 113, at 105-06
(testimony of Paula Wendt, clinic counselor, Feb. 10-11, 1986).
18 Id. at 57-62 (testimony of Paula Wendt, clinic counselor, Feb. 10-11, 1986).
118 See Hodgson Record, supra note 113, at 1357-58 (testimony of Dr. Steven
Butzer, psychiatrist); Hodgson P.Ex. 92 (vol. I), supra note 117, at 124 (deposition
testimony of Dr. Jane Hodgson).
120 See Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 763-764 ("Some minors are so upset by the
bypass proceeding that they consider it more difficult than the medical procedure itself.
Indeed, the anxiety resulting from the bypass proceeding may linger until the time of
the medical procedure and thus render the latter more difficult than necessary.").
[Vol. 136:655
SPECULATION AND REALITY
was always contrary to medical judgment and the minors' best interests.
The burdens imposed were not justified by the state's purported
interest in protecting parent-child consultation because, as the district
court found, consultation with a parent regarding an abortion choice
was frequently inadvisable and detrimental to the family unit.12' Physi-
cal, sexual, and psychological abuse among family members was preva-
lent in Minnesota, as elsewhere,'22 and "[n]otification of an abusive or
even a disinterested absent parent may reintroduce that parent's disrup-
tive or unhelpful" behavior toward the minor and the rest of the family
in a time of stress.'23 Moreover, statutory exceptions made for minors
fearful of abuse did not provide meaningful relief chiefly because
"[m]inors who are victims of sexual or physical abuse often are reluc-
tant to reveal the existence of the abuse to those outside the home."' 24
Even for minors who did not fear abuse, the revelation, through
inadvertence' 25 or compulsion, 2' of a pregnancy or proposed abortion
121 See supra notes 111-20 and accompanying text.
122 See Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 764. Studies indicating two million incidents of
family violence annually in the United States substantially underestimate the problem.
See M. STRAUS, R. GELLES & S. STEINMETZ, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS 4 (1980). In
1978, the FBI estimated that 25% of all homicides in the United States occur between
family members. L. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 38 (1984). In
Minnesota, battering of women by their partners "has come to be recognized as per-
haps the most frequently committed violent crime." See MINNESOTA DEP'T OF COR-
RECTIONS, MINNESOTA PROGRAM FOR BATTERED WOMEN, 1985 UPDATE 4 (1985).
Further, 55% of battered women reported that their abuser also battered their children.
Walker & Edwall, Domestic Violence and Determination of Visitation and Custody in
Divorce, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL DIMEN-
SIONS OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 127, 135 (1987). Of course, these reported figures do not
include low-level or unreported abuse. See Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 768-769 (setting
forth statistics on family violence with the caveat that underreporting is to be expected).
2I Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 764. Notification can also be dangerous. See id. at
769 ("Notification of the minor's pregnancy and abortion decision can provoke violence
...."). This is particularly true because the incidence of violence in an abusive dys-
functional family appears to escalate during pregnancy. See Gelles, Violence in Preg-
nancy: A Note on the Extent of the Problem and Needed Services, 24 FAM. COORDI-
NATOR 81-86 (1975). See generally H.L. 450 U.S. at 439 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
("[T]he minor [forced by statute to notify her parents] may confront physical or emo-
tional abuse.").
"24 Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 764.
Many minors in Minnesota live in fear of violence by family members;
many of them are, in fact, victims of rape, incest, neglect and violence. It is
impossible to accurately assess the magnitude of the problem of family
violence in Minnesota because members of dysfunctional families are char-
acteristically secretive about such matters and minors are particularly re-
luctant to reveal violence or abuse in their families. Thus the incidence of
such family violence is dramatically underreported.
Id. at 768-69.
125 Id. at 768.
126 See Hodgson Record, supra note 113, at 910-11, 993 (testimony of Dr. Elissa
Benedek, psychiatrist); see also id. at 2543-46 (testimony of Dr. Henry David, psychol-
1988]
684 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
generally had a negative impact on and could provoke crisis and dishar-
mony in the family. x27 Any parent-child consultation resulting from
such a revelation lacked the voluntarism that is the "hallmark" of pro-
ductive communication in a healthy family. 2 "
Addressing the aspect of Minnesota's law requiring that both par-
ents be notified, the court found that "the need to notify the second
parent or to make a burdensome court appearance actively interferes
with the parent-child communication voluntarily initiated by the child,
communication assertedly at the heart of the State's purpose in requir-
ing notification . -12 Both the burdensome, intrusive court process
and notification of an abusive or disinterested second parent could dis-
tract from, complicate, and harm any communication process that had
already been voluntarily undertaken.' 30 The court also found that "the
ogist) (noting that the adolescent's privacy is important not only to the adolescent, but
also to her parents because of their ambivalence about their daughter's sexual activity);
id. at 1147-49 (testimony of Dr. Gary Melton, Director of the Law-Psychology Pro-
gram, University of Nebraska) (describing the importance of privacy to adolescents and
the effects of denying it to them).
"' In general, the revelation of a secret, such as pregnancy, by one family member
can result in "acute shock waves" to the delicate family system. Grunebaum & Glick,
The Basics of Family Treatment, in 2 PSYCHIATRY UPDATE, THE AMERICAN PSYCHI-
ATRIC ASSOCIATION ANNUAL REVIEW 202 (1983). For this reason, clinicians find that
at times "secrets are better kept secret. While sharing secret feelings . . . may be use-
ful, revealing . . . [a secret] can be destructive. Decisions in this area require clinical
sensitivity and empathy rather than rules." Id. at 203.
"' See Hodgson Record, supra note 113, at 906, 930-31 (testimony of Dr. Elissa
Benedek, psychiatrist); cf. id. at 2355-56 (testimony of Dr. Vincent Rue, psychothera-
pist) (defendants' expert conceding that when parental notification is involuntary, the
family does not receive the benefit of the child's having trusted her parents with her
problems). In sum, "experts . . . of unquestionably high standing in their respective
fields agreed [at trial] that although family relationships benefit from voluntary and
open communication, compelling parental notice has an opposite effect. It is almost
always disastrous." Hodgson v. Minnesota, 827 F.2d 1191, 1197 (8th Cir. 1987), va-
cated and reh'g granted, Nos. 86-5423/86-5431 (8th Cir. Nov. 13, 1987) (rehearing
held in abeyance pending Supreme Court decision in Hartigan v. Zbaraz, 763 F.2d
1532 (7th Cir. 1985), affd without opinion by an equally divided court, 56 U.S.L.W.
4053 (U.S. Dec. 14, 1987)), judgment reinstated and reh'g en banc granted, Nos. 86-
5423/86-5431 (8th Cir. Dec. 31, 1987). See generally D. CURRAN, TRAITS OF A
HEALTHY FAMILY 59-63, 99-103, 231-33, 257 (1983) (among the fifteen traits dis-
cussed are affirmation and support of family members, a sense of trust among the fam-
ily, respect for the privacy of family members, and the ability of the family to admit to
and seek help for its problems).
139 Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 778.
130 Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 764, 769, 778. The two-parent requirement is par-
ticularly onerous in single-parent families. "In 1978, there were 1.1 million divorces
and 2.2 million marriages . . . . If the current level of divorce continues on a lifetime
basis, the proportion of marriages ending in divorce may be close to 40 percent." U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, DIVORCE, CHILD CUSTODY, AND
CHILD SUPPORT 1 (Series p-23 No. 84 1979). In 1980, 18.4% of all births were out-of-
wedlock, L. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 215 n.* (1985), and a census
official estimates that 59% of children born in 1983 will live in single-parent families
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requirement that minors notify both biological parents actually re-
duce[d] parent-child communication" by dissuading minors from notify-
ing one parent, since they were going to court anyway.13'
In both Minnesota and Massachusetts, experience has demon-
strated that the burdens imposed by bypass systems on all minors are
not counterbalanced by the state's desire to identify immature minors
whose best interests compel parental involvement." 2 Although the os-
tensible purpose of a judicial bypass mechanism is to permit an impar-
tial, adult decisionmaker to separate immature minors whose best inter-
ests compel notification from all other minors, judges in Massachusetts
and Minnesota have not in fact had the opportunity to do so. Data
from both states indicate that nearly every petition filed was granted 3
and several of those denied were anomalies13 4 or were refused due to
the judge's "unfamiliarity" with the bypass procedure and its stan-
dards.' These statistics indicate that either immature "non-best inter-
est" minors do not exist,3" judges are unable to detect them,3 7 or such
before the age of 18, id. "Divorce or separation usually impairs family communication
severely. The non-custodial parent often has very little communication with the child.
In addition, communication between divorced or separated spouses frequently is
marked with . . hostility and . . . vindictiveness . . . ." Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at
769. Reintegration of the non-custodial parent into the family is often disruptive and
harmful and does not result in the reestablishment of beneficial relations between a
minor and an absent parent. Id.
"I' Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 769. In Minnesota, 20-25% of minors who go to
court are accompanied by, or have notified, one parent. Id. at 764. "[Alpproximately 75
percent of Massachusetts minors seeking in-state abortions do consult their parents and
obtain parental consent." Zbaraz Amicus Brief, supra note 93, at 42 n.8 (citation
omitted).
"' Note that other state interests "must give way to the constitutional right" of
minors outside this category to obtain a confidential abortion. Akron, 462 U.S. at 428
n.10.
... In Minnesota, 3,558 of the 3,573 bypass petitions were granted; six were with-
drawn and nine were denied. See Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 765, 781. In Massachu-
setts, jn slightly less than two years, 90% of the 1,300 minors petitioning were judged
mature; five petitions were denied, three of which were overturned on appeal, one was
granted by a second judge, and one minor went out-of-state for her abortion. See NA-
TIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 99, at 195 (citing Mnookin, supra note 97);
see also Zbaraz Amicus Brief, supra note 93, at 20-21 (11 denials through 1987, all
but one reversed on appeal).
134 See Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 765 (regarding Minnesota); see, e.g., Hodgson
Record, supra note 113, at 1286 (testimony of Judge George Peterson that he denied
only one petition of more than 700 received and that his denial served to spare a minor
who did not want an abortion from being coerced by her boyfriend into having the
operation).
Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 765.
136 It is not at all inconceivable that it cannot, logically, be in the best interest of
an immature minor to consult with her parents against her will if requiring her to do
so will delay her abortion or deter her from obtaining an abortion at all. In short, it
may never be in the best interest of an immature minor to become a parent, and there-
fore it may never be in her best interest to require her to do something that may lead to
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minors do not or cannot get through the court process to its comple-
that result. See Melton & Pliner, Adolescent Abortion: A Psycholegal Analysis, in AD-
OLESCENT ABORTION: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES 1, 33-34 (1986) (Report of
the Interdivisional Committee on Adolescent Abortion, American Psychological Associ-
ation) [hereinafter APA REPORT] ("It is hard to imagine a minor too immature to
make the decision [whether to abort] but mature enough to bear a child."). Gary Mel-
ton, who was both Chair of the APA Interdivisional Committee and author of portions
of the APA REPORT, supra, testified as an expert witness in the Hodgson trial. See
Hodgson Record, supra note 113, at 1103-1227.
Moreover, "while there may be 'no logical relationship between the capacity to
become pregnant and the capacity for mature judgment concerning the wisdom of an
abortion,' some relationship does exist between the decision to abort in privacy and the
capacity for mature judgment concerning the wisdom of this decision." Hodgson, 648
F. Supp. at 767-68 (quoting H.L., 450 U.S. at 408); see id. at 775.
M The testimony of judges who, in the aggregate, heard 90% of the petitions in
Minnesota, indicated that there was no consensus regarding the meaning of "maturity."
Compare Hodgson Record, supra note 113, at 21-22 (testimony of Judge Allen
Oleisky, Feb. 11, 1986) (maturity is synonymous with ability to give informed consent,
and a mature decision was one made independently for good reasons after weighing
available alternatives and giving thought to the future) and id. at 1032 (testimony of
Judge William Sweeney) (maturity and ability to give informed consent are synony-
mous in practice and refer to a child of sufficient intellect to appreciate her situation
and make a rational decision based on available alternatives) with id. at 408 (testimony
of Judge Gerald Martin) (minors are ostensibly immature by definition, yet an imma-
ture person might give informed consent if she were given appropriate background in-
formation); see also id. at 1293-96 (testimony of Judge George Peterson) (maturity and
ability to give informed consent are the same and are evaluated based on the minor's
manner and conduct, her activities and whether they indicate an acceptance of responsi-
bility, and the thought she has given to her decision); id. at 2008 (testimony of Judge
Neil Riley) (maturity and ability to give informed consent are synonymous and depend
on the minor's having been counselled and her understanding of the ramifications of
her decision). See generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 99, at 277
(such an undefined standard runs "the risk of being inconsistently interpreted and ap-
plied, as well as being inaccurate").
Similarly, there was no consensus at trial regarding the meaning of "best interest."
Compare Hodgson Record, supra note 113, at 23-24 (testimony of Judge Allen
Oleisky, Feb. 11, 1986) ("best interest" refers to the choice between abortion and child-
birth, not to parental notification) and id. at 10-11 (testimony of Judge Henry Al-
brecht, Feb. 19, 1986) ("best interest" refers to the choice between abortion and
childbearing) and id. at 1032-33 (testimony of Judge William Sweeney) ("best inter-
est" refers to "whether or not it is in the best interest of this particular minor to do the
procedure") with id. at 1296 (testimony of Judge George Peterson) ("best interest"
refers to parental notification only, not to whether an abortion is in the minor's best
interest). See generally Zobel, Judges and Abortion: The Judicial Question Becomes
Political, Christian Sci. Monitor, Oct. 17, 1984, at 16, col. 1 (arguing that the judge's
role in deciding a minor's best interest is "entirely non-judicial").
In general, testimony at trial indicated that minors and their single parents are
better able to determine the effects of involving an additional family member in the
abortion -decision than are judges. Minors, especially those from violent or dysfunc-
tional families, can accurately predict their families' reactions to notification of the mi-
nors' pregnancy. See Hodgson Record, supra note 113, at 314-15 (testimony of Dr.
Lenore Walker, clinical psychologist); id. at 911 (testimony of Dr. Elissa Benedek,
psychiatrist). Similarly, the parent accompanying a minor through the court process,
with whom she has voluntarily communicated, is generally in the best position to pre-
dict the other parent's reaction to notification. See id. at 2009 (testimony of Judge Neil
Riley); see also Hodgson v. Minnesota, 827 F.2d 1191, 1200 (8th Cir. 1987) ("[T]he
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tion.1" For these reasons, and because it does not involve counselling 3 9
or promote consultation, the bypass process does not appear to serve
any purpose whatsoever. "4 In sum, documentation of the actual func-
tioning of these laws
suggest[s] that special provisions for judicial review of ado-
lescents' abortion decisions have served as obstacles to protec-
tion of privacy and to diminution of stress. At best, they are
benign but costly and purposeless legal procedures. At worst,
they increase pregnant minors' delay in seeking medical at-
tention and induce embarrassment, anxiety, family conflict " "
and unwanted teen motherhood. Nevertheless, after finding that the
law should be unconstitutional upon this record, the district court felt
precluded from restraining its enforcement on this ground." 2
b. Social Science, Medicine, and Professional Opinion
A growing body of psychological and medical research has con-
firmed what the court in Hodgson found: the harm imposed on minors
minor and/or custodial parent, and not a court, is in the best position to determine
whether notifying the non-custodial parent would be in the child's best interests"), va-
cated and reh'g granted, Nos. 86-5423/86-5431 (8th Cir. Nov. 13, 1987) (rehearing
held in abeyance pending Supreme Court decision in -Hartigan v. Zbaraz, 763 F.2d
1532 (7th Cir. 1985), affd without opinion by an equally divided court, 56 U.S.L.W.
4053 (U.S. Dec. 14, 1987)), judgment reinstated and reh'g en bane granted, Nos. 86-
5423/86-5431 (8th Cir. Dec. 31, 1987).
138
Minnesota courts have denied only an infinitesimal proportion of the peti-
tions brought since 1981. This fact indicates that in Minnesota immature,
non-best interest minors rarely seek judicial authorization to terminate
their pregnancies without parental involvement. Such minors either inform
their parents, obtain an abortion outside Minnesota, or carry the preg-
nancy to term.
Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 767.
139 Id.
140 All witnesses at trial who had any direct involvement with implementation of
the bypass procedure agreed that it served no purpose and instead functioned as a
traumatic barrier to timely abortion services for minors. Nearly every judge involved in
adjudicating minors' petitions in Minnesota testified at trial and agreed with this con-
clusion. Id. at 766; id. at 775. Trial testimony in Minnesota included the testimony of
Judge Garrity who adjudicated such petitions in Massachusetts. Id. at 766; see also
Melton, Legal Regulation of Adolescent Abortion: Unintended Effects, 42 AM. Psy-
CHOLOGIST 79, 80 (1987) (there is no evidence that judicial bypass proceedings pro-
mote more reasoned decisions). Moreover, the Court in Hodgson found that those im-
mature minors who notify their parents rather than go to court do so because of their
immaturity and not because of the notification law. See Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 775.
141 Melton, supra note 140, at 82 (based on a review of all available data and
studies regarding the implementation of bypass laws in Minnesota and Massachusetts).
141 See Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 776-77; infra text accompanying notes 175-85.
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by mandatory parental involvement laws cannot be justified by any of
the asserted state interests because these interests have turned out to be
based more on cliche and folklore than on empirical fact. For example,
contrary to the assumptions made by both legislatures and courts, by all
available measures143 minors are on average indistinguishable from
adults in their ability to understand and reason about health care alter-
natives.1 44 These findings confirm the prevailing theories of cognitive
development, 45 which place adolescents in the most advanced stage of
development, thereby presuming them to be capable of abstract reason-
143 Experts measure competency in the decisionmaking context by examining abil-
ity to make and express a preference among alternatives, ability to understand and
appreciate the nature and consequences of a particular choice, ability to reason about
alternatives and rationally weigh risks and benefits, and ability to arrive at an objec-
tively reasonable choice. See Meisel, Roth & Lidz, Toward a Model of the Legal Doc-
trine of Informed Consent, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 285, 287 (1977); Roth, Meisel &
Lidz, Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatment, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 279,
280-82 (1977); Weithorn & Campbell, The Competency of Children and Adolescents
to Make Informed Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD DEv. 1589, 1595-96 (1982).
144 See Kaser-Boyd, Adelman & Taylor, Minors' Ability to Identify Risks and
Benefits of Therapy, 16 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY: RESEARCH AND PRAC. 411, 411-12
(1985); Kaser-Boyd, Adelman, Taylor & Nelson, Children's Understanding of Risks
and Benefits of Psychotherapy, 15 J. CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOLOGY 165, 166 (1986);
Weithorn & Campbell, supra note 143, at 1596. See generally CHILDREN'S COMPE-
TENCE TO CONSENT (1983) (arguing that minors have the ability to understand com-
plex medical issues concerning their health and should be allowed to make such deci-
sions); Interdivisional Committee on Adolescent Abortion, American Psychological
Association, Adolescent Abortion: Psychological and Legal Issues, 42 AM. PSYCHOLO-
GIST 73, 73 (1987) [hereinafter APA SUMMARY REPORT] (suggesting that legislatures
should recognize the proven ability of minors to make intelligent decisions regarding
abortion); Melton, Developmental Psychology and the Law: The State of the Art, 22 J.
FAM. L. 445, 463-66 (1984) (suggesting that, "for most purposes, there is no basis for
differentiation of adolescents from adults on the ground of competence alone").
Although it is of course true that some minors do not use these abilities in what
would appear to be an objectively mature or rational way, it is equally true that most
adults would fail some of the available tests of competency on occasion. See C. LIDZ, A.
MEISEL, E. ZERUBAVEL, M. CARTER, R. SESTAK & L. ROTH, INFORMED CONSENT:
A STUDY OF DECISION MAKING IN PSYCHIATRY 26-30 (1984); cf. Thompson, Psy-
chological Issues in Informed Consent, in 3 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECIsIONs 86-87
(1982) (President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medical and Bi-
omedical and Behavioral Research); Melton, Children's Participation in Treatment
Planning: Psychological and Legal Issues, 12 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY 246, 247 (1981)
(noting that some jurisdictions did not distinguish between 19 year old minors and 21
year old adults in cases alleging malpractice due to lack of informed consent). In addi-
tion, "the limited evidence available from studies of pregnancy and contraceptive deci-
sion making suggests that minors may equal adults in their competence to reason about
decisions, and that differences between minors and adults in decision-making perform-
ance may be a result of the circumscribed role of adolescents in the family and society"
regarding empowerment and responsibility in general. Lewis, Minors' Competence to
Consent to Abortion, 42 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 84, 87 (1987).
14 See Grisso & Vierling, Minors' Consent to Treatment: A Developmental Per-
spective, 9 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY 412, 418-20 (1978).
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ing in a logical manner. 146 Moreover, studies have shown that minors
are capable of making reproductive decisions, such as whether or not to
terminate a pregnancy, 4" and of providing health histories, as accu-
rately as are their parents.'4  Finally, many states have statutorily rec-
ognized that minors are competent to make medical treatment choices
relating to pregnancy without parental involvement.' 49
148 See D. ELKIND, CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS: INTERPRETIVE ESSAYS ON
JEAN PIAGET 99-103 (1974); J. FLAVELL, THE DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
JEAN PIAGET 204-06 (1963); B. INHELDER & J. PIAGET, THE GROWTH OF LOGICAL
THINKING 335 (1958).
147 See Lewis, supra note 144, at 86; Lewis, A Comparison of Minors' And
Adults' Pregnancy Decisions, 50 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 446, 451 (1980); Melton
& Pliner, Adolescent Abortion: A Psycholegal Analysis, in APA REPORT, supra note
136, at 18-19. See generally APA SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 144.
To the extent that the abortion decision differs from other medical choices because
of the moral or religious issues that may be implicated for some, it is clear that by age
14 adolescents have developed their own sense of conscience and morality. See generally
2 L. KOHLBERG, ESSAYS ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL
DEVELOPMENT 171 (1984) (most adolescents are capable of advanced moral reason-
ing); Mischel & Mischel, Development and Behavior, in MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND
BEHAVIOR: THEORY, RESEARCH AND SOCIAL ISSUES 87-88 (1976) (adolescents are
capable of moral reasoning). Further, they are capable of weighing such factors in
making an abortion choice consistent with their own sense of what is right for them.
See Smetana, Reasoning in the Personal and Moral Domains: Adolescent and Young
Adult Women's Decision Making Regarding Abortion, 2 J. APPLIED DEv. PSYCHOL-
OGY 211 (1981). For a somewhat different analysis of moral judgment, see C. GILLI-
GAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 17-18, 66, 95-101 (1982) (discussing gender-related dif-
ferences in moral development).
As to the effect of factors other than specific competence, it is "noteworthy that
comparisons of personality functioning between adolescents who abort and those who
carry to term generally show more adaptive, healthier functioning in the former
group." Melton & Pliner, supra, at 19. See Dixon, Teenage Pregnancy: A Personality
Comparison of Prenatal and Abortion Groups, 38 DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INT'L
168-A, 168-A (1977); Falk, Gispert & Baucom, Personality Factors Related to Black
Teenage Pregnancy and Abortion, 5 PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN Q. 745-46 (1981);
Kane & Lachenbruch, Adolescent Pregnancy: A Study of Aborters and Non-Aborters,
43 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 796, 802-03 (1973); see also Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at
767-68, 775 (suggesting that there is a relationship between the decision to abort in
privacy and the ability to make mature decisions).
14I See McKinney, Chin, Reinhart & Trierweiler, Health Values in Early Ado-
lescence, 14 J. CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOLOGY 315, 316 (1985).
"I See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8-6 (1984); ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.100(3)-(4)
(1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-363(d) (1976); CAL. CIV. CODE § 34.5 (West 1982);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 708(b) (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 743.065(1) (West
1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-2(a)(5)(1985); HAW. REV. STAT. § 577A-2 (1985);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111, para. 4501 (Smith-Hurd 1978); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-123
(1986); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 214.185(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.53(e) (West 1977); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-
102(4) (1982); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12F (Law. Co-op. 1985); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 144.343(1) (West Supp. 1987); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-3(i) (West 1981 &
Supp. 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 431.061 (1)(4)(a) (Vernon Supp. 1987); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 41-1-402(c) (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 129.030(1)(c), (2)
(Michie 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17A-1 (West 1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-1-
13 (1986); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2504(3) (McKinney 1985); N.C. GEN. STAT.
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Contrary to the assumptions of both courts and legislatures, the
abortion procedure itself is safer than continued pregnancy and child-
birth.1 50 Abortion is rarely followed by significant medical151 or psycho-
logical 152 sequelae. Statistical studies have demonstrated that the life
§ 90-21.5(a)(ii) (1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2602(A)(3) (West 1984); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 10103 (Purdon 1977); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 35.03 (a)(4)
(Vernon 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-5(4)(f) (1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 54-
325.2(D)(2) (1982).
Many of these statutes, which grant minors the right to make their own decisions
regarding medical treatment concerning pregnancy, are the same statutes that require a
minor to give parental notice or obtain consent for an abortion. A comparison of the
statutes listed above with those listed supra note 94, reveals that abortion has been
statutorily singled out as an exception. Because minors are equally competent to make
the abortion choice and because minors who abort generally tend to be better function-
ing in other respects, see supra notes 143-49 and accompanying text, this statutory
distinction defies both reason and reality. But see H.L., 450 U.S. at 412-13 (assuming
that the decision to abort carries "potentially more grave emotional and psychological
consequences").
150 At eight weeks of gestation or earlier, the risk of death from abortion is about
20 times lower than that of childbirth, see LeBolt, Grimes & Gates, Mortality from
Abortion and Childbirth: Are the Populations Comparable?, 248 J. AM. MED. A.
188, 191 (1982), and at no point in pregnancy is abortion more dangerous than child-
birth, see Gates, Smith, Rochat & Grimes, Mortality from Abortion and Childbirth:
Are the Statistics Biased?, 248 J. A.M.A. 192, 195-96 (1982).
Teenagers, particularly young teenagers, have a two and a half times greater risk
of death from continued pregnancy or childbirth than adult women. ALAN
GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, TEENAGE PREGNANCY: THE PROBLEM THAT HASN'T
GONE AWAY 29 (1981) [hereinafter HASN'T GONE AWAY]. This is equally true for
morbidity rates (major health complications). See id. at 28-29; Gates, Schultz &
Grimes, The Risks Associated with Teenage Abortion, 309 NEW ENG. J. MED. 621,
622 (1983). For example, women younger than age 15 are 15% more likely to suffer
from toxemia, 92% more likely to develop anemia, and 23% more likely to suffer com-
plications from a premature delivery than are women age 20-24. See HASN'T GONE
AWAY, supra, at 29.
While studies show that prenatal care might alleviate some of the problem, see
Makinson, The Health Consequences of Teenage Fertility, 17 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 132,
133 (1985), a significant percentage of teenagers in the United States do not obtain
prenatal care in the first three months of pregnancy. See Singh, Torres & Forrest, The
Need for Prenatal Care in the United States: Evidence from the 1980 National Na-
tality Survey, 17 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 118, 119 (1985).
151 For example, abortions have no demonstrable negative effect on subsequent
pregnancies either in the United States, see Scheinberg v. Smith, 550 F. Supp. 1112,
1117 (S.D. Fla. 1982); Chung, Smith, Steinhoff & Mi, Induced Abortion and Sponta-
neous Fetal Loss in Subsequent Pregnancies, 72 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 548, 551
(1982) or worldwide, see Hogue, Gates & Tietze, The Effects of Induced Abortion on
Subsequent Reproduction, 4 EPIDEMIOLOGIC REVS. 66, 88-89 (1982); see also C.
TIETZE & S. HENSHAW, INDUCED ABORTION: A WORLD REVIEW 1986, at 97-105
(6th ed. 1986) (examining complications and sequelae from induced abortion).
152 Studies show that the most frequent emotional response to the abortion proce-
dure is relief. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 99, at 195; Adler &
Dolcini, Psychological Issues in Abortion for Adolescents, in APA REPORT, supra note
136, at 84. Severe psychological aftereffects are very rare, see Marecek, Consequences
of Adolescent Childbearing and Abortion, in APA REPORT, supra note 136, at 110,
and other sequelae such as regret, depression, or guilt "are mild and diminish rapidly
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consequences of the choice to carry to term are vastly more grave, long-
lasting, and irreparable.
15 3
Studies have similarly conflicted with the assumption that parental
input into an adolescent's decisionmaking in the areas of sex, preg-
nancy, and abortion is good for the adolescent. For example, communi-
cation between parents and their adolescent children about sexuality
over time and general functioning is not adversely affected," Adler & Dolcini, supra, at
84. In addition, adverse psychological aftereffects such as depression are more common
for childbirth than for abortion. See Cates, Adolescent Abortions in the United States, 1
J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH CARE 18, 22 (1980). See generally Marecek, supra, at 112
(suggesting that severe emotional consequences rarely, if ever, occurred, and that there
is evidence that suggests positive changes in personality in some cases).
"'3 Teen-age motherhood, particularly unwanted motherhood, is often psychologi-
cally, economically, and educationally devastating. Mothers who give birth before age
18 are only half as likely to have graduated from high school than those who postpone
childbearing until after age 20. See Card & Wise, Teenage Mothers and Teenage Fa-
thers: The Impact of Early Childbearing on the Parents' Personal and Professional
Lives, 10 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 199, 203-04 (1978); see also Moore & Waite, Early
Childbearing and Educational Attainment, 9 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 220, 222-23 (1977);
Mott & Marsiglio, Early Childbearing and Completion of High School, 17 FAM.
PLAN. PERSP. 234, 235-36 (1985). They are four to five times less likely to finish
college. See Card & Wise, supra, at 204. Families headed by teenage mothers are seven
times more likely than others to be poor, and the younger the mother, the lower the
family income. See HASN'T GONE AWAY, supra note 150, at 33. See generally,
Marecek, supra note 152, at 98-108 (long-term effects of carrying to term can include
negative impact on educational and occupational attainment, economic status, marital
experiences, and subsequent childbearing).
The children of teenage mothers are also adversely affected. They are twice as
likely to die in infancy as the children of women in their 20's. See HASN'T GONE
AWAY, supra note 150, at 29. They are more likely to be premature or of low birth
weight. See id. But see Social Factors, Not Age, Are Found to Affect Risk of Low Birth
Weight, 16 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 142, 142 (1984) (arguing that factors other than youth,
such as race, prematurity, untimely prenatal care, and low maternal weight, are in fact
the cause of low birth weight). Low birth weight is itself a major cause of infant mor-
tality, serious illness, birth injury, mental retardation, and other neurological defects.
See HASN'T GONE AWAY, supra note 150, at 29; Substantially Higher Morbidity and
Mortality Rates Found Among Infants Born to Adolescent Mothers, 16 FAM. PLAN.
PERSP. 91, 91-92 (1984). Moreover, the children of teenage mothers also suffer educa-
tional disadvantage, tend to have lower I.Q. and achievement scores, and are more
likely to repeat at least one grade. See Baldwin & Cane, The Children of Teenage
Parents, 12 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 34, 37 (1980). In addition, children born to teenage
mothers as the result of a denial of permission to abort have been shown to manifest
particular problems in adjustment, mental and physical capacity, and in the mother/
child-relationship. Cf Caplan, The Disturbance of the Mother-Child Relationship by
Unsuccessful Attempts at Abortion, 38 MENTAL HYGIENE 67, 77 (1954) (reporting the.
findings of studies on development problems of children born as the result of denied
abortions); David & Matejcek, Children Born to Women Denied Abortion: An Update,
13 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 32, 33 (1981) (same); Hook, Refused Abortion: A Follow-Up
Study of Two Hundred and Forty Nine Women Whose Applications Were Refused by
the National Board of Health in Sweden, 42 ACTA PSYCHIATRICA SCANDINAVICA 71-
88 (1966) (same); Born Unwanted: Developmental Effects of Denied Abortion (H.
David, Z. Dytrych, Z. Matejcek & V. Schuller eds. forthcoming) (same). See generally
Marecek, supra note 152, at 111 (noting that in Europe, studies indicate that such
children are deficient in numerous areas when compared to a control sample).
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and related matters is characterized by severe discomfort on both sides
and is often entirely absent from the parent-child relationship. 54 Clini-
cians thus question the rationality of an emphasis on parental consulta-
tion regarding such matters. 155 Moreover, compelling parental involve-
ment in adolescent decisionmaking can be detrimental to the
psychological development and maturation of the adolescent. Individua-
tion from parents, 56 control over the process and consequences of deci-
sionmaking,1 57 and a sense of privacy itself'58 are all critical to the
'" See Fox & Inazu, Mother-Daughter Communication About Sex, 29 FAM. REL.
347, 349-50 (1980); Rothenberg, Communication About Sex and Birth Control Be-
tween Mothers and Their Adolescent Children, 3 Pop. & ENV'T 35 (1980); see also
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 99, at 102-03 (review of studies of sexu-
ally active teenagers demonstrates that communication between parents and children on
matters concerning sex is often ineffective).
155 Upon finding that communication about sex is absent and uncomfortable with
parents but more prevalent with peers, one researcher noted the following:
Although parents, particularly mothers, have traditionally been
viewed as the most appropriate persons to inform children about sex, the
present findings cause us to question this assumption. More than one-
third of the mothers indicated they did not find it easy to discuss sex with
their children. If this is the case, why burden them with a task they find
difficult and as a result avoid?
Rothenberg, supra note 154, at 48-49. The author goes on to suggest that sex educa-
tion in school may be the appropriate response to the problem.
M Development of an individual identity and value system are the most impor-
tant developmental tasks confronting the adolescent. See Blos, The Second Individua-
tion Process of Adolescence, 22 PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY CHILD 162, 162-64 (1967).
... Learning to make decisions independently is critical to the individuation pro-
cess. In fact, control over decisionmaking, both perceived and actual, leads to psycholog-
ical well-being, high academic achievement, high motivation, high self-esteem and be-
havioral responsibility. See deCharms, Personal Causation and Perceived Control, in
CHOICE AND PERCEIVED CONTROL 29 (1979); Melton, Decision Making by Children:
Psychological Risks and Benefits, in CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 21, 27-
34 (1983). Loss of control over decisionmaking or a social message that a minor is not
competent to make decisions can result in rebellion, depression, hypertension, or regres-
sion. See, e.g., J. BREHM, A THEORY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE 2 (1966) (dis-
cussing relationship between decisionmaking, need satisfaction, and health and well-
being); M. SELIGMAN, HELPLESSNESS: ON DEPRESSION, DEVELOPMENT, AND DEATH
9-11, 20 (1975) (consistent feelings of helplessness lead to health and emotional
problems); Strickland, Internal-External Expectancies and Cardiovascular Function-
ing, in CHOICE AND PERCEIVED CONTROL, supra, at 221, 228 (suggesting "that the
relationship(s) between real control and perceived control is (are) complex and unlikely
to be understood through any simple hypotheses linking control and adaptive function-
ing" because "individual attributions such as perceived control or learned helplessness
may be embedded in a net of numerous other cognitions that would be expected to
interact with behavior"); Bandura, Self-Efficacy Mechanism in Human Agency, 37 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 122, 136-37 (1982) (suggesting that ability to control events is stress-
reducing and that lack of control leads to severe anxiety).
158 The need for privacy is integral to the process of differentiating and integrat-
ing in relation to society as a whole. See Melton, Minors and Privacy: Are Legal and
Psychological Concepts Compatible?, 62 NEB. L. REV. 455, 487-88 (1983).
"[C]hildren's experiences with privacy feed back into their sense of self-esteem and help
define the ranges, limits, and consequences of individual autonomy within our society."
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transition from adolescence to adulthood.
Based on the foregoing medical and behavioral research, and on
the experiences with such laws in both Minnesota and Massachusetts,
major nonpartisan professional groups such as the American Psycho-
logical Association and the National Academy of Sciences have issued
reports summarizing these findings.1 59 These groups have called for the
abolition of laws requiring parental notification or consent for a minor
seeking an abortion16 and have noted the burdens imposed by judicial
bypass procedures,'' as well as their unworkable and inaccurate na-
ture." 2 They have also joined the numerous groups that have argued
against such laws as amici curiae before the Supreme Court.'63
Id. at 487 (footnote omitted).
151 See APA REPORT, supra note 136; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra
note 99.
160 See, e.g., APA REPORT, supra note 136, at 33; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUN-
CIL, supra note 99, at 278-79.
161 See, e.g., APA REPORT, supra note 136, at 23-28; NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCI., supra note 99, at 195, 277.
16I See APA REPORT, supra note 136, at 23-24; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
supra note 99, at 277.
"6I See Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (Center for Constitutional Rights; Planned
Parenthood Federation of America, Inc.); Bellotti II, 443 U.S. 622 (Medical Organiza-
tions: American Academy of Child Psychiatry; Society for Adolescent Medicine; Associ-
ation of Planned Parenthood Physicians; American Public Health Association. Family
Planning Organizations: Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc.; National
Family Planning Forum, Inc. Women's Organizations: YWCA National Board.);
H.L., 450 U.S. 398 (Medical Organizations: Association of Planned Parenthood Physi-
cians, Inc.; American Academy of Child Psychiatry. Family Planning Organizations:
Coalition for the Medical Rights of Women; Planned Parenthood Federation of
America, Inc. Legal Organizations: Juvenile Law Section of the National Legal Aid
and Defender Association. Other Professional Associations: American Association of
Sex Educators, Counselors, and Therapists; National Association of Social Workers,
Inc.; Association for Women in Psychology); Akron, 462 U.S. 416 (Medical Organiza-
tions: American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists; American Medical Associ-
ation; American Academy of Pediatrics Nurses Association of the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists; Association of Planned Parenthood Physicians, Inc.;
Society for Adolescent Medicine; American Psychiatric Association. Family Planning
Organizations: Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc.; National Family
Planning and Reproductive Health Association, Inc.; Center for Population Options;
Reproductive Rights National Network. Legal Organizations: NAACP Legal Defense
and Educational Fund, Inc.; California Women Lawyers; Women Lawyers' Associa-
tion; Emergency Civil Liberties Committee; Equal Rights Advocates; National Law-
yers Guild; National Bar Association (Women Lawyers Division). Religious Organiza-
tions: National Council of Jewish Women; American Jewish Congress; American
Jewish Committee. Other Professional Organizations: American Psychological Associa-
tion; American Association of Sex Educators, Counselors and Therapists. Women's Or-
ganizations: Committee for Abortion Rights and Against Sterilization Abuse; National
Women's Health Network; National Organization for Women.); Ashcroft, 462 U.S.
476 (Medical Organizations: Association of Planned Parenthood Physicians, Inc.; Soci-
ety for Adolescent Medicine; American Psychiatric Association. Family Planning Orga-
nizations: Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc.; National Family Planning
and Reproductive Health Association, Inc. Religious Organizations: American Jewish
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4. The Hodgson Litigation
From the outset, the State of Minnesota defended the constitution-
ality of one of the most restrictive mandatory parental notification laws
in the country"" by taking the position that the district court was pre-
cluded from inquiring into the actual effects of a notification/judicial
bypass scheme in operation." 5 Pointing to prior decisions of the United
States Supreme Court,'66 the state ignored nearly a century of Ameri-
can jurisprudence' 67 in arguing that legislative facts previously assumed
by the Supreme Court' were "legal principles," which could not be
explored by a district court through the introduction of "evidence" at
trial. 16 9 Moreover, the state argued that, far from being "issues of fact
Congress. Other Professional Organizations: American Association of Sex Educators,
Counselors and Therapists.); Hartigan v. Zbaraz, 763 F.2d 1532 (7th Cir. 1985), affd
without opinion by an equally divided court, 56 U.S.L.W. 4053 (U.S. Dec. 14, 1987)
(Medical Organizations: American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists; Ameri-
can Academy of Pediatrics; American Medical Women's Association. Family Planning
Organizations: Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc.; National Abortion
Federation; National Abortion Rights Action League; Center for Population Options.
Health Organizations: American Public Health Association; National Black Women's
Health Project; National Women's Health Network; American Psychological Associa-
tion. Legal Organizations: Center for Constitutional Rights; Committee to Defend Re-
productive Rights; Equal Rights Advocates; Northwest Women's Law Center; National
Organization for Women Legal Defense and Education Fund; Women's Law Project,
Women's Legal Defense Fund. Religious Organizations: American Jewish Congress
(Minnesota and Massachusetts); National Council of Jewish Women; Anti-Defamation
League (Minnesota and Massachusetts). Women's Organizations: American Associa-
tion of University Women; Coalition of Labor Union Women; National Federation of
Business and Professional Women's Clubs, Inc. of the United States of America; Na-
tional Organization for Women; National Women's Political Caucus; Women's Equity
Action League. Other Organizations: U.S. Student Association; Americans for Demo-
cratic Action; National Campaign to Restore Abortion Funding; Voters for Choice.).
164 See supra note 95.
165 See, e.g., Defendants' Post-Trial Brief at 42, Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F.
Supp. 756 (D. Minn.) (No. 3-81-538) [hereinafter Defendants' Post-Trial Brief] ("Ev-
idence Of The 'Effects Of A Judicial Bypass Applied In Conformance With The Stan-
dards Of Bellotti 1I Is Immaterial To Its Constitutionality").
166 See Defendants' Post-Trial Brief, supra note 165, at 42; see also Brief of State
of Minnesota Filed in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Before Judgment at 8-11, Hodgson, 648 F.
Supp. 756 (No. 86-882) [hereinafter Opposition to Petition for Certiorari] (discussing
Bellotti II, 443 U.S. 662, H.L., 450 U.S. 398, and Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476). For a
discussion of these cases, see supra notes 66-92 and accompanying text. For an analysis
and rebuttal of the state's argument in this regard, see infra notes 186-226 and accom-
panying text.
167 See supra notes 2-39 and accompanying text.
168 See supra notes 74-92 and accompanying text; supra note 27.
169 Opposition to Petition for Certiorari, supra note 166, at 3. The state con-
tended that
trial in this matter was not to be held to explore, through alleged "evi-
dence," the correctness of the legal principles recognized by . . .[the Su-
preme] Court in Ashcroft . . ., Matheson . . ., and Bellotti II . . . Nor
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subject to trial," these empirical assumptions about minors and families
are principles "inherent in the very fabric of our culture, society and
system of government."17 The state thus concluded that it did not bear
the burden of "prov[ing] as matters of fact" that its asserted interests
are significant or even legitimate,17 1 "or even that laws . . . designed to
comport with these fundamental principles have achieved .. a speci-
fied quantum of success, in the eyes of the court, in fulfilling their
goals. '17 2 The State of Minnesota thus adopted a self-imposed limit on
the scope of permissible proof at trial 3 and attempted to meet its
heavy burden 17  by relying on facts assumed in prior cases which it
contended were legal principles immune from evaluation by subsequent
courts.
Because "law has always been dominated by ideas of the past long
after they have ceased to be vital in other departments of learning"
17 5
and because precedent continues to be revered, 17 6 the district court's
conclusions of law failed to follow from its post-trial findings of fact.
would it appear that the factual nature of the supposed "burden" imposed
by the underlying requirement of advance notice to both parents was to be
tried as an issue of fact insofar as it relates to the functioning of the no-
tice/bypass system operating in tandem.
Id.; see also Reply Brief of Appellants and Cross-Appellees State of Minnesota at 17-
18, Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. 756 (Nos. 86-5423-MN, 86-5431-MN) [hereinafter Reply
Brief of Appellants] ("[Tihe cases. . . have articulated a rule of law, the application of
which is in no way conditioned upon any particular lower court agreement with its
... underpinning as matters of 'fact'.").
170 Opposition to Petition for Certiorari, supra note 166, at 9. The state would
presumably consider the principles universal, unchanging, even divine. Cf supra text
accompanying note 3.
1 See Opposition to Petition for Certiorari, supra note 166, at 10.
172 Id.
17 The state believed that the only issue reserved for trial was whether its judicial
bypass mechanism had in fact been operating with the requisite confidentiality (ano-
nymity) and expedition. See id. at 3. It claimed to have therefore "refrained from con-
suming the time of the trial court or potential witnesses with philosophical or sociologi-
cal debate" regarding its asserted interests and whether they had in fact been served by
operation of the notification law. Id. at 10-11. In its brief on appeal, the state argued
that to have attempted to prove that its interests were served by the law "would have
been a waste of the court's time." Reply Brief of Appellants, supra note 169, at 20
n.16. Given the state's difficulty in finding credible expert testimony in support of its
case, see Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 768, 774-75 (finding state's "experts" to be lacking
in credibility and qualifications), it appears that the state may have adopted this stance
to hide its inability to meet its burden of proof.
174 See infra notes 227-48 and accompanying text.
175 Pound, supra note 6, at 25.
176 See, e.g., Akron, 462 U.S. 416, 419-20 ("[T]he doctrine of stare decisis, while
perhaps never entirely persuasive on a constitutional question, is a doctrine that de-
mands respect in a society governed by the rule of law." (footnote omitted)); Thurston
Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand, Ltd., 460 U.S. 533, 534-35 (1983) (chastising
the appellate court for twisting the facts in order to distinguish the case from what the
Ninth Circuit had referred to as a "most troublesome precedent").
19881
696 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
The court "reject[ed] plaintiffs' challenge to Minnesota's notification/
bypass requirement as a whole,' 1  despite its finding "as a matter of
fact"'78 that the law "fails to further either of [the state's asserted] in-
terests in any meaningful way,"'7 9 and despite its recognition that
"[wihen, as here, the state's asserted interest fails to justify the burden
imposed upon pregnant minors by an abortion regulation, the Supreme
Court has invalidated such regulations as unduly burdensome upon the
rights of pregnant minors.'
8 0
The district court reasoned that while it was proper to inquire into
and make findings regarding "the existence of a particular state of facts
[previously] assumed but never demonstrated,"'' it was nevertheless
not the "court's place to determine whether the facts actually demon-
strated at trial comport or conflict with any assumptions the Supreme
Court may have made" in prior cases.'8 2 The court concluded that,
"[w]ere [it] writing on a clean slate, it could not uphold the constitu-
tionality of" Minnesota's notification/bypass law but believed this con-
clusion to be precluded by Bellotti II and Ashcroft even on the facts as
found.' 3 In short, the district court understood the Supreme Court in
Ashcroft to have directed all subsequent courts to disregard the facts in
determining constitutional results in the area of minors' abortion
17 Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 777. Although the court refused to invalidate Min-
nesota's law "as a whole," the court nevertheless found both its waiting period and its
two-parent notice requirement to be unconstitutional. Id. at 777-81. The court further
found that the two-parent notice requirement was not severable from the remainder of
the statute. Id. The entire statute is thus under court injunction at this time. Id. at 781.
The court of appeals relied on the district court's findings of fact, concluding that they
were supported by the record and not clearly erroneous, Hodgson, 827 F.2d 1191, 1198
(8th Cir. 1987), vacated and reh'g granted, Nos. 86-5423/86-5431 (8th Cir. Nov. 13,
1987) (rehearing held in abeyance pending Supreme Court decision in Hartigan v.
Zbaraz, 763 F.2d 1532 (7th Cir. 1985), affd without opinion by an equally divided
court, 56 U.S.L.W. 4053 (U.S. Dec. 14, 1987)),judgrment reinstated and reh'g en banc
granted, Nos. 86-5423/86-5431 (8th Cir. Dec. 31, 1987), but affirmed the decision of
the lower court without modification in that it failed to reverse or even comment on the
lower court's rejection of the challenge to the law "as a whole." Id. at 1202.
178 Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 775.
178 Id. at 776; see also supra notes 98-142 and accompanying text (reviewing the
evidence adduced at trial on this point).
18 Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 776 (citations omitted).
181 Id. at 774.
182 Id. at 776.77. For a discussion of these assumptions, see supra notes 74-92
and accompanying text.
183 Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 776-77. For a description of the court's findings, see
supra notes 98-142 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 143-63 and accompa-
nying text (analyzing sociological, medical, and professional opinions concerning, inter
alia, the deleterious effects of notification/bypass statutes). For a discussion of how the
district courts in the cases consolidated in Brown felt similarly precluded, see supra
notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
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rights.184 Dutifully, the district court did exactly that.'
III. TOWARDS A MORE RIGHTS-PROTECTIVE RESULT:
THE "OPERATIONAL CHALLENGE"
The Hodgson"8 6 result"' is fundamentally inconsistent with judi-
cial review and appears to legitimate the abdication, at least by lower
federal courts, of their responsibility to safeguard constitutional rights.
In a challenge to an operational statutory scheme as in Hodgson, a
different conclusion is not only possible, but necessary for the adequate
protection of fundamental rights.' 8 This Part sets forth the defining
184 See Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 777. In sum, although the court made findings
of fact pursuant to "the factual inquiry mandated by the Carolene Products Court,"
id. at 774 (citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938)), to
the effect that Minnesota's law "is not [even] rationally related to the State's asserted
interests," Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 774, it read Ashcroft to "direct[ I that [its] inquiry
be limited instead to an issue purely of statutory construction: whether Minnesota pro-
vides a judicial alternative that is consistent with established legal standards," id. at 777
(citing Asheroft, 462 U.S. at 491-92). The court's reading of Ashcroft was, however,
incorrect in this regard. The question before the Supreme Court in Ashcroft was indeed
limited to statutory interpretation by the statement of issues presented made to the
Court by the parties. See 50 U.S.L.W. 3928 (U.S. 1982). Though properly limiting its
own review in that case, the Court in its opinion nowhere "directed" all future consti-
tutional review of such statutes to be thus limited regardless of the questions or factual
record presented to subsequent courts.
185 See Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 777. Moreover, the district court apparently
believed that any other result would constitute an effort to overrule Supreme Court
precedent. Id. at 776.
188 Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 774 (D. Minn. 1986), petition for
cert. before judgment in the Court of Appeals denied, 107 S. Ct. 1333 (1987) (this
petition attempted to consolidate the case with Hartigan v. Zbaraz, 763 F.2d 1532 (7th
Cir. 1985), affd without opinion by an equally divided court, 56 U.S.L.W. 4053 (U.S.
Dec. 14,1987)), affd, 827 F.2d 1191 (8th Cir. 1987), vacated and reh'g granted, Nos.
86-5423/86-5431 (8th Cir. Nov. 13, 1987) (rehearing held in abeyance pending Su-
preme Court decision in Zbaraz), judgment reinstated and reh'g en banc granted,
Nos. 86-5423/86-5431 (8th Cir. Dec. 31, 1987).
87 See supra notes 177-85 and accompanying text. The term "Hodgson result"
here refers to the district court's dutiful disregard of factual findings that should have
compelled invalidation of Minnesota's law "as a whole" and to the resulting constitu-
tional validation by the Court of a state statute that burdened minors' fundamental
right to choose abortion independently and privately, although the statute in fact failed
to achieve or even to promote any legitimate state purpose. See Hodgson, 648 F. Supp.
at 776-77. As the term is used in this sense, it is of no consequence that the court in
Hodgson found an alternate and narrower basis for enjoining the notification law. See
supra note 177.
188 The district court in Hodgson appears to have been particularly concerned
with what a lower court was free to decide in the face of Supreme Court precedent.
Section C of this part of the Article addresses the role of facts in reaching a result in
lower courts and in the Supreme Court in the presence of prior cases in which the facts
in question were assumed. The central premise is that a legal result is impermissible if
it sustains, for any amount of time, a statute that infringes rights and that serves no
legitimate state purpose. Under the peculiar circumstances of the Hodgson case, the
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properties of an "Operational Challenge" and argues that a lower court
presented with such a challenge is uniquely free to rely on facts in
arriving at a rights-protective constitutional result at variance with ex-
isting precedent.
A. The Peculiar Importance of Facts to
an "Operational Challenge"
Constitutional challenges to statutory or regulatory law can take
many forms and can vary in the degree to which they rely upon or
require legislative fact-finding by courts. Such challenges may be
mounted either before or after the effective date of the statute in ques-
tion. They may attack the entire statutory scheme or only an individual
application or subset of applications of the statute. Finally, they may
challenge the statute on principle, contesting its facial validity, or they
may attack the factual underpinnings or impact of the operating statu-
tory scheme, through discovery, observation, and expert analysis where
available. These considerations, alone and in combination, determine
the form of constitutional challenge and determine, as well, the nature
and importance of legislative and adjudicative facts to the litigation and
to the judicial opinions that result.
Traditional concepts and terminology, such as "facial" versus "as
applied" analyses of constitutionality, offer a woefully inadequate
means of understanding the case law. The concepts are confused by the
courts and, as classically conceived, fail to account for what is unique
about cases such as Hodgson."8 9
"Facial" challenges to legislation, outside the context of the first
amendment, are "the most difficult challenge[s] to mount successfully,
since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists
under which the Act would be valid."' 90 Such challenges generally in-
statute in question was enjoined by the court on other grounds. See Hodgson, 648 F.
Supp. at 780-81. Ordinarily, the plaintiffs in a constitutional challenge would not be
thus protected. In such a case, fundamental rights would be subject to ongoing viola-
tion, in fact, and without means of legal address, either until Supreme Court review or,
if the Supreme Court denies review, ad infinitum.
189 See infra notes 205-08 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 98-142
(discussing the evidence presented and the findings of fact in Hodgson).
"'0 United States v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2100 (1987) (holding the Bail Re-
form Act to be "facially" constitutional); see Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside,
Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 n.5 (1982) ("A 'facial' challenge . . . means
a claim that the law is 'invalid in toto-and therefore incapable of any valid applica-
tion'." (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 474 (1974))). The Court in Sa-
lerno went on to note that "[tihe fact that the ... Act might operate unconstitutionally
under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid,
since we have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the
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volve judicial scrutiny of the four corners of the document, and the fac-
tual record may be limited or nonexistent. 1 ' The relevance of adjudica-
tive facts regarding the individual litigants may be disavowed by
choice192 or by doctrine, 93 and critical legislative facts often are as-
First Amendment." Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2100. But see H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S.
398, 427 & n.2 (1981) (Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting) (referring
to plaintiffs' claim as an "overbreadth challenge to an abortion statute"). For a discus-
sion of "overbreadth," see infra note 193.
191 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886) (finding of facial invalidity
based on "deductions from the face of the ordinance, as to its necessary tendency and
ultimate actual operation").
92 One example of a choice to disregard adjudicative facts is when the challenge
to the constitutionality of the law "as applied" to the plaintiff or criminal defendant,
see infra notes 197-201 and accompanying text, either is not made or is not pursued on
appeal. See, e.g., Houston v. Hill, 107 S. Ct. 2502, 2508 n.6 (1987) ("[t]he question
whether the ordinance has been unconstitutionally applied .. is neither presented by
this appeal nor essential to our decision"); Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2100 n.3 (no claim by
respondent that the law is unconstitutional as applied). Another example is when coun-
sel chooses not to develop adjudicative facts in a strategic attempt to obtain a broad
across-the-board invalidation of the law in question. For example, in H.L., counsel
insisted that "the specifics of the reasons [that H.L., a minor class representative, did
not wish to notify her parents of her abortion] are really irrelevant to the Constitutional
issue," 450 U.S. at 403, despite indication by the trial court that such specifics could be
important in determining the constitutionality of the notice requirement as applied in
specific circumstances. Id. at 403 n.7. One final example is when a case is commenced
before the challenged statute goes into effect, rendering adjudicative (and legislative)
facts speculative, even if relevant. See, e.g., Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 584 F. Supp. 1452,
1454 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (action instituted and injunction granted before the Act took
effect); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 483 F. Supp. 679, 683 (W.D. Mo.
1980) (temporary restraining order granted one day after statute's effective date).
193 The primary example of a facial case that is litigated and decided indepen-
dently of adjudicative facts by doctrine is an "overbreadth" challenge under the first
amendment. See, e.g., Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 107 S. Ct.
2568, 2571 (1987) (holding a total airport ban on first amendment activity to be sub-
stantially overbroad in that it created a virtually first amendment-free zone); Houston,
107 S. Ct. at 2508 ("a statute that is substantially overbroad may be invalidated on its
face"); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965) (rejecting an approach requir-
ing the "contours of regulation .. . to be hammered out case by case").
Both the "facial" nature of an "overbreadth" challenge and recognition of the
"chilling effect" of an overbroad law on free expression have led the Supreme Court to
permit a litigant as to whom a law has been applied constitutionally to raise the claims
of those as to whom it would be unconstitutional if applied. See, e.g., Coates v. City of
Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 619-20 (1971) ("Although a statute may be neither vague,
overbroad, nor otherwise invalid as applied to the conduct charged against a particular
defendant, he is permitted to raise its vagueness or unconstitutional overbreadth as ap-
plied to others."); Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 487 ("permitting determination of the inva-
lidity of [overbroad] statutes without regard to [their] permissibility . . . on the facts of
particular cases ...avoid[s] making vindication of freedom of expression await the
outcome of protracted litigation"); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432 (1963) (in
ruling on the first amendment constitutionality of a statute, "this Court has not hesi-
tated to take into account possible applications of the statute in other factual contexts
besides that at bar"); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940) ("Proof of an
abuse of power in a particular case has never been deemed a requisite for attack on the
constitutionality of a statute purporting to license the dissemination of ideas."); see also
1988]
700 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
sumed, judicially noticed, or determined a priori by logic or reference to
judicial precedent."" If a litigant meets the "heavy burden" of demon-
strating facial unconstitutionality,"9 ' the remedy is invalidation of the
law or the relevant provision in its entirety. 96
L. TRIBE, supra note 22, § 12-24 (discussing the chilling effect of vague and overbroad
statutes). But see Broaderick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973) (requiring "sub-
stantial" overbreadth for the facial invalidation of a law). In short, the Court has "not
required that all of those subject to overbroad regulations risk prosecution to test their
rights." Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 486. This is an exception to the usual rules of stand-
ing. See id.; United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1960); Note, Standing to
Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii, 88 HARV. L. REV. 423, 423-24 (1974) (discussing
exceptions to the Supreme Court's general rule that one may not claim standing to
vindicate the constitutional rights of a third party).
The result of this exception is that neither the constitutionality nor the facts re-
garding the application of the law to the particular plaintiff or criminal defendant in
that case are material to the overall constitutionality of the law or the court's power to
declare it. See, e.g., Houston, 107 S. Ct. at 2508 n.6; Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 487.
Interestingly, however, although evidence regarding the actual application and enforce-
ment of the law is not necessary for facial invalidation, such evidence has been found to
be probative of the law's potential for unconstitutional application, that is, probative of
its overbreadth. See Houston, 107 S. Ct. at 2508 n.6.
In a challenge to a statute as "void for vagueness," but when first amendment
freedoms are not at issue, adjudicative facts remain relevant for purposes of standing.
Hoffman, 455 U.S. at 495 n.7. However, some vagueness challenges are still considered
to be facial by doctrine. "As a matter of due process, a law is void on its face if it is so
vague that persons 'of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application'." L. TRIBE, supra note 22, § 12-28 (quoting Connally v.
General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)); see Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104, 108 (1972); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972);
see also Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964) (statute requiring oaths of all
teachers is "indefinite . . .[and] abut[s] upon sensitive areas of First Amendment free-
doms"). A statute that is "perfectly vague" in the sense that it is entirely standardless,
is vague "in all its applications" and thus unconstitutional on its face. L. TRIBE, supra
note 22, § 12-25; see Hoffraan, 455 U.S. at 494-95. Such a statute will be invalidated
in its entirety; see, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 578 (1974) (flag-misuse statute
is held void for vagueness in all its applications); Coates, 402 U.S. at 614 (statute
prohibiting sidewalk assembly held unconstitutionally vague because "no standard...
is specified"). Alternatively, a statute may be "vague as applied." See infra notes 197-
201 and accompanying text.
194 See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-03 (1979) (Court relies upon
presumption that parents act in the best interests of their children); cf. Posadas de
Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 106 S. Ct. 2968, 2976 & n.6, 2977-78 (1986)
(Supreme Court will "abide by the narrowing constructions announced by the Superior
Court and approved sub silentio by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico" because of its
understanding of the "unique [local] cultural and legal history"). But see FED. R.
EvID. 201(a) and advisory committee's note (permitting judicial notice of adjudicative
facts only). See generally Karst, supra note 26, at 84 (judges assume legislative facts
not found in the record).
' See, e.g., Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2100 ("A facial challenge to a legislative Act
is, of course, the most difficult challenge . . . since the challenge must establish that no
set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.").
196 See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2583 (1987) ("Creationism
Act" unconstitutional on its face); Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc.,
107 S. Ct. 2568, 2571 (1987) (resolution banning all "First Amendment activities" in
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"As applied" challenges to statutory or regulatory law assert that
a law actually was or will be applied in an unconstitutional manner as
to an individual 197 or a subclass of individuals198 within its reach. In
this type of challenge, the statute generally is in effect and enforced, 99
and the adjudicative and some of the legislative facts may be proven on
a fully developed factual record. 00 " Such challenges may be distin-
guished from those addressed to the "face" of a statute, first, because of
the availability and relevance of adjudicative and/or legislative facts,
and second, because of the nature of the remedy sought. In an "as ap-
plied" case, the court simply invalidates the application or enforcement
of the law as to the litigant and, either expressly or by operation of
precedent, to the class she represents. The challenged law remains in
airport terminal held facially unconstitutional).
117 See, e.g, Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544, 545 (1971) ("ordinance is so
vague and lacking in ascertainable standards of guilt that, as applied to Palmer it failed
to give" notice of what conduct is forbidden); id. at 546 (Stewart and Douglas, JJ.,
concurring) (basing their opinion on ground that ordinance is also "unconstitutionally
vague on its face"); see also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 564, 571 (1965) (anti-
picketing law constitutional "on its face" but unconstitutional "as applied" to a particu-
lar parade and demonstration led by Cox).
19' See, e.g., Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 107 S. Ct. 2862, 2870 (1987) (exemption from Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for religious organizations held constitutional "as applied
to the nonprofit activities of religious employers"); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398,
413 (1981) (parental notification requirement for abortion without judicial bypass op-
tion is constitutional "[a]s applied to the class [of immature, unemancipated minors]
properly before us"); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235-36 (1972) (invalidating
state's "generally valid" compulsory school attendance law as applied to the Amish).
199 Of course, so long as the plaintiff has standing and the claim is ripe for judi-
cial consideration, in theory an "as applied" challenge could be asserted against an
anticipated application of a law even before it takes effect. See generally Pennsylvania
v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 593 (1923) (ripeness doctrine "does not [require one]
to await the consum[m]ation of threatened injury to obtain preventative relief"), quoted
in Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 143 (1974).
200 For example, in Yoder, the challenged compulsory school attendance law had
been in operation since 1933. 406 U.S. at 227 n.15. As to the burden the law placed on
the constitutional rights of the Amish, the Court stated:
[T]he unchallenged testimony of acknowledged experts in education and
religious history, almost 300 years of consistent practice, and strong evi-
dence of a sustained faith pervading and regulating respondents' entire
mode of life support the claim that enforcement of the State's requirement
. . . would gravely endanger if not destroy the free exercise of respon-
dents' religious beliefs.
Id. at 219; see id. at 209-13 (summarizing expert testimony). In scrutinizing the state's
asserted interests, the Court rejected the speculation that Amish children who leave the
church would be unprepared for the world, holding that the state had failed to intro-
duce any particularized evidence of attrition from the Amish community, of the inade-
quacy of Amish home education, or evidence that two additional years of school would
make any difference in terms of preparation for life. Id. at 224-27. The Court also
noted the "independence and successful social functioning of the Amish community for
a period approaching almost three centuries . . . ." Id. at 226-27.
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operation, although subsequent applications may continue to be
challenged.2" 1
Thus, the customary distinction between the constitutionality of a
law "on its face" and "as applied" appears in most cases to be clear,
202
and the two forms of constitutional analysis often compete, as if oppo-
sites, for the prevailing view of the court. For example, appellate courts
frequently split, with majority and concurring or dissenting opinions
disagreeing over a "facial" versus an "as applied" conclusion in the
case presented.20 3 Moreover, courts frequently reject a facial attack but
go on to consider the constitutionality of a law as applied to the
litigants.20 4
However, neither of these concepts as traditionally used by the
courts are applicable to a constitutional challenge of the Hodgson
type.20  In Hodgson, plaintiffs challenged an operating state law
scheme based on evidence of the law's real operational impact as ap-
plied and enforced by the state throughout the effective period of the
law. The case is not an attack on the law "as applied," however, be-
cause plaintiffs sought across-the-board relief, not invalidation of a par-
ticular application or set of applications of the parental notice and by-
21 See, e.g., Palmer, 402 U.S. at 545 (Court reverses judgment against Palmer
without holding statute facially unconstitutional). See generally Schall v. Martin, 467
U.S. 253, 273 (1984) (rejecting challenge to state law permitting pretrial detention of
juveniles "on its face," but stating that "[iut may be . . . that in some circumstances
detention of a juvenile would not pass constitutional muster ... [b]ut the validity of
those detentions must be determined on a case-by-case basis").
202 At times, however, the terms become murky. For example, in H.L. v Mathe-
son the Court rejected a "facial" challenge to a law in favor of an "as applied" theory
of relief to a subclass of individuals, H.L., 450 U.S. at 413, but nevertheless referred to
the issue before it as "facial," presumably because the litigant chose not to develop a
factual record and had sought across-the-board invalidation as to a definable class of
individuals to which the law appeared to apply. See id. at 407.
203 See, e.g., Palmer, 402 U.S. at 545-46 (majority held ordinance unconstitu-
tional "as applied"; concurrence would hold ordinance unconstitutional "on its face");
United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 1004-05, 1010 (2d Cir. 1986) (opin-
ion of the court held Bail Reform Act unconstitutional "on its face"; concurrence would
hold Act unconstitutional "as applied"; dissent would hold Act constitutional).
204 See, e.g., County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 162-63 (1979) (stating that the
Court should not pass on the constitutionality of the "presumption of possession" stat-
ute "on its face," but should consider it "as applied to the facts"); T.L.J. v. Webster,
792 F.2d 734, 735 (8th Cir. 1986) (considering constitutionality of law requiring pa-
rental notification for abortion, first "facially" and then "as applied" to named plain-
tiffs in case). It is also common for a district court to grant in part and deny in part a
motion for summary judgment under FED. R. Civ. P. 56, holding a challenged law to
be constitutional "on its face" but holding that genuine issues of material fact remain to
be tried as to claims that the law is unconstitutional "as applied." See Hodgson, 648 F.
Supp. at 760; Weissman v. City of Alamogordo, 472 F. Supp. 425, 432 (D.N.M.
1979).
200 See supra notes 91-185 and accompanying text.
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pass law.2" 8 The case also is not, at the trial stage, an attack on the
"facial" validity of the law, because facial validity had previously been
adjudicated.20  Moreover, the case is not a descriptively "facial" attack
in the sense that it is addressed to the four corners of the law; both the
five-week trial and the district court's findings of fact were based on
record evidence and expert evaluation of nearly every application of the
law over its five years of operation.2"8
No existing term adequately describes a constitutional challenge of
the Hodgson variety. Thus, this Article proposes that the term "opera-
tional challenge" be adopted to identify an across-the-board constitu-
tional challenge to an operating statutory scheme when: a) that chal-
lenge is based on empirical evidence as to the statute's operating record
drawn from the totality of statutory applications; and b) the statute in
question is or previously has been held valid on its face.20 ' Again, a
case litigated in this fashion is neither "facial" nor "as applied" as
these terms traditionally have been understood.
Operational-style challenges are not unprecedented. 2 0 One exam-
ple of such a challenge is the recent Supreme Court case McCleskey v.
208 Cf Webster, 792 F.2d at 736-39 ("facial" challenge dismissed in part because
Supreme Court had upheld challenged statute; "as applied" challenge dismissed be-
cause the case was moot as applied to the individual litigants and no class with standing
to seek across-the-board relief had been certified).
207 Hodgson, 648 F. Supp at 760. The court's determination that the bypass por-
tion of the law was constitutional on its face purported to be on the authority of Bellotti
II, 443 U.S. 622 (1979), and Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476
(1983). See Hodgson v. Minnesota No. 3-81 CIV 538, slip op. at 4-9, (D. Minn. Jan.
23, 1985) (order denying summary judgment); supra notes 181-85 and accompanying
text.
208 The trial of the case involved the presentation of years of research and study,
taking the form of testimony by single parents, minors, abortion clinic nurses and coun-
selors, nationally renowned physicians, psychologists, psychiatrists, reproductive epide-
miologists, state court judges, guardians, and public defenders involved in the imple-
mentation of the judicial bypass procedure. Among the 57 witnesses whose testimony
forms a part of the Hodgson record, "[tihe court heard testimony of judges who collec-
tively [had] adjudicated over 90 percent of the parental notification petitions," Hodg-
son, 648 F. Supp. at 766, as well as testimony about each of the anomalous applica-
tions of the law leading to denial of such a petition. Id. at 765. The court also heard
testimony from counselors who counseled nearly every pregnant minor in the state since
the law went into effect. Id. at 766-67.
209 One obvious question is how long must a statute be in operation before a true
"operational challenge" may be mounted. An "operational challenge" can be made at
any time, but it should be successful only if the plaintiffs have gathered sufficient facts
to meet their burden of proof, see infra notes 229-30, 281-82 and accompanying text,
and to rebut the defense that the sample is too small to permit an inference that the law
cannot operate in a constitutional manner.
20 They are, however, unusual. This is largely because they are tremendously
resource-intensive. They require lengthy and costly discovery, extensive expert witness
participation, and many attorneys, witnesses, documents, weeks at trial, and dollars.
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Kemp.211 In McCleskey, a criminal defendant who had been sentenced
to death under Georgia's capital punishment law challenged the consti-
tutionality of that law under the eighth and fourteenth amendments.212
The law had previously been held to be valid on its face.213 Despite the
fact that McCleskey was an individual litigant who did not represent a
class of similarly situated individuals,214 the thrust of McCleskey's case
consisted of "wide ranging arguments that basically challenge[d] the va-
lidity of capital punishment in our multi-racial society .... 1121* These
arguments were largely based on statistical evidence indicating that the
law actually operated in a manner that discriminated against black cap-
ital defendants, such as McCleskey himself, whose victims were
white.2" 6
The Supreme Court rejected McCleskey's "operational challenge"
to the Georgia statutory scheme in its entirety. In essence, the Court
found statistical evidence to be insufficient to prove either that racial
animus pervades Georgia's facially constitutional sentencing process217
or that it played an impermissible role in McCleskey's sentence.2"' In
so holding, the Court expressed its emerging philosophy of judicial re-
straint 1 9 as well as its concern for a workable system of criminal jus-
211 107 S. Ct. 1756 (1987).
212 Id. at 1763.
213 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206-07 (1976). In Gregg, the Court
"found that the Georgia capital sentencing system could operate in a fair and neutral
manner." McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1769 (citation omitted).
214 See McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1766 n.8.
215 Id. at 1781; id. at 1770 ("McCleskey also argues that. . . the Georgia capital
sentencing system violates the Eighth Amendment." (emphasis added)).
218 McCleskey introduced a statistical study by Professor David C. Baldus (the
"Baldus study") that "purports to show a disparity in the imposition of the death sen-
tence in Georgia based on the race of the murder victim and, to a lesser extent, the race
of the defendant. The Baldus study is actually two sophisticated statistical studies that
examine over 2,000 murder cases that occurred in Georgia during the 1970s." Id. at
1723. The study concluded that "black defendants, such as McCleskey, who kill white
victims have the greatest likelihood of receiving the death penalty." Id. at 1764. (foot-
note omitted).
217 Id. at 1769-70. Having previously found the scheme to be constitutional on its
face, proof of apparent disparities in sentencing was found to be inadequate to invali-
date the law in the context of adequate safeguards and of a criminal justice system that
depends on jury discretion. Id. at 1778 ("we decline to assume that what is unex-
plained is invidious").
"I "Even Professor Baldus does not contend that his statistics prove that race
enters into any capital sentencing decisions or that race was a factor in McCleskey's
particular case. Statistics at most may show only a likelihood that a particular factor
entered into some decisions." Id. at 1775 (footnote omitted). The Court also rejected
statistical evidence as proof of intent for purposes of the equal protection challenge to
the capital sentencing decision. Id. at 1769.
219 Noting that McCleskey's operational challenge might be "best presented to [a]
legislative bod[y]," id. at 1781, the Court indicated that the "ultimate duty of courts"
was to make "case-by-case" determinations, id., at least where facial validity is estab-
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tice.220 But in considering the statistical proof with care, the Court
made clear that facial validity alone will not save a statutory scheme
subject to an operational challenge in which the litigant is able to meet
the threshold burden of proof.22'
A close examination of Hodgson and McCleskey reveals the impor-
tance of a unique sort of factual proof to the constitutional issues
presented. Adjudicative facts regarding any one individual or named
litigant are of only secondary and representative importance. The cen-
tral legislative or constitutional facts, instead of being assumed, are sub-
ject to proof through statistics or testimony regarding the law in opera-
tion.222 Thus, while the Supreme Court assumed that Georgia's death
penalty would be implemented rationally and without discrimination
on grounds of race under the procedural safeguards approved in Gregg
v. Georgia,22 McCleskey attempted to demonstrate that racially dis-
criminatory imposition of capital sentences was not, in fact, prevented
lished and no class action is present. See id. ("the only question before us is whether in
[McCleskey's] case, . . . the law of Georgia was properly applied").
220 Id. at 1779.
221 See infra notes 222-48 and accompanying text. The Court's conclusion that
McCleskey had failed to meet his burden of proof in that case would not, of course,
preclude success in an operational challenge generally. McCleskey faced three difficul-
ties not present in most such cases. First, because he was an individual petitioner in a
federal habeas corpus proceeding rather than a named plaintiff and class representative
in a civil class action, the Court was able to sidestep the full scope of the operational
proof presented and construe the issue before it to be the constitutionality of McCles-
key's individual sentence. See McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1766-67. Second, although sta-
tistics concededly prove only a risk of capital sentencing based on race, see id. at 1775,
McCleskey was necessarily limited in the evidence he could introduce to supplement
the Baldus study. "'[Controlling considerations of public policy,'. . . dictate that ju-
rors 'cannot be called . . . to testify to the motives and influences that led to their
verdict'." Id. at 1768 (citations omitted). Finally, in rejecting "the Baldus study as the
constitutional measure of an unacceptable risk of racial prejudice influencing capital
sentencing decisions," id. at 1775, the Court relied on an eighth amendment principle
that regardless of "imperfections, . . . constitutional guarantees are met when 'the
mode [for determining guilt or punishment] itself has been surrounded with safeguards
to make it as fair as possible'." Id. at 1778 (citation omitted). Thus, it is conceivable
that even if McCleskey had been able to prove that capital sentences are discriminato-
rily imposed in Georgia, the Supreme Court might nevertheless have sustained the law
on the ground that procedural safeguards are presumed to work. This principle ap-
pears to mandate deferential review of legislative facts. See Booth v. Maryland 107 S.
Ct. 2529, 2532 (1987) ("this Court normally will defer to a state legislature's determi-
nation of what factors are relevant to the sentencing decision"). Such deference would
be antithetical to fundamental rights review in the context of an affirmative constitu-
tional challenge.
222 In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), noting that facial challenges
focus on the face of a law, the Court stated that in a challenge to an operating law,
"[w]e are not obliged to reason from the probable to the actual . . . [fior the cases
present the ordinances in actual operation . . . ." Id. at 373.
223 428 U.S. 153, 163-68, 196-207 (1976) discussed in McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at
1772.
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by such safeguards.224 Similarly, while the Supreme Court assumed
that a judicial bypass procedure would alleviate the unconstitutional
burdens of requiring parental involvement in a minor's abortion
choice,225 the facts presented in Hodgson establish that this assumption
is incorrect as a matter of fact.226
The very essence of an operational challenge is the availability and
presentation of factual proof as to the statute's application while in op-
eration. It is upon this sort of evidence that assumed legislative or con-
stitutional facts may at last be conclusively evaluated. The implications
of the availability of such evidence on burdens of proof and on the con-
stitutional result in an operational challenge to a law previously upheld
on its face will be discussed in Sections B and C of Part IV
respectively.
B. Burdens of Proof in an "Operational Challenge"
The ultimate burden of persuasion 22 in a civil case is placed upon
the plaintiff who must generally prove by a preponderance of the evi-
224 See McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1763-64, 1775 (Court conceded that there is
"some risk of racial prejudice influencing a jury's decision in a criminal case"). This
claim was rejected for the reasons discussed supra notes 218-20. See also supra notes
211-21 and accompanying text (discussing the burden of proof imposed in McCleskey).
225 See supra notes 51-55, 66-73 and accompanying text.
228 See supra notes 154-74 and accompanying text.
22 There are three evidentiary burdens: The burden of pleading (alleging the
necessary facts); the burden of production (coming forward with evidence); and the
burden of persuasion (to convince the trier of fact of the truth of the material facts
alleged). See Ashford & Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due Process in
Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE L.J. 165, 171 (1969). The ultimate
burden of persuasion is thought to have "both a location and a weight: the location
specifies the party that loses if the burden is not met, and the weight specifies how
persuasive the evidence must be in order to carry the burden." Underwood, The Thumb
on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 YALE L.J.
1299, 1300 (1977). Intermediate, as opposed to ultimate, burdens of persuasion may be
placed with different parties on different issues. See, e.g., Texas Dep't of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981) (describing the allocation of burdens
of proof in a Title VII case).
The burden of production and the burden of persuasion are frequently placed
upon the same party; when they are, the distinction serves to allocate the roles of judge
and jury as well as to set a threshold quantum of proof. See generally McNaughton,
Burden of Production of Evidence: A Function of a Burden of Persuasion, 68 HARV.
L. REV. 1382, 1386 (1955) ("[Tlhe burden of production involves not just a determina-
tion of the probabilities of a fact by a jury. It involves also an estimate by the judge as
to the limits within which such determinations might fall."); Underwood, supra, at
1300 n.3 (contrasting this situation with the assignment of the burden of production to
the party who does not have the burden of persuasion). These burdens are sometimes
assigned to different parties in order to facilitate an orderly presentation and considera-
tion of proof. See, e.g., Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54, 255 n.8 (allocation of burdens
serves to sharpen the inquiry into factual questions).
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dence228 "that what is alleged is true." '229 When the law imposes a re-
buttable presumption against the defendants, however, the burden of
production shifts to the defendant to produce evidence rebutting the
plaintiff's prima facie showing.230
In an affirmative constitutional challenge to a state statute, a law
that impinges on a fundamental right is considered "presumptively un-
constitutional."2 ' Thus, the state bears the burden of justifying any
regulation that infringes on the exercise of a such a right under the
appropriate standard.232 To meet this burden, the state must come for-
21 In "the typical civil case" the burden of proof is the "preponderance of the
evidence," Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979). This standard contrasts with
the more stringent "beyond a reasonable doubt" and "clear and convincing evidence"
standards. Id. at 423-24. In general, the function of a standard of proof is to "instruct
the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in
the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication." In re Win-
ship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). "The standard serves to allo-
cate the risk of error between the litigants and to indicate the relative importance at-
tached to the ultimate decision." Addington, 441 U.S. at 423.
22 Ashford & Risinger, supra note 227, at 173.
220 See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55 nn.7 & 8; FED. R. EVID. 301.
231 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 312 (1980) (citing Mobile v. Bolden, 446
U.S. 55, 76 (1980)). See generally 2 TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note
2, at 323 (statutes touching upon "fundamental constitutional values" will be subject to
strict scrutiny and upheld only if "necessary to promote an extremely important or
'compelling' end of government").
.2 See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 55 U.S.L.W. 4208,
4209 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1987) (burden on free exercise of religion can "be justified only by
proof by the State of a compelling state interest" (emphasis added)); Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 430 (1983) (discussing Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v.
Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983) ("burden on . . . interests
protected by the First Amendment. . . cannot [be] countenance[d] . . . unless the State
asserts a counterbalancing interest of compelling importance that it cannot [otherwise]
achieve"); Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 701-02 (1977) (applying the
Brandenburg standard to contraceptive advertising); id. at 702 (White, J., concurring)
("[Tlhe State ha[d] not demonstrated that the prohibition. . . measurably contribute[d]
to the . . . purposes which the State advance[d as justification for the restriction.").
The state bears this burden under any standard of judicial review. See, e.g., Heckler v.
Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 744 (1984) (intermediate scrutiny) (citing Mississippi Univ.
for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724-25 (1982) (intermediate scrutiny)); Matthews
v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 509-10 (1976) (minimal scrutiny or "rational relationship
test"). Only when a law has its sole impact on matters of social or economic policy, do
courts apply a modernized "presumption of constitutionality" and defer to the wisdom
of the legislature. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 729
(1984); see Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 76 (1980) (Stewart, J., plurality) (delivering
the opinion of the Court).
Of course in an operational challenge mounted as an affirmative defense or a
habeas challenge by a criminal defendant to a law under which he has been convicted
or sentenced, the burden of proof may be placed on the defendant instead of the state.
See, e.g., McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1775 (discussing fourteenth amendment claim) (cit-
ing Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985)); id. at 1774 (discussing eighth
amendment claim); see infra notes 240-41 and accompanying text.
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ward with evidence demonstrating that the law in question narrowly
serves the permissible interests asserted by the state in the particular
case. 13 Neither bare assertions13' nor "archaic and overbroad general-
izations, '"235 unsupported by evidence, are sufficient to meet the state's
burden of proof.236
The state must come forward with such proof even though plain-
tiffs initial burden is minimal. In first amendment litigation, "it is
131 See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 796-806 (1983) (rejecting
Ohio's proffered justification for its early filing deadline for presidential candidates, as
the statute placed an unconstitutional burden on the voting and associational rights of a
candidate's supporters); Hogan, 458 U.S. at 730-31 & n.16 ("the state has made no
showing that the gender-based classification is substantially and directly related to its
proposed compensatory objective"); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718-19
(1981) ("The state may justify an inroad on religious liberty by showing that it is the
least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest."); Wengler v. Drug-
gists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 151-52 (1980) ("The burden . . . is on those de-
fending the discrimination to make out the claimed justification . . . ."); First Nat'l
Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789-90 (1978) ("If appellee's arguments were sup-
ported by record or legislative findings that corporate advocacy threatened imminently
to undermine democratic processes . . . these arguments would merit our considera-
tion."); Carey, 431 U.S. at 696 ("[Wihen a State . . . burdens the exercise of a funda-
mental right, its attempt to justify that burden as a rational means for the accomplish-
ment of some significant state policy requires more than a bare assertion, based on a
conceded complete absence of supporting evidence, that the burden is connected to such
a policy."); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 150, 200-02 (1976) (refusing to rely on statistics,
introduced by Oklahoma to justify age-sex differentials, in an equal protection
challenge).
234 See, e.g., Wengler, 446 U.S. at 151 ("It may be that there is empirical support
for the proposition that men are more likely to be the principal supporters of their
spouses and families, but the bare assertion of this argument falls far short of justifying
gender-based discrimination on the grounds of administrative convenience." (citation
omitted)); Carey, 431 U.S. at 696 (asserting that a state must provide supporting evi-
dence for its assertion that the burdening of a fundamental right is a rational means to
accomplish a significant state policy). "Neither a bare assertion that the burden[some
regulation] is connected to a significant state policy, nor sentiment or folklore, will
satisfy this burden." Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 772 (citations omitted).
"' Hogan, 458 U.S. at 730 n.16.
236 See generally Shaman, supra note 27, at 246 (government regulations will not
be upheld on speculative or hypothetical fact). Moreover, even where the state in-
troduces such evidence, courts consistently and fastidiously examine the record in evalu-
ating whether the state has met its burden. For example, in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190 (1976), the Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of an Oklahoma statute
prohibiting the sale of 3.2% beer to males under 21 years of age, but prohibiting the
sale of such beer only to females under age 18. On the assumption that the state's
objective was to enhance traffic safety, the Court scrutinized pertinent arrest statistics
for drunk driving, an Oklahoma City random roadside survey, and nationwide FBI
data. It concluded that the evidence failed to establish a gender-based disparity in the
incidence of drunk driving significant enough to justify the claim that the beer sale
restriction would actually lead to better traffic safety. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 199-204;
see also Hogan, 458 U.S. at 729-30 (Court examined statistics in determining whether
the state had failed to demonstrate that women lacked opportunities in the nursing field
and examined deposition testimony regarding the state's claim that the presence of men
had an adverse effect on female students).
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common to place the burden upon the Government to justify impinge-
ments on [protected] interests, [although] it is the obligation of the per-
son desiring to engage in assertedly expressive conduct to demonstrate
that the First Amendment . . . applies."23 In the fourteenth amend-
ment context, the Supreme Court has expressly rejected a requirement
that a plaintiff claiming a violation of her right to privacy must demon-
strate an "undue burden" on the exercise of that fundamental right.2 38
The Court has consistently indicated that any infringement on a funda-
mental right triggers strict scrutiny and, in turn, gives rise to the state's
burden to present evidence justifying the infringement under the appro-
priate standard.239
In an operational challenge, the burden of producing evidence is
more rigorous for both parties than in other types of constitutional liti-
gation. Neither party can rely upon unproven assertions about the costs
and benefits of the challenged legislation. Particularly when facial va-
lidity has been previously adjudicated in a defendant's favor, the plain-
tiff must make a prima facie evidentiary showing that the law has in
fact burdened the exercise of rights without serving the state's pur-
ported interests.24 ° When the plaintiff introduces such prima facie evi-
27 See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 n.5
(1984). The proponent of a first amendment claim can meet this burden so long as her
contention is something more than "plausible". Id. ("To hold otherwise would be to
create a rule that all conduct is presumptively expressive.").
238 Compare Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 453
(1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (suggesting that a state need not justify a law that
does not unduly burden a right with a compelling interest); with id. at 420 n.1 (Powell,
J., for the Court) (rejecting Justice O'Connor's argument as insufficiently protective of
fundamental rights).
239 See Nyberg v. City of Virginia, 667 F.2d 754, 757 (8th Cir. 1982), appeal
dismissed, 462 U.S. 1125 (1983); see, e.g., Thornburgh v. American College of Obste-
tricians & Gynecologists, 106 S. Ct. 2169, 2182 (1986) (striking down an omnibus
abortion statute that, inter alia, raises only the "spectre" of public exposure); Akron,
462 U.S. at 420 n.1 (rejecting the undue burden standard put forth by the dissent); Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) ("[w]here certain 'fundamental rights' are involved,
the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a
'compelling state interest' . . . narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state in-
terests at stake"); Planned Parenthood v. Board of Medical Review, 598 F. Supp. 625,
634, (D.R.I. 1984) (to constitute a legally significant burden on a woman's fundamen-
tal right triggering the compelling state interest test, the regulation "must merely have
tht potential to frustrate or delay a woman's abortion decision").
240 Cf. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-55
(1981) (discussing plaintiff's required prima facie showing in a discrimination action
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (same). What constitutes the plaintiff's ultimate burden in an
operational challenge is a question of some importance. Does plaintiff have to show
both that no actual application has been constitutional and that no application of the
law could be constitutional? The plain answer is no. Operational validity may be estab-
lished in part by proof that nearly every application of the law has been or will be
unconstitutional, but such proof is not necessary. A statute may be unconstitutional in
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dence of operational unconstitutionality, the state must rebut this proof
with evidence that the law has actually achieved its purpose.24 a
Unlike an ordinary "facial" challenge, but similar to many "as
applied" challenges, the state cannot rely on speculative testimony
about what the law might or could accomplish.242 Thus, where a state
operation even when it has been applied permissibly in many cases. It need only be
established that the very existence of the statutory system burdens the exercise of consti-
tutional rights by substantial numbers of others while yielding no demonstrable benefit.
For example, even if an occasional minor successfully navigates the judicial bypass op-
tion without trauma or delay, the facts in Hodgson reveal that the very existence of the
statutory system leads untold numbers of other minors to forgo a constitutionally guar-
anteed reproductive option. As Justice Marshall has noted, "[iut is the presence of the
notice requirement, and not merely its implementation in a particular case, that signi-
fies the intrusion." H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 440 n.27 (1981) (Marshall, J.
dissenting) (citing Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (finding the
availability of a spousal veto of abortion, not its exercise, to be unconstitutional)). A
statute is thus operationally invalid when plaintiffs can demonstrate a "risk that [the]
exercise of personal freedoms may be chilled" although "the moving party's conduct"
may not fall "within the protected core." H.L., 450 U.S. at 427 n.2; see also Thorn-
burgh, 106 S. Ct. at 2178 ("[t]he States are not free, under the guise of [their asserted
interests] ...to intimidate women into continuing pregnancies"); id. at 2182 (state
requirements which "raise the spectre of public exposure and harassment of women
who chose to exercise their personal, intensely private, right . . . to end a pregnancy"
are unconstitutional even in absence of proof of actual exposure or harassment).
24 See generally Metromedia Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 507
(1981). In Metromedia, the Court noted that a restriction on commercial speech may be
upheld only if it "seeks to implement a substantial governmental interest," "directly
advances that interest," and "reaches no further than necessary to accomplish the
given objective." Id. (emphasis added); See Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S.
678, 696 (1977) (rights infringing statute cannot be sustained "based on a conceded
complete absence of supporting evidence" for state's asserted interest); High 01' Times,
Inc. v. Busbee, 456 F. Supp. 1035, 1043 (N.D. Ga. 1978) (first amendment violated
when state "has offered no evidence to demonstrate" that burden on speech "will foster
the goal they envision"), affd, 621 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1980); Shaman, supra note 27,
at 245 (rights-infringing regulation is invalid if it does not "in fact" serve the state's
interest). Even under the less rigorous standards of review employed by the Court, the
state has been required to come forward with evidence substantiating its arguments.
See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985) ("the
record does not reveal any rational basis for believing that [a home for the mentally
retarded] would pose any special threat to the city's interests"); id. at 451-54 (Stevens
J., concurring) (state justification of regulation was unconvincing and unacceptable);
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 224, 228 (1982) (denial of free public education to illegal
alien children must further a substantial goal of the state, and no evidence supported
state's claim that it did so).
2 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1885).
In the present cases we are not obliged to reason from the probable to the
actual . . . .For the cases present the ordinances in actual operation
... .Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appear-
ance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil
eye and an unequal hand, . . . the denial of equal justice is still within
the prohibition of the Constitution.
Id. at 373-74; see, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 730
n.16 (1981) (state failed to prove the necessity of gender-segregated nurses' training);
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 21-22, 29-30 (1966) (court used empirical evidence "candidly
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seeks to restrict door-to-door solicitation, it must demonstrate that any
such regulation does in fact reduce residential crime. 43 To impose a
residence requirement for parents or guardians of children seeking free
public education, the school district must show that the requirement
prevents and helps predict the fluctuation of student enrollment
figures.244 To restrict access to contraceptives for minors, in the view of
Justice White, the state must demonstrate that such a restriction "mea-
surably contributes" to deterring premarital sexual activity.245 Like-
wise, a state may not impose a public school tuition charge on the chil-
dren of undocumented aliens without demonstrating that such a charge
will in fact restrict the flow of illegal immigrants.246 To permit a state
to meet its heavy burden by relying on previously assumed facts when
actual facts are available for judicial review and when the state fails to
establish that its interests are in fact served by the law,2 47 would be
"inconsistent with the principles of heightened scrutiny."24 8
[to] appraisef]" a state's justification for a regulation and to dispel "mere verbiage...
cliche").
24 See New Jersey Citizen Action v. Edison Township, 797 F.2d 1250, 1256-60
(3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1336 (1987).
24 See Horton v. Marshall Pub. Schools, 769 F.2d 1323, 1330-31 (8th Cir.
1985).
245 Carey, 431 U.S. at 702 (White, J., concurring).
248 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 228 (1982) (a tuition charge is a "ludicrously
ineffectual" means of reducing the flow of illegal aliens); id. at 228 n.24 ("[t]he evi-
dence demonstrates that undocumented persons do not immigrate in search for a free
public education" (citing In re Alien Children Educ. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 544, 578
(S.D. Tex. 1980))).
217 In some cases, the state might argue that the legitimacy and importance of its
interest in rights-restrictive legislation, or the extent to which that interest is actually
served, are matters inherently unprovable by testimonial or documentary proofs cogni-
zable under the Federal Rules of Evidence. For example, a state may argue that it
cannot be required to prove as a matter of fact that its amorphous concern with the
public welfare or morality has actually been achieved because such matters are not
amenable to proof.
This argument should not be permitted to relieve the state of its evidentiary bur-
den in an operational challenge. To say that achievement of the state's interest cannot
be proved is to necessitate one of two conclusions: either the statute has failed to pro-
mote the state's interest or the state does not know whether it has done so. It defies
logic to accept the conclusion that a law can have a real and substantial beneficial effect
on society or on individuals that is so elusive as to be inherently unprovable. See, e.g.,
Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 775 ("The court has considered the possibility that the stat-
ute's existence encourages immature, non-best interest minors to tell their parents, and
that this intangible effect is not amenable to proof at trial. The court does not believe
this to be the case."). Strict scrutiny cannot sustain a rights-infringing law when it fails
to serve the state's interest. To uphold a law based on the unknown or unknowable is
to defer to legislative judgment and to presume constitutionality. See infra notes 257-
63.
248 Shaman, supra note 27, at 245; see supra notes 2-39 and accompanying text;
infra notes 257-63 and accompanying text.
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C. The Effect of Facial Precedent on
the Result of an "Operational Challenge"
This Section examines the precedential effect of a prior holding of
facial constitutionality on the result of an operational challenge to a
statute that is pending in a lower court or in the same court. Adjudica-
tive or legislative assumptions of fact made in the course of facial re-
view should not bind subsequent courts presented with a full opera-
tional factual record when heightened scrutiny is required. To the
extent that rules of law are based on assumed legislative fact, a subse-
quent court should be free to modify these rules, at least when failing
to do so would result in ongoing infringement of constitutional rights.
Thus, while the standard of scrutiny employed by the earlier court does
have precedential effect, applying that standard to legislative facts that
have been materially modified by time, circumstances, science, or better
factfinding can and should compel a subsequent court to enunciate a
different constitutional rule. This position is consistent with basic juris-
prudential principles and with the commonplace, though ill-articulated,
manner in which courts have treated the existence or subsequent devel-
opment of operational facts." 9
As to jurisprudential philosophy, it has been asserted that a "prin-
cipal justification for giving the independent review of legislation to the
judiciary lies in the ability of a court to weigh constitutional claims on
the basis of experience which was not available when the legislature
acted."'2 50 To deprive a court of the power to invalidate a law at the
precise time that such an action becomes necessary undermines "the
very essence of judicial duty." 25' Moreover, to sustain a statutory
scheme in the presence of a factual record that conclusively proves that
rights are infringed, that great harm is inflicted, and that no benefit is
gained, transforms the requisite exacting standard of review into one of
minimal scrutiny.2 52
For these reasons, legislative facts previously assumed by the Su-
preme Court253 should not preclude modification of the law by a subse-
"" See infra note 278.
250 Karst, supra note 26, at 76-77 (citing H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FED-
ERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 77-79, 93 (1953)).
2"' Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (discussing judicial
review of legislation that conflicts with the Constitution).
252 See Shaman, supra note 27, at 245-47. Such a low level of scrutiny is un-
known even to judicial review of economic or commercial legislation that has no impact
on fundamental constitutional guarantees.
253 See, e.g., supra notes 74-92 and accompanying text (discussing facts assumed
by the Court regarding minors' maturity levels and family relationships, the abortion
procedure, and the impact of a judicial bypass procedure).
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quent court when operational facts disprove the assumptions made pre-
viously.254 If subsequent courts were bound in this fashion, findings of
legislative fact would be elevated to the status of Blackstonian rules of
law, and the concept of "precedent" as so defined would anchor rules of
law to the facts of the past, precluding judicial cognizance of a changing
empirical world.255 Deference to previously assumed facts thus under-
mines the essential function of a reviewing court in the protection of
fundamental rights, effectively resurrects the "presumption of constitu-
tionality," '256 and threatens to push constitutional jurisprudence back
into the nineteenth century.
Scholars have recognized that meaningful judicial scrutiny of legis-
lation cannot be performed absent an independent25 and searching
consideration of all relevant facts.258 Likewise, it has been noted that
simply because a judicial ruling of facial constitutionality has been ren-
dered, "not all that the court decides is 'law,' or at least generically
different from fact to the extent that it is incapable of being checked
and verified by ordinary observation of external facts or scientific
study" 259 or experience.210 The purported burdens and benefits of legis-
lation, which are integral to applying any rigorous standard of review,
are facts, and once found, they are the foundation of any conclusion of
constitutionality."' "Constitutional facts" are not defined as in their
nature "unprovable," but simply as those "decisive of constitutional
rights."2 2 As facts, these underpinnings of constitutional principle are
254 See infra notes 280-88; see, e.g., New Jersey Citizen Action v. Edison Town-
ship, 797 F.2d 1250, 1257 (3d Cir. 1986) (invalidating, based on factual findings, a
door-to-door solicitation ordinance similar to one upheld by a different panel of the
circuit based on assumed facts), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1336 (1987).
255 This is precisely what defendants in the Hodgson case asked the court to do.
See supra notes 164-74 and accompanying text; supra notes 2-6 and accompanying
text.
258 See Shaman, supra note 27, at 246; cf. Bikl, supra note 19, at 19 ("[Tjhe
legislative finding as to the fact upon which the validity of the legislation depends can-
not be allowed to be binding upon the courts, since this would furnish a simple means
of preventing judicial review of such legislation . . .
2517 See Bikl6, supra note 19, at 19.
258 "[Clonstitutional litigation demands fact analysis of the most particularized
kind . . . ." Karst, supra note 26, at 75, quoted in New Jersey Citizen Action, 797
F.2d at 1259.
259 Isaacs, supra note 12, at 13.
280 See Karst, supra note 26, at 84; supra note 37 and accompanying text.
281 See generally Karst, supra note 26, at 84 (outlining the questions of legislative
fact that are answered by any judge in reviewing legislative action).
282 New Jersey Citizen Action, 797 F.2d at 1259; see supra notes 25-34 and ac-
companying text (discussing legislative or constitutional facts); supra note 247 (discuss-
ing the argument that some factual issues may be inherently unprovable).
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subject to change and, inevitably, to repeated challenge.263
For this reason, courts frequently note that facial validity leaves
open the question of whether the law may be unconstitutional in opera-
tion based on a more fully developed factual record. For example, in
Buckley v. Valeo,264 the Supreme Court was presented with a challenge
to an election campaign financing law on the ground that it discrimi-
28 Thus,
[wihere the existence of a rational basis for legislation whose constitution-
ality is attacked depends upon facts beyond the sphere of judicial notice
• . . the constitutionality of a statute predicated upon the existence of a
particular state of facts may be challenged by showing to the court that
those facts have ceased to exist.
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938); see Batson v. Ken-
tucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1719 (1986) ("[c]ourt[s . . . [are] repeatedly . . . [required to]
review the application of [constitutional] principles to particular facts"); see, e.g., In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17-31 (1967) (noting that the theoretical basis underlying the crimi-
nal justice system's decision to apply different due process norms to juveniles was no
longer accurate); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954) (citing
several studies that documented the psychological effects of segregation, thereby discred-
iting the "separate but equal" doctrine developed in prior cases). See generally infra
notes 295-321 and accompanying text (discussing a critique of this principle from the
civil rights standpoint). In general, the doctrine of stare decisis does not apply to find-
ings of fact by a prior court. See 1B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 0.402[2].
It is of course true that some constitutional conclusions are more heavily predi-
cated on so-called "constitutional fact" than others. Moreover, some of the factual un-
derpinnings of law may be more susceptible to change or at least to proof of change
than others. So, for example, when the Supreme Court decided that minors are not
excluded from the protection afforded adults under the fourteenth amendment guaran-
tee of due process, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (sub-
stantive right to choose abortion); In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 30-31 (procedural fairness
in criminal/delinquency proceedings), it implicitly relied upon a wide range of facts
about the needs and competencies of minors in relation to their parents and to social
institutions generally. Such facts do not tend to change rapidly and, if change occurs at
all, it may be difficult to demonstrate in a courtroom setting. When the Court decided,
however, that mandatory parental notification or consent for an abortion would be per-
missible in certain circumstances, see generally supra notes 56-70 (overview of case
law), the facts relied upon and assumed by the Court, see supra text accompanying
notes 74-92 (discussing Court's assumptions about competence to make treatment deci-
sions, risks of abortion, effect of compelling notification) are somewhat more amenable
to research, change and disproof. See generally supra text accompanying notes 93-142
(Minnesota and Massachusetts experience); supra notes 143-63 (social science,
medicine, professional opinion). Also more amenable to change and challenge are facts
such as those regarding the judicial bypass procedure in Minnesota, e.g., supra text
accompanying notes 129-42, which pertain to the operating effects of a law in a partic-
ular geographical, cultural, and institutional context. Such facts may not be universal
and may necessarily change when these external factors are modified in a material
manner. But see supra note 240 (discussing extent to which the very existence of a
notice requirement and bypass system constitute the constitutional violation). For these
reasons, the nature and importance of factual underpinnings to a facial conclusion of
law will affect the availability and frequency of subsequent operational challenges. For
further discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 287-88.
26- 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
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nated against "minor and new" political parties. 6 ' While upholding
the challenged provisions, the Court specifically held that a finding of
facial validity would not preclude a future finding of invidious discrimi-
nation based on "factual proof that the scheme is discriminatory in its
effect."' 26 6 Likewise, in a challenge of a state law that prescribed pre-
requisites for independent candidates to obtain a position on the ballot,
the Supreme Court found that "[o]n its face, the statute would not ap-
pear to require an impractical undertaking" but remanded for factfind-
ing on whether the law actually imposed "too great a burden." 2867 Fi-
nally, in a challenge to a parental consent for abortion law not unlike
that at issue in"Hodgson, the First Circuit ruled that "a requirement
unduly burdensome in operation will be struck down even if not clearly
invalid on its face."
268
The implication of these cases is that the entire statutory scheme
may yet be invalidated upon a full factual record.28 9 In so holding,
these courts correctly understood and referred to the principle that legal
standards developed under one set of facts can and often should lead to
different legal results when applied to a different set of facts.270 In not-
265 Id. at 97.
266 Id. at 97 n.131.
287 Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 740 (1974).
28 Planned Parenthood League v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006, 1011 (1st Cir. 1981)
(review of preliminary injunction "on a record [as yet] undeveloped as to the actual
operation of the judicial approval procedure"), amended complaint dismissed in part,
No. 80-1166-MA, slip op. (D. Mass. filed July 11, 1986) (dismissing claim that the
judicial bypass provision was unconstitutional "as applied" on abstention grounds), dis-
missed, No. 80-1166-MA, slip op. (D. Mass. filed Nov. 2, 1987); see Wilder v.
Sugarman, 385 F. Supp. 1013, 1029 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (New York laws regulating fos-
ter care placement constitutional on face but question of constitutionality as imple-
mented left open), modified sub nom. Wilder v. Bernstein, 645 F. Supp. 1292, 1354
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (settlement approved subject to certain conditions; to date this case is
pending); see also Alabama State Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 462
(1945) (review of constitutionality of statute not proper "in advance of its application
and construction . . . and without reference to some precise set of facts to which it is to
be applied"); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 396-97 (1926)
(general zoning ordinance provisions upheld without foreclosing future challenges to
the application of specific provisions); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886)
(ordinance invalidated based on its actual operation as indicated by the facts presented
to the Court).
2'9 Whether under some circumstances the appropriate remedy would be some-
thing short of across-the-board invalidation is not addressed by this Article. It is, of
course, conceivable that an appropriate interim remedy could in some cases be a
mandatory injunction to implement the law in a constitutional manner. Such a reme-
dial option would not, of course, be available when it is the very existence of the law
and not its implementation that offends the Constitution. See supra note 240.
270 See supra note 263; see, e.g., McAdory, 325 U.S. at 462 ("A law which is
constitutional as applied in one manner may. . . violate the Constitution when applied
in another."). This is one of the reasons that the Supreme Court consistently takes
pains to emphasize that its decisions are limited to the facts on the record presented.
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ing that subsequent lower courts could come to different conclusions
based on facts not previously known, these courts nowhere contem-
plated that in so doing the lower court would be considered to be over-
ruling precedent271 or that lower court freedom in this regard would be
precluded if no explicit reference to the possibility of modification due
to new facts was made in the prior case.
The only court to have squarely faced these issues is the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals in New Jersey Citizen Action v. Edison
Township,2 72 a case involving a first amendment challenge to several
door-to-door solicitation ordinances.2 7 ' The townships seeking to re-
See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 2266 (1987) (conclusion that law was
facially invalid closely linked to the facts developed on the record); United States v.
National Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 726 n.10 (1985) ("narrow holding" limited
to particular facts).
271 As a general matter, it is of course true that lower courts are bound by legal
precedent set by higher courts. See, e.g., Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K.
Rand, Ltd., 460 U.S. 533, 535 (1983) (per curiam) ("Needless to say, only [the Su-
preme Court] may overrule one of its precedents."); Jaffree v. Board of School
Comm'rs, 459 U.S. 1314, 1316 (Powell, Circuit Justice 1983) ("Unless and until [the
Supreme Court] reconsiders the foregoing decisions, they appear to control this case. In
my view, the District Court was obligated to follow them.").
Even if a modification of a rule of law based on new facts is properly conceptual-
ized as "overruling," there is "some precedent for a lower court engaging in the antici-
patory overruling of a higher court decision where that decision is predicated on an
empirical circumstance that has changed over time." Monahan & Walker, supra note
2, at 516 n.130. In fact, commentators have argued that "lower court[s] should be able
to reach empirical conclusions that differ from those of an appellate court when [they
have] obtained new research not previously before the reviewing court." Id. at 516
(emphasis added); see also P. BREST, supra note 24, at 950 n.22 (lower courts may
overrule precedent that is no longer good law). Of course, the Supreme Court itself has
distinguished or overruled constitutional precedent in cases in which it found that legis-
lative facts previously relied upon were no longer applicable. See, e.g., Kassel v. Con-
solidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670-74 (1981) (concluding that the Iowa
truck-length limitations unconstitutionally burdened interstate commerce based on sta-
tistical evidence generated since a related previous case was decided, Raymond Motor
Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978)); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650-52
(1961) (discussing factual considerations upon which the Court in Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25 (1949), based its decision not to impose the exclusionary rule on the states
as an essential element of the right of privacy); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,
492-95 (1954) (overruling Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), because, inter alia,
public education institutions and society in general had evolved subsequent to Plessy);
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938) (constitutionality of a
statute based on a state of facts may be challenged upon a showing that those facts no
longer exist). The Court has also noted the necessity of heeding "the lessons of experi-
ence," Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407-08 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting), in order to depart from precedent when circumstances have changed. See
United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 86-87 (1978); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,
74-80 (1938). For a general discussion of the criteria for overuling precedent, see P.
BREST, supra note 24, at 1118-20; Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The "Art" of Over-
ruling, 1963 Sup. CT. REV. 211, 219-29.
272 797 F.2d 1250 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1336 (1987).
273 Id. at 1252.
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strict solicitation and the dissenting Third Circuit judge, Judge Weis,
argued that prior decisions of the Third Circuit and of the Supreme
Court had assumed, or, on a limited factual record, had decided, that
such restrictions furthered the state's interest in crime prevention and
that to hold otherwise even on a different record would be to overrule
those precedents. After a lengthy factual hearing, the district court
found that the challenged ordinances did not in fact deter or prevent
crime.27 "4 The Third Circuit held that neither factual assumptions in
prior Supreme Court cases, nor the "meager record" in a prior case
decided by that circuit could "be considered to have foreclosed all future
litigation anywhere else .. .on this issue no matter how compelling
the facts produced by the challengers" of a comparable ordinance.2 5 In
so holding, the court questioned "whether 'assumptions and widely-
held beliefs' have a[ny] role to play" in judicial analysis of a constitu-
tional claim.270
The Third Circuit understood that its approach could lead to in-
consistency and increased litigation. 7 It nevertheless concluded that
when fundamental rights are "patently burdened, the district court not
only is free to but indeed is required to overturn regulations that are
premised on legislative assumptions contradicted by facts in the rec-
ord."121 8 It further noted that "an appellate court must take the record
as it comes" and order the result compelled by the facts judged by the
appropriate standard of review.279
The approach adopted by the Third Circuit in New Jersey Citizen
Action is appealing in its simplicity and yet disconcertingly broad in its
potential application. To permit every lower court to reevaluate prece-
dent based on what it perceives to be "new facts" would threaten civil
liberties as well as the consistency of federal constitutional principle.
There is, however, a more limited and acceptable articulation of the
basis for lower court freedom to grant relief in cases such as New Jersey
Citizen Action and Hodgson. The limiting principles of lower court
freedom to stray from precedent in an operational challenge are out-
lined below.
2174 See id. at 1253.
275 Id. at 1259-60.
278 Id. at 1259.
277 See id. at 1260.
278 Id. at 1257.
279 Id. at 1260.
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D. Proposed Requirements for a Successful
Operational Challenge
New Jersey Citizen Action and Hodgson were both operational
challenges as defined in Section A of Part III. The facts pertinent to
constitutional review were available and proven in evidentiary trials.2"'
In both cases, the district courts found that the statute or ordinance in
question did not in fact serve any of the purposes proffered by the
governmental defendants in support of the regulation.2"' In short, these
courts found that defendants had failed to meet the heightened burden
of production required to sustain an operating law against operational
challenge.2"2 Earlier cases deciding similar issues had assumed facts or
made conclusions to the contrary based on a limited or non-existent
factual record.28 The district courts felt compelled, even after more
complete factfinding, to reject the operational challenges posed.28 4 Both
operational challenges were initially rejected despite the fact that
heightened scrutiny of the factual record was required 8 ' and despite
the fact that the courts previously addressing the question of constitu-
tionality had not sought to preclude reevaluation of the rule of law
espoused in light of changing facts.286
Plaintiffs should prevail in an operational challenge when, as in
Hodgson and New Jersey Citizen Action, the following factors are pre-
sent: 1) the plaintiff has presented comprehensive evidence of the real
effects of the law in operation; 2) the state defendant has failed to meet
280 See New Jersey Citizen Action, 797 F.2d at 1253; Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at
759, 761-70. See generally supra notes 187-226 and accompanying text (discussing the
relevance of factfinding to an operational review).
281 See New Jersey Citizen Action, 797 F.2d at 1256; Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at
775.
282 See supra notes 227-48 and accompanying text.
28 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 490-91 (1983)
(Powell, J., plurality) ("A State's interest in protecting immature minors will sustain a
requirement of a consent substitute, either parental or judicial."); see also Pennsylvania
Alliance for Jobs & Energy v. Council of the Borough of Munhall, 743 F.2d 182, 187
(3d Cir. 1984) (noting the "well known" fact that "unregulated canvassing poses a risk
of crime"); supra text accompanying notes 74-92 (discussing the assumed facts in Bel-
lotti II, 443 U.S. 622 (1979), H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981), Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983), and Ashcroft).
284 See New Jersey Citizen Action, 797 F.2d at 1253; Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at
776-77. Of course, as noted above, the Court in Hodgson found alternative bases for
enjoining Minnesota's law, see Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 773, 778-81, and the district
court in New Jersey Citizen Action was reversed by the Third Circuit, see New Jersey
Citizen Action, 797 F.2d at 1266. Had this not been so, plaintiffs in both cases would
have been subjected to continuing violation of their constitutional rights either pending
higher court review or indefinitely.
281 See New Jersey Citizen Action, 797 F.2d at 1256; Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at
770.
286 See infra notes 295-321 and accompanying text.
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its heightened burden of coming forward with evidence demonstrating
that the law in fact achieves or even furthers any legitimate state inter-
est; 3) there has been no previous operational challenge relying upon a
comparable body of facts287 or, judicial examination of the factual rec-
ord of the effect of the law in operation;288 4) a fundamental right or
other recognized basis for requiring courts to apply strict or elevated
scrutiny to the record and to the state's claimed interests is involved;
and, 5) there is a potential for irreparable violation of that right, even
pending review by a higher court.
As illustrated in Part III, these factors are present in Hodgson,
289
and they were present in many of the cases consolidated in Brown v.
Board of Education.'" The lower courts in all of ihese cases should
have been free to grant the relief compelled by the facts. In Hodgson
and Belton v. Gebhart,291 for example, the trial courts' findings of fact
demonstrated that the true effects of a law in operation may be ob-
scured by or unknowable based on the facial logic and subjective as-
287 Operational facts may also change and thus the result of an operational chal-
lenge is itself subject to relitigation and testing in the courts. The possibility of succes-
sive operational challenges after an initial examination of the facts assumed in facial
precedent is, however, self-limiting. If, for example, plaintiffs were to mount a success-
ful operational challenge to a law, there could be no subsequent challenge (at least in
the same jurisdiction) until the legislature re-enacted a comparable statute similarly
infringing upon fundamental rights. Re-enactment should not lead a court applying
strict scrutiny to assume that facts have changed; the legislature may just be trying
again! In subsequent litigation, plaintiffs should be able to obtain summary judgment
invalidating the newly enacted law unless the state is able to convince the court that the
facts have materially changed in ways not previously considered or known. Similarly, a
previous operational challenge which was unsuccessful could not be relitigated or re-
opened without being subject to summary dismissal unless plaintiff could meet a com-
parable burden of proof. In sum, any subsequent challenge would require a district
court to determine whether assertedly new facts were in fact new and material under
the appropriate standards. Cf Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act § 1 (11 U.L.A.
485 (1968)) (providing a remedy to attack the validity of a criminal conviction if there
exists "evidence of material facts not previously presented and heard that requires vaca-
tion of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice"); supra note 263 (discussing
varying degrees of amenability to change and disproof of different categories of consti-
tutional facts).
288 Thus, a prior facial challenge could not preclude an operational challenge be-
cause the facial challenge would, by definition, have failed to involve judicial scrutiny of
the actual effects of the operation of the statute. See supra notes 189-96 and accompa-
nying text.
289 See supra notes 93-142, 164-85 and accompanying text. These arguments also
require the Supreme Court to reconsider its own assumed facts, such as those made in
Bellotti II, 443 U.S. 622 (1979), H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981), Akron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983), and Planned Parenthood
Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983). See supra notes 74-92; see also supra note 65.
290 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
2'91 32 Del. Ch. 343, 87 A.2d 862 (Del. Ch.), affid, 33 Del. Ch. 144, 91 A.2d 137
(Del. 1952), affd sub. nom. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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sumptions of courts.2 92 Moreover, they illustrate the manifest injustice
of permitting a factually unconstitutional law to remain in operation,
for any length of time, in blind reliance on precedent established with-
out the benefit of experience. As Oliver Wendell Holmes said: "It is
revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was
laid down in the time of Henry IV.
' '293
The factors enumerated above will not occur together often. When
they do, however, even a lower court should be free to provide plaintiffs
with relief from an ongoing violation of constitutional rights. No other
result will protect fundamental rights from infringement, and the risk
of error in this regard is appropriately placed on the defending govern-
mental entity, either pending Supreme Court review, or indefinitely
once review is denied.
29 4
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES AND FOR LITIGANTS
The position advanced in the preceding Section is not without
troubling implications for civil liberties in general and for litigants
seeking to vindicate constitutional rights in the courts. Recognition of
the factual nature of questions such as "does the statute serve the state's
asserted interest?" necessarily increases the burden of proving facts
through discovery and trial on both parties. 25 For a law upheld on its
face to be held unconstitutional in operation requires a comprehensive
presentation of facts gained from experience, expert testimony, and re-
search. An operational challenge is thus substantially more resource-
intensive than other sorts of constitutional litigation; this translates into
money, time, and staff.
The potential for inconsistency and relitigation of apparently es-
tablished constitutional principles js also troubling. The argument that
lower courts may deviate from precedent in certain circumstances ap-
pears at once to permit successive challenges to laws that burden the
exercise of fundamental rights as well as to precedential cases protect-
ing such rights.
292 The facts in Belton are discussed above. See supra notes 43-47 and accompa-
nying text.
293 Holmes, supra note 8, at 469.
29 See infra note 319.
299 See supra note 219; supra notes 240-48 and accompanying text. Moreover,
recognition of the factual component of questions routinely asked by courts applying
heightened scrutiny could place a greater burden on litigants even in a facial challenge
to a statute. For example, in some areas such as "overbreadth," the willingness of
courts to assume facts pertinent to facial review has proven to be advantageous to liti-
gants pressing constitutional claims, making it easier to prevail and easier to obtain
summary judgment or preliminary injunctive relief. See supra notes 192-93.
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It is of course clear that "the fundamental aspiration of judicial
decisionmaking . . . [is the] application of neutral principles 'suffi-
ciently absolute to give them roots throughout the community and con-
tinuity over significant periods of time . . . ."296 The modification of
legal rules based on changing facts jeopardizes ideals of Blackstonian
constancy while subjecting hard won constitutional rights to continual
attack and defense in the courts. For this reason, some commentators
have criticized the Supreme Court for basing constitutional principles
on the shifting sands of empirical knowledge. They have argued, for
example, that the principle of equality espoused in Brown v. Board of
Education2 97 neither was nor should have been grounded on social sci-
ence or empirical study.
2 9 8
Perhaps the most provocative question that can be asked is
whether district courts, under the factors enumerated in Section D of
Part III of this Article, would have been permitted to disregard Brown
based on what they believed to be "new facts" developed in subsequent
litigation. The answer to this question illustrates the limits of the oper-
ational challenge and, in particular, the limits of its potential for suc-
cess in a lower court.
In Brown, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether racial
segregation in public schools deprived minority children of equal educa-
tional opportunity even in the presence of apparent factual equality in
educational facilities. Years of experience with segregation, expert testi-
mony,299 and social science,"' 0 led the Court to conclude:
Segregation of white and colored children in public schools
296 Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 458 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 114 (1976)); see Wechsler, supra note 15, at 19 ("A princi-
pled decision ... is one that rests on reasons with respect to all the issues in the case,
reasons that in their generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate result that
is involved.").
297 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
29' For example, Professor Edmund Cahn believed that Brown was not and
should not be based on sociological data because "the constitutional rights of Ne-
groes-or of other Americans-[should not] rest on any such flimsy foundation as some
of the scientific demonstrations [contained] in ...[the Brown] records." Cahn, supra
note 22, at 157-58. Professor Cahn also expressed a fear of having "fundamental rights
rise, fall, or change along with the latest fashions of psychological literature," id. at
167, and noted the "ominous" possibility that "constitutional safeguard[s] might be se-
riously restricted" if in future equal protection cases, the Supreme Court were" to hold
that Brown was a factual determination as opposed to a conclusion of law. Id. at 168.
But see Ball, Law and Social Scientists-Guiding the Guides, 5 VILL L. REV. 215,
220-21 (1959-60) ("In Brown ... [t]he Court used sociological data as a means of
proving its proposition that 'separate' could never be 'equal.' This, it seems to me, was
most commendable and most desirable.").
29 See generally Belton v. Gebhart, 32 Del. Ch. 343, 87 A.2d 862 (Del. Ch.),
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has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The im-
pact is greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the
policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denot-
ing the inferiority of the negro group. A sense of inferiority
affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with
the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the
educational and mental development of negro children and to
deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a
racial[ly] integrated school system. 0 '
The Court thus held that the "doctrine of 'separate but equal' [had] no
place" in the public education system and that "[sleparate educational
facilities [were] inherently unequal.
30 2
Several years after the Supreme Court's decision in Brown, liti-
gants in Georgia mounted what could be called an operational-style
challenge to the principle of integration mandated by Brown in Stell v.
Savannah-Chatham County Board of Education.03 In that case, the
district court held that Brown could not have created a conclusive pre-
sumption of injury to black schoolchildren due to segregation because
Brown, the court found, set forth only findings of fact, not conclusions
of law, and thus the Brown decision had no binding authority over
subsequent courts.304 After a lengthy evidentiary trial, the court stated
affd, 33 Del. Ch. 144, 160-61, 91 A.2d 137, 146 (Del. 1952) (discussing evidence
produced by plaintiffs' expert witnesses), affd Sub. nom. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349
U.S. 294 (1955); R. KLUGER, supra note 22, at 439-50 (discussing the use of expert
testimony in Brown).
300 See, e.g., Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95 n.11 (listing social science sources in
support of the Court's opinion).
301 Id. at 494.
302 Id. at 495 (emphasis added).
303 220 F. Supp. 667 (S.D. Ga. 1963), rev'd, 333 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1964).
304 The court stated:
The binding effect of any decision is legally a problem of privity of
party or precedent, of prior adjudication or estoppel. Under the principles
of res judicata and stare decisis fall most of the rules which govern these
concepts.
Since intervenors were not parties to nor members of any class repre-
sented by defendants in Brown, it follows that Brown does not bind them
under the doctrine of res judicata.
While res judicata applies to decisions of both law and fact, stare
decisis is applicable only on questions of law and related generally to all
causes subsequently arising in the same or an inferior court. It applies as
well to strangers as to privies. Under this principle therefore this Court is
bound by the decision in Brown v. Board of Education to the extent that it




that the Stell expert testimony had a "somewhat stronger indicia of
truth" on the question of injury due to segregation than the evidence
examined in Brown.30 5 The court then concluded that, on the record
before it, segregation had not been shown to cause harm to black
schoolchildren and, therefore, held that Georgia's segregated school sys-
tem was constitutional.308 Predictably, the district court was reversed on
appeal.30
The question posed is whether the limiting principles enumerated
in Section D of Part III38 were present in Stell, thus permitting the
district court's decision to stand under the analysis set forth in Section
C of Part III. A careful analysis of the circumstances reveals that they
were not. Stell was indeed an operational-style challenge presenting
facts and expert testimony regarding the operational or actual effects of
segregated schools in Georgia.309 However, the precedent from which
The Court holds that the existence or non-existence of injury to white
or black children from integrated or segregated schooling is a matter of
fact for judicial inquiry and was so treated in Brown.
Stell, 220 F. Supp. at 676-78 (citations omitted).
305 Id. at 680.
101 The Court stated:
Plaintiffs' assumption of injury to Negro students by the continuance of
segregated schools is not supported by any evidence in this case. Whatever
psychological injury may be sustained by a Negro child out of his sense of
rejection by white children is increased rather than abated by forced inter-
mixture ....
• . . Each study presented to the Court, confirmed by the opinions of
the witnesses showed that the damaging assumptions of inferiority increase
whenever the child is brought into forced association with white children.
The principal author of the studies relied on by the Supreme Court in the
Brown case came to the conclusion that compulsory intermixture rather
than racial separation in school was the principle source of damaging loss
of race identification.
Id. at 684.
o The court of appeals held as follows:
[N]o inferior federal court may refrain from acting as required by [Brown]
even if such a court should conclude that the Supreme Court erred either
as to its facts or as to the law . ...
W .. e do not read the major premise of the decision of the Su-
preme Court [in Brown] as being limited to the facts of the cases there
presented. We read it as proscribing segregation in the public education
process on the stated ground that separate but equal schools for the races
were inherently unequal. This being our interpretation of the teaching of
that decision, it follows that it would be entirely inappropriate for it to be
rejected or obviated by this court.
Stell v. Savannah - Chatham County Bd. of Educ., 333 F.2d 55 61 (5th Cir. 1964).
"I See supra notes 287-88 and accompanying text.
309 Although operational in its factual record, Stell is distinguishable in one im-
portant respect: the court in Stell found constitutional what the Supreme Court had
found unconstitutional instead of the reverse. As the following discussion will show, the
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the court believed itself free was not a facial challenge. Likewise, the
Stell court was not presented with new or previously unknown facts."'0
The Brown court was reviewing the factual record from five cases com-
bined for review in light of the "full development and . . . present
place [of public education] in American life throughout the Nation.""11
In addition, "[a]s Thurgood Marshall sought to convince the Supreme
Court to sweep aside the conniving legalisms of past decisions uphold-
ing Jim Crow law, he . . .[presented] a half-century evolution in the
social sciences that declared segregation to be both a cause and a result
of the victimization of black America." '12 It can hardly be said, then,
that Brown was based on assumed or speculative facts and that it
should be accorded less precedential importance in the face of a subse-
quent operational challenge.3 13 Moreover, the Supreme Court's conclu-
sion that separate schools were "inherently unequal"3 4 can be read as
more akin to a rule of law31 than a finding of legislative fact, thus
precluding re-evaluation of the Brown result by a lower court based on
findings of operational facts. This is precisely how the Fifth Circuit
read Brown in reversing Stell.1 6 Alternatively, it can be read as a legal
former is a much more difficult result to support.
310 The Stell court was presented with expert testimony in simple disagreement
with the expert testimony presented in Brown. See Stell, 220 F. Supp. 680 ("The
Court ... accepts the evidence given in the present case as having somewhat stronger
indicia of truth than 'that on which the findings of potential injury were made in
Brown."). It was not presented with either new methods of evaluating material facts or
with a changed set of circumstances not presented to the Brown court. Thus, the third
factor from Section D of Part III was not satisfied.
311 347 U.S. at 492-93.
312 R. KLUGER, supra note 22, at 314.
313 It is true that a district court may depart from fact-based precedential decisions
in certain circumstances. However, it should not do so without a finding that facts have
changed or were unavailable to the higher court. Disagreement with the conclusions of
a prior court based on a like factual record does not meet this standard. See supra note
287.
314 Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
31' See Stell, 333 F.2d at 61; supra notes 297-302 and accompanying text. It is
recognized that all "rules of law" are, at some level of generality, informed by fact. See
supra note 263. At a minimum, the constitutional requirement of a "case or contro-
versy," see 1 TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 2, § 2.13, guarantees
that all federal court decisions will be grounded in the facts of specific cases. In addi-
tion, some rules of law are more fact-based than others and some facts are more suscep-
tible to challenge than others. See supra note 263.
316 The court stated:
We do not read the major premise of the decision of the Supreme Court in
the first Brown case as being limited to the facts of the cases there
presented. We read it as proscribing segregation in the public education
process on the stated ground that separate but equal schools for the races
were inherently unequal.
Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Bd. of Educ., 333 F.2d 55, 61 (5th Cir. 1964); see
also Cahn, supra note 22, at 159 (arguing that the holding of Brown was not based on
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directive that certain facts about harm due to segregation or the lack
thereof would henceforth be immaterial to constitutional review of seg-
regated school systems.
3 17
Finally, and in some sense most importantly, the district court's
holding in Stell perpetuated ongoing violations of fundamental guaran-
tees in the period pending appellate review. 1 " The risk of district court
error should be placed upon the governmental entity seeking to defend
its practices and not on the litigants of claims of constitutional right.319
Lower courts should be permitted only the latitude of departing from
precedent on the basis of new facts where necessary to prevent harm of
constitutional magnitude.32 When faced with the prospect of ongoing
violation of fundamental rights, however, it is not only within their eq-
uitable discretion to so rule, it is their duty.32" '
factual data, but on common sense notions "(1) that racial segregation under govern-
ment auspices inevitably inflicts humiliation, and (2) that official humiliation of inno-
cent, law abiding citizens is especially injurious and morally evil").
317 This is essentially how the Hodgson district court attempted to read the Su-
preme Court's decision in Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
See supra note 184.
38' Thus, the fifth factor (potential for irreparable violation of the fundamental
right) from Section D of Part III, supra notes 289-94 and accompanying text, was not
present.
319 Likewise, in the area of criminal law, the due process clause of the Constitu-
tion places the risk of loss on the state rather than the defendant by requiring that an
offense be proven "4eyond a reasonable doubt." See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364
(1970); id. at 371-72 (Harlan, J., concurring). Placing the risk of error on the alleged
offender of constitutional rights ensures that error will never be at the expense of con-
stitutional guarantees.
320 The concept of permitting special latitude where necessary to protect rights but
not where the effect would be a retraction of rights is not new to the law. Cf.
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (a state constitution
may grant more expansive protection of rights than the federal constitution, but not less
protection); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966) (Congress has the
power to expand rights under the fourteenth amendment, but not to "restrict, abrogate,
or dilute" those rights); Note, Religion and Morality Legislation: A Reexamination of
Establishment Clause Analysis, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 301, 332 n.134 (1984) ("[T]he
Court, like Congress, may in certain instances expand the scope of constitutional rights,
but under no circumstances may either reduce those rights below the constitutionally
required minimum."). See generally supra notes 231-48 and accompanying text.
321 B. CARDOZO, supra note 4, at 112-133.
The social interest served by symmetry or certainty must . . . be balanced
against the social interest served by equity and fairness or other elements
of social welfare. These may enjoin upon the judge the duty of drawing
the line at another angle, of staking the path along new courses, of mark-
ing a new point of departure from which others who come after him will
set upon their journey.
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CONCLUSION
Rigid application of precedent to a new or changing reality unnec-
essarily restricts the evolution of constitutional principle. Such a fact-
blind process of adjudication as much as guarantees that constitutional
law will at times be entirely out of step with what is fair, right, or just.
For this reason, the protection of basic civil liberties requires rec-
ognition of the factual component of the standards governing judicial
determinations of constitutionality. The answers to questions such as
whether a statute burdens a fundamental right or serves an asserted
state interest may at first be logically ascertained; upon examination of
an operating law, however, such deductions may be established or dis-
proved as a matter of fact.
Adherence to precedent should never preclude meaningful judicial
review and relief. Speculation by a prior court that a law may in theory
achieve a purported state interest, should for no amount of time be per-
mitted to justify legislation in the presence of operational proof that a
law has failed to accomplish even the most laudable of state goals.
Thus, where laws such as those permitting segregated schools,322 re-
quiring parental notification for abortion, 323 regulating door-to-door so-
licitation,"" or setting up procedural safeguards for the imposition of
capital punishment 25 are shown to fail in their intended goal, a court
must be free to re-evaluate the assumptions and principles of prior
cases and to enter the appropriate constitutional result. Just as the Su-
preme Court has itself recognized that precedent must 'at times be re-
examined, 2 ' so, too, lower courts should be free to fulfill their essential
judicial duty. 2'
322 See supra notes 40-47, 290-93, 300-303, 311-15 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing cases consolidated in Brown).
323 See supra notes 164-85 and accompanying text (discussing Hodgson v. Minne-
sota, 648 F. Supp. 756 (D. Minn. 1986), petition for cert. before judgment in the
Court of Appeals denied, 107 S. Ct. 1333 (1987) (this petition attempted to consolidate
the case with Hartigan v. Zbaraz, 763 F.2d 1532 (7th Cir. 1985), affd by an equally
divided court, 56 U.S.L.W. (U.S. Dec. 14, 1987)), affd, 827 F.2d 1191 (8th Cir. Aug.
27, 1987) (amended for technical corrections Sept. 2, 1987), vacated and reh'g
granted, Nos. 86-5423-MN/86-5431-MN, (8th Cir. Nov. 13, 1987) (rehearing held in
abeyance pending Supreme Court decision in Zbaraz) (Minnesota)).
324 See supra notes 272-86 and accompanying text (discussing New Jersey Citizen
Action v. Edison Township, 797 F.2d 1250 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1336
(1987)).
32" See supra notes 211-26 and accompanying text (discussing McCleskey v.
Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756 (1987)).
326 See supra note 271 (discussing decisions in which the Supreme Court has
overruled itself).
327 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 169-71 (1803). In realist
and post-realist times, the "ageless process of testing and retesting" of legal principle is,
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SPECULATION AND REALITY
Judicial cognizance of a changing world can indeed occur only at
some expense to the uniformity and constancy of law. Lower courts
may sometimes reach different results based on materially different fac-
tual records, and constitutional principles, once litigated, may periodi-
cally be defended or challenged anew. Although limits on lower court
latitude can minimize the problem, 28 the preservation and protection of
the most fundamental of constitutional rights comes at no lesser cost.
"Eternal vigilance is," it is said, "the price of liberty." '29 Lower courts
thus must be free to depart from precedent to declare operationally un-
constitutional laws invalid.
quintessentially, the duty of the courts. See B. CARDOZO, supra note 4, at 129.
128 See supra notes 280-94 and accompanying text.
29 J. BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 397 n.8 (15th ed 1980) (paraphrased
quotation of John Philpot Curran (1750-1817)).
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